

INTRODUCTION: COLLECTIVE HOPE

For social scientists, power and governance are big themes. Our ambition is to persuade that so is hope. Some may expect these issues to be addressed in this volume in a top-down fashion. We have not chosen this path. In a world racked by war, hunger, dislocation, and social upheaval, the contributors in this volume have opted for a bottom-up approach. If we can recognize and understand hope in situ and communicate our insights in intellectually challenging ways, perhaps we may be able to entice others to do likewise; steadily pulling the pieces together from our learnings from culturally diverse settings to fully grasp, and respect, the process by which groups set out to mould different futures for themselves.

In this volume, hope is aligned with reason (see especially John Cartwright, Philip Pettit) and action (see especially Sasha Courville and Nicola Piper), and has social roots that empower individuals and collectivities (see especially John Braithwaite, Valerie Braithwaite, Victoria McGeer, Clifford Shearing and Michael Kempa). Through “parental- and peer-scaffolding” (McGeer this volume) we are taught the process of hope, we learn its social etiquette – how to empower others through the gift of hope and how to empower ourselves through receiving the hope that others offer. Like all social phenomena, hope can go very wrong (see especially Peter Drahos), although as our authors remind us, we do not need to look to the collective for blame on this count. Individual hope is no less certain in the “goodness” of its outcomes than collective hope. But regardless of outcomes, hope we must. It remains the human beacon of engagement with the task of mapping our destinies.

If hope is at the core of our being, the question becomes how do we hope productively, not only as individuals (Gillham 2000; Snyder 2000), but also as collectivities (Krygier 2001)? We refer to a positive form of this process – hope that is genuinely and critically shared by a group – as collective hope (see Peter Drahos for a delineation of private, collective and public hope). Less sustainable we argue, is public hope, at its worst a contagious but superficial form of hope peddled by spin-doctors and uncritically accepted by expectant beneficiaries. One of the goals of this volume is to identify the conditions under which collective hope thrives and public hope is exposed, although we do not for a moment turn a blind eye to the overlap between these ways of hoping, and to the synergies for social change that are created when they co-exist (see especially Valerie Braithwaite, John Cartwright, Clifford Shearing and Michael Kempa). Such is the complexity of understanding the process of hoping well at the collective level. Only when we have satisfactorily accomplished this goal will we be in a position to offer a positive theory of hope, power and governance. The papers that follow mark the beginning of our journey.

DEFINING INSTITUTIONS OF HOPE

Institutions are conceived as the cultural regulators of life's journey. They are defined broadly as the interconnected rules, norms and practices that order social encounters and signpost the way toward valued goals. Institutions of hope refer to sets of rules, norms and practices that ensure that there is some room for us not only to dream of the extraordinary, but also to do the extraordinary. Institutions of hope move us

collectively away from a social script that makes engagement in shaping our futures seem futile, toward one in which we are expected to be active and responsible participants contributing to a vibrant civil society. Institutions of hope are part of the family of enabling institutions that offset, loosen or challenge the constraints imposed by regulatory institutions.

Institutions of hope, while richly explored in literature, art and cultural studies (see John Cartwright this volume; see also Zournazi 2002), have received relatively little attention in the social sciences, particularly the more empirically driven social sciences (for an exception see Mack 1999). Over the past decade, however, there has been an upsurge of interest within the discipline of psychology. Psychologists have advanced the case for a cognitive-affective process of successful adaptation that is defined by hope (Snyder 2000). Through learning the skills of setting goals and plucking up courage to actively and responsively try different pathways that might lead to the achievement of these goals, individuals can improve their problem solving capacity as well as their mental outlook. This literature coheres around the theme of positive psychology – the study of how individuals can be the best they can possibly be – as opposed to a clinical preoccupation with why people fail to realize their potential. Positive psychology might be seen as the beginnings of an emerging institution of hope in itself, one that takes academic scholarship into the marketplace and the helping professions.

Institutions, however, rarely deliver what they promise standing alone (Braithwaite 1993; 1998a; Heimer 1998). Institutions are about social behaviour and social behaviour cannot be compartmentalized. Plans of action developed with a counsellor must confront the harsh realities created by other powerful institutions, some close to home such as the

family and the workplace, others more distant such as legal and political systems. If individual hope is to be promoted within our enabling institutions (as practiced by schools, medical services, social welfare agencies), it must be accommodated in the design of our constraining institutions, most notably political and legal institutions at the community, regional and international levels. This volume is directed toward understanding how this goal might be institutionally accomplished.

INSTITUTIONS OF HOPE

The volume is divided into two parts. Part I, comprising papers by Peter Drahos, Sasha Courville and Nicola Piper, Clifford Shearing and Michael Kempa, and John Braithwaite, presents a set of case studies demonstrating institutions of hope at work, sometimes for good, sometimes not, from wealthy to poorer countries. These contributors identify the strengths and pitfalls of the institutions they have studied, setting out criteria for what constitutes a socially constructive institution of hope. In all cases, the institutions of hope that are analysed coexist – in some cases compete – with entrenched, resource-rich institutions that are able to undermine or hijack the hopes of the less powerful.

In the opening paper to the volume, Peter Drahos provides insight into how hope is not only de-railed within the competitive structure of some of our institutions, but is rendered dysfunctional for those who have judged poorly, mistakenly assessing the pathways for turning their hopes into reality. Drahos addresses the impact of intellectual property agreements on the less developing world and hopes for free trade. The problem

he identifies is the struggle to provide anti-retroviral medicines to poor people suffering from AIDS in developing countries. Drahos steps up to the platform to expose the achilles heel of hope. Hope can be spooned out to mass publics by those who command our institutions – as a sedative to injustice and abuse and as a means of delaying, even circumventing calls for social change.

While recognizing the abuses of hope by the politically powerful, Drahos does not argue for withdrawal from hope – quite the opposite. He proposes a four point plan for strengthening institutions of hope through ensuring that hope becomes the object of critical scrutiny, comparative analysis, rigorous research, and earnest development that is owned as a possible future by protagonists and sceptics alike, and that is shared openly with members of the society. For a society to hope well it must do the hard yards of forging collective hope out of individual hope, and not take the easy road of skating on public hope.

The second paper, by Sasha Courville and Nicola Piper, examines the role that hope plays in NGO activism. Focusing their analysis on the fair trade movement and foreign migrant worker rights, Courville and Piper document the ways private hopes can be shared within collectivities and become a force for social change. Starting from a general and commonly shared conception of hope, Courville and Piper are strong in articulating its limitations. But like Drahos, they then proceed to analyze the add-ons that make hope functional in delivering better outcomes for a community. Their argument centers on the notion that hope must have an object. Through introducing us to the operations of NGOs at the grassroots, Courville and Piper demonstrate how hope acquires its object – through shared feelings of injustice, through ideas for change and

through a sense of empowerment as the feelings and ideas are shared within a community. But most important is action. Once action is seen as being the companion of hope, social movements gain momentum. Courville and Piper have provided a richly textured account of the bootstrapping that takes place between hope, empowerment, ideas for change, and action. Hope is the most enduring of these, lying in wait through cycles of adversity and resistance to change. In concluding, Courville and Piper lend substance to their opening supposition: Collective hopes are many – and power cannot be divorced from the question of whose hopes will dominate and be realized.

The seeds of doubt that Courville and Piper sow in relation to whose hopes dominate at the collective level are explicitly tackled by Clifford Shearing and Michael Kempa in their paper on the hopes embodied in the South African museum built on Robben Island. Shearing and Kempa's case study directly confronts the issue of whether we are observing, through the accounts of the authors, the power of hope – or the hopes of those who now hold power. Shearing and Kempa push the envelope further by asking the hard and provocative question: does the museum peddle public hope or is it part of a set of enabling institutions that are nurturing collective hope for a new South Africa? Drawing on the work of social theorists such as Foucault and Bourdieu, Shearing and Kempa begin their analysis from the position that all hope is socially constructed and that any analysis of authentic hope has to be made against this background. They proceed to argue, through drawing on case material from Robben Island, that it still makes sense to talk about authentic hope, because the issue is not how it is constructed, but how it is contested. Just as individuals and institutions have to prove their trustworthiness (Braithwaite, 1998b), those who offer hope must prove the authenticity of that hope.

Shearing and Kempa offer three avenues for establishing authenticity. The first critically examines the hope that is on offer in its cultural context and asks, does this hope have integrity for these people, does it espouse the ways of being, the sensibilities that have historically been valued in this population? Shearing and Kempa connect the design and operation of the Robben Island Museum to the South African sensibility of *ubuntu*. In this way, the museum constitutes a technology of governance that symbolizes and reinforces a deeply and widely held sensibility that speaks to the dignity of a new South Africa. The second avenue for establishing authentic hope proposed and illustrated by Shearing and Kempa picks up on two of Drahos' conditions for collective hope – providing opportunity for the bearers of truth to come forward and allowing those who inspire private hope to lead the new hope among South Africans. Shearing and Kempa use interview material to show the priority that the designers of the Robben Island Museum have placed on living history, through opening their doors the moment that Robben Island was declared a museum and employing those who lived and learned to hope with Mandela as museum guides. The openness of the museum experience, where guides tell their story without the careful scripting of museum curators and archivists can no doubt be confronting. But this brings Shearing and Kempa to their third avenue for authenticating hope. The museum exposes visitors to sensibilities of a particular kind, but visitors do not have to take them on board. They can contest them and respond to alternatives. Authenticated hope is chosen, not imposed.

Hope that we choose to embrace is empowering, an idea introduced into this volume by Courville and Piper and Shearing and Kempa, and developed by John Braithwaite in his paper on the recursive process of hope fuelling emancipation and

emancipation fuelling hope. On this view, to engage with only half the cycle is to deny ourselves and others full potential. Braithwaite draws on the work of psychologists such as Seligman (2000; 2002) and Snyder et al. (1991) to assert that hope solves problems at the individual and collective levels; but then goes on to argue that it is the emancipation-hope strategy rather than the hope strategy that is critically important to cultivate. Hope without emancipation (for example, without the means to support oneself) is likely to give rise to frustration and despair. But then, structural reforms that bring emancipation, as important as they are, lead nowhere without a politics of hope.

In accord with Drahos, Braithwaite develops the theme of “cold analysis” as an ally of hope, arguing for a multi-dimensional conception of human agency whereby we move between optimistic and pessimistic frames as we negotiate our futures. What is accomplished with ease at the individual level, however, is not facilitated at the institutional level. Missing in the modern world is the social infrastructure that nurtures optimism and gives the less privileged the confidence to act on their freedom and planfully pursue their hopes. Starting with an analysis of Emancipation Conferences for young people moving out of foster care in California, and drawing on a theoretical model of youth development circles in the restorative justice tradition, Braithwaite demonstrates how, in practice, we can institutionalize the hope and emancipation loop. The key element is the cultivation and celebration of strengths – of individuals in this case, but by extension, of collectivities.

While institutional acknowledgment of strengths breaks the chains, it is the care eliciting actions of young people themselves at these conferences that gives the emancipation-hope cycle momentum. The institutional setting empowers young people

to invite those whom they would like to join them – those who have the life skills they need, the resources they can draw on, and the cold analysis they can trust; as well as offer the kind of support that shares disappointments as communal failures and pursues hopeful action through deliberation and commitment to turning things around. The experience of the emancipation-hope cycle is hypothesized as a key to revitalizing citizenship and democratic participation – a hypothesis that in the best hope tradition, requires cold analysis through democratic experimentalism (Dorf and Sabel 1998).

These four papers on building institutions of hope address not only their practicability and desirability, but demonstrate, most importantly, that they are currently in existence. As John Braithwaite points out in his paper, we are social scientists observing the inventiveness and ingenuity of others, certainly not inventors ourselves. Through the process of observation and analysis, however, we can contribute in a number of ways.

First, we can pull together principles that appear to underlie institutional successes and failures. In all papers we see hope being supported by other principles of institutional design. Hope is not imposed, it is shared and individuals should be assured that they can walk away from it if they choose. Hope as emotional sharing needs to be tempered by ideas, deliberation, experimentation and cold analysis. As a design principle, individuals should not be offered the emotional experience without the reasoned analysis. The process should be open and transparent, otherwise the risks of manipulation and deception are magnified. But probably the two most important allies of hope realization are empowerment and action. Individuals must not only be given the

scope to hope and plan thoughtfully, but they must be allowed to act, and feel empowered to act.

From this summary of the empirically derived principles for designing institutions of hope emerges an important corollary. None of the authors suppose that hopes and actions, no matter how carefully conceived and implemented, always lead to positive outcomes for collectivities. A further design principle, therefore, must be to re-align hopes, and preserve empowerment and action when things go wrong (as in John Braithwaite's hope emancipation loop). Embedded within this design principle are a number of propositions worthy of further analysis. One such proposal, that is most evident in Clifford Shearing and Michael Kempa's paper on the new South Africa, is learning to design institutions that will facilitate our capacity to collectively re-direct our hopes without becoming immobilized in a culture of blame and recrimination. As Victoria McGeer points out later in the volume, this is an essential step in being able to nurture the human spirit in times of disappointment and despair. Fear, like hope, is a contagious emotion which quickly robs collectivities of their productivity and momentum.

Through the papers in Part I we have been able to see institutions of hope in operation and extract principles for how such institutions can function productively. The primary case that has been made for their importance is that they are carriers of social change for a better world. But institutions of hope may function in other ways as well, for instance, as spaces for the expression of human need. It is this issue of institutionalizing hope to address the psychological needs of individuals that occupies the authors in the remaining half of this volume.

Victoria McGeer opens Part II with a developmental analysis of why and how we learn to hope. McGeer asks what does it mean for an individual to hope well? Her analysis provides a theoretical account of hoping that underpins the institutional arguments in Part I. McGeer starts from the position that from birth we all face our agential limitations: we desire things that are beyond our reach. But she goes on to point out that human development is about engaging with these limitations, testing the boundaries, achieving previously unattainable goals, and finding ways of compensating when we fail. McGeer explains the process whereby we get to know our capacities, both current and potential, through the concept of scaffolding. It is at this point that McGeer breaks with an individualistic account of hope and argues that hoping well is essentially a social phenomenon. Initially, scaffolding is provided by parents as they reinforce and regulate an infant's first attempts at skill acquisition and provide emotional comfort when frustration and disappointment are encountered. While maturity brings a capacity to self-scaffold, individuals retain the capacity to draw on the strengths and hopes of others to rekindle their own sense of agency and re-align their hopes when things become difficult. In this way, peer-scaffolding replaces parental-scaffolding as a mechanism that assists us to hope well throughout our lives.

McGeer's account of peer-scaffolding sits comfortably alongside John Braithwaite's account of youth development circles and emancipation conferences. McGeer, however, rejects the idea that we are entirely dependent on institutions to hope well. Using George Eliot's novel, *Middlemarch*, as an observational field of human hoping, she provides examples of two ways in which we can hope badly. First, she describes wishful hoping whereby we retreat from accepting responsibility for planning

our future, and indulge in the fantasy or expectation that others will provide for us. The second way in which we hope badly is described as willful hoping. Here our relationships with others subsume secondary importance as achievement becomes all important to our sense of self and meaning in life.

The alternative that McGeer proposes for hoping well is responsive hope. While the individual must assume responsibility for articulating their own hopes, the process of hoping well involves interacting with the hopes of others. McGeer argues that through investing in the hopes of others, in helping make these hopes meaningful and realistic, a sense of agency and trust in one's own capacities grows. At this point, McGeer floats the prospect of building "communities of mutually responsive hope". As she points out, if hopes are shared and we can jointly reflect on their meaning and value, surely it is but a small step toward developing collective hopes and shared ways of being.

From McGeer's perspective, to hope in a world that is not responsive is a tall order. Valerie Braithwaite explores this theme through examining the way in which individuals engage with a tax authority as a key institution for delivering desired outcomes for the democracy. In this paper, a model of the collective hope process is developed, based on Snyder's (2000) work on individual hope. The central hypothesis is that individuals will engage in collective action when hopes remain high that the object of that action (in this paper, a tax authority) can serve the public good. Hope is defined as being high when three conditions are satisfied: (a) individuals feel part of the democratic process; (b) individuals believe it is important to make reforms to improve the tax system; and (c) individuals trust the tax authority to act in the collective's best interest. Under these circumstances, individuals will be prepared to cooperate with tax

authorities. When hope is low, however, individuals are likely to turn their backs on the collective.

Using survey data from 2040 Australians, cooperation was shown to be related to aspirations for better tax administration and perceptions of tax authority trustworthiness. Those who turned their back on the system and dissociated from the collective signed on to a tax reform package that limited government options for using the tax system to redistribute income. In addition, they expressed lack of trust in the tax authority not only as it currently stood, but also as it might be. In other words, they were of the view that there was nothing the authority could ever do to prove itself trustworthy in their eyes. At one level, these data convey a positive message about the ways in which a democracy carries a variety of different voices and different hopes for the future of the society. At another level, the data hold a warning for the conditions under which different goals cannot be reconciled or tolerated. The absence of trust and the loss of hope for future trust is a divisive social force that threatens a society's capacity to move toward a more productive future together.

The final two papers of the volume provide contrasting perspectives on how and why hope is such a fundamental component of being human. In both cases, hope is conceptualized as an expression of our rationality.

From the perspective of analytical philosophy, Philip Pettit argues that hope – in a substantial, not superficial sense – should be understood as “cognitive resolve.” Substantial hope represents a disciplined mental game in which one constructs a scenario of “what if...?” that can be set in competition against evidenced-based beliefs absorbed through interaction with the environment. Pettit sets the scene for his analysis of hope

through drawing on the precautionary assumption: We hold beliefs about what in all likelihood will occur, and simultaneously, we entertain a worse-case scenario and plan accordingly. This approach, a common feature of modern risk management, protects us from danger. Pettit argues that hope assumes a parallel form to precaution, except the outcome is something that we desire, not something that we fear.

The case for running with a hope-based action plan rather than strictly going on the evidence available at a particular time is considered rational from the perspective of individual well-being and social well-being. Given that humans are attuned to being emotionally responsive to their environments, having to reassess an action plan with every bit of evidence that comes to one's attention can be exhausting and emotionally destabilizing. Both conditions can induce a state of inaction, a sense of having little control, and ultimately a loss of personal agency. Pettit argues that through adopting a hope-based action plan, individuals can protect themselves from this emotional roller-coaster and preserve their sense of agency for when it may be needed. An important aspect of his analysis is that at no stage does he visualize substantial hope as self-deception. To do so would deny hope the rational mental rigour that it entails.

Extending the argument for the rationality of hope at the individual level to the collective level, Pettit puts forward the observation that interpersonally we presume of each other that we are conversable subjects, capable of reason. This presumption is not dented in any serious way by evidence – we could not function effectively in social contexts if we made our interactions contingent on evidence to this effect. Furthermore, when we act collectively to achieve certain outcomes, we enter the arena with cognitive resolve that we will all collaborate and that we will be successful in our undertaking.

Again, we do so, not on the basis of hard evidence, but because we know that this is the only base from which we can launch collective action. Pettit notes that it is when the hope game is abandoned that collective groups unravel. Hope of the substantive kind is, in Pettit's words, "ubiquitous in human life".

The analytical perspective is supplemented in the final paper of this volume by a literary perspective. John Cartwright takes us on a journey through space and time from the Middle Ages to present day South Africa, and in so doing sums up the way in which we have come to conceptualize the hope of individuals and collectivities. Through diverse stories, we understand that individuals always have had, and always will have images of how their futures might be different and better (hope), they practice their futures almost always imperfectly, but are nevertheless capable of constructing a better world for themselves and others when they are enmeshed in social institutions of hope. Such institutions, to be effective, encapsulate the kind of hope analyzed in this volume – hope that is empowering, that is action oriented, that is subject to cold analysis, that is authentic – but all these qualities acquire their strength and integrity through hope being linked with its traditional sisters, love, faith and respect for others, and its companions, reason, imagination and perseverance.

The juxtaposition of these two sets of papers – those concerned with institutions of hope in Part I and those with individuals undertaking a journey of hope in Part II – is purposeful in setting up a future research agenda on the institutionalization of collective hope. A myriad of collective hopes, be they consonant or discordant, is held to be a desirable feature of a pluralist democratic society. But designing institutions that allow collective hopes to be aired and practiced is fraught with large challenges. Finding the

institutional structures that respect competing collective voices and allow for the realization of the most promising hopes involves a research agenda in which theory and practice can dynamically accommodate each other. Detailed observation of practice and experimentation with different models are necessary adjuncts to the construction of institutions of hope; for wherever they are built, they will need to bridge the gap between the psychological needs of individuals and the regulatory constraints imposed by dominant social institutions.

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TRADING IN PUBLIC HOPE

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ABSTRACT: The paper distinguishes three categories of hope: private, collective and public. Public hope is hope that is invoked by political actors in relation to a societal goal of some kind. The paper argues that public hope is the most dangerous kind of hope. The argument is developed using the recent history of trade negotiations between the US and developing countries concerning intellectual property rights, as they relate to life-saving medicines for AIDS. Public hope may allow political actors to harness emotionally collectivities to economic and social agendas that are poorly understood by those collectivities and that are ultimately destructive of the social institutions upon which actual private and collective hopes depend. Or public hope may be secret hope that drives policies that escape public notice till it is too late. The final section of the paper identifies four principles that help to make public hope a contingent force for the good.

Keywords: intellectual property, collective hope, public hope, TRIPs, medicines, trade negotiations.

MERCHANTS OF HOPE

Monsanto sells herbicide-tolerant and insect-protected crops and agricultural herbicides. It also offers hope as part of its package of systems. 'Food, Health, Hope' is one of its key slogans. There are, as World Bank statistics make clear, a lot of sick, poor and starving people in the world (World Bank 2002). Monsanto's basic message, which is to be found on its many websites and publications, is that biotechnology product lines are the best bet when it comes to meeting the needs and hopes of the world's poor.

Monsanto is in a sense a merchant of hope. In fact, most multinationals operating in high technology sectors invoke hope as part of the solutions package they offer their customers and the broader world. The words of a senior executive of the world's largest pharmaceutical company, Pfizer ask us to "[i]magine a childhood free of ear infections, fending off AIDS with a nose spray, reining in cancer with an injection, or developing vaccines for everything from diabetes to asthma."¹

There are three things to note about the corporate merchandising of hope. First, hope, which on the face of it might seem to be an individual and unilateral act, enters the bilateral context of the market. Companies that span the globe and command much of the world's technological resources offer hope at the same time as they offer solutions. The levels of poverty, sickness and starvation in the world mean that there is a strong demand for hope in the world. Moreover, if we take on board the sociological insight that deprivation is relative to one's peer group, it follows that the demand for hope even in rich capitalist societies is massive. Hair, fitness and weight-loss clinics are all in the hope

business and so are, as Valerie Braithwaite's paper in this volume suggests, tax consultants. Second, hope is a psychological event or process that is distinct from the services and products to which it may be linked. Companies charge for their services and products. They do not charge for hope. Instead hope functions as something of a loss leader. Even if the supply of hope is free, the many services and products that promise to fulfill it are not. Companies expend resources in creating hope in others because hope is a powerful psychological hook. Hope is constituted of imagining and believing in the possibility that some state of affairs in the future will come to pass. Once an individual is in the grip of hope, it becomes rational for an individual to reason in the following instrumental way: "Since I hope for X, I should do Y," where doing Y may consist of purchasing the company's products or services and perhaps staying loyal to the company. Hope, perhaps more than other emotions, is closer to the border that separates the passions from reason. Those who write about marketing point out that understanding the emotions of consumers is fundamental to the sale of products (Massey 2002; O'Shaughnessy and O'Shaughnessy 2002). Companies know that by creating links between their products and individual hopes they potentially gain the benefit of a powerful driver of human behavior.

The third and last thing to note about hope in its commercial context is that corporate messages about hope are aimed at multiple audiences. Multinationals like Monsanto and Pfizer operate in complex global and national regulatory environments. Messages of corporate hope are also aimed at regulators, policy makers and politicians. A new drug or a genetically modified good cannot simply be dumped on the market, but

typically has to go through a process of regulatory approval. A regulator who has to decide whether to approve or not the release of, for example, a genetically modified corn knows that one spin that Monsanto might put on the decision not to approve release is that the agency in question now blocks the path to hope. Policy makers and politicians are also in the market for hope. Politicians like to invoke hope because of its motivational and emotional effects. Bill Clinton's "I believe in a place called hope" is a classic of the genre because when uttered by a charismatic figure it beckons its listeners to follow a leader who by implication can lead them to this place. In political contexts of popularity and re-election the rhetoric of hope has to appear credible, has to be made true by being linked to policies and programs. The language of hope takes on a signaling function in politics. When political leaders identify a global challenge such as the eradication of poverty or hunger and promise hope they also signal that they are in the market for ideas and programs that will go some way to fulfilling that hope. The suppliers of models of hope signal back with their own messages of hope. In the case of hunger Monsanto's message of 'Food, Health, Hope' is attached to a commercial and regulatory agenda based on biotechnology, genetically engineered foods, globally protected intellectual property rights, and agricultural markets that do not discriminate between genetically engineered and non-genetically engineered products. Hope when offered by corporate merchandisers always comes as part of a carefully thought out package backed by technical analysis. Analyzing hope in this political context reveals how the fulfillment of individual hope is crucially dependent upon wider circles of action by others (something that John Cartwright's paper in this volume also draws to our attention).

To sum up, the private hopes of individuals living in a society have complicated public dimensions. Commercial actors understand that if they can link their products to the private hopes of individuals they will sell more of those products and gain customer loyalty. They strive, therefore, to find ways to link consumption to the private hopes of their customers. Politicians know that if they can find ways to turn these private hopes into big public hopes for their political programs and policies, electoral rewards will, for a time at least, come their way. When politicians signal that they are in the market for models of hope, corporate planners using the language of hope offer to supply those models. Politicians and other political actors are traders in hope. They see hope as part of an exchange relationship in which it is traded for votes, favors, privileges, or money.

The focus of this paper is on public hope in the context of the political institutions of a society. Public hope is different from both private hope and collective hope. Private hope simply refers to the hopes that an individual holds. Some hopes that an individual holds may be held in common with others and under certain conditions these common hopes can be said to be the collective hopes of a society. Daniel Bar-Tal (2001) identifies seven conditions of collective hope including, the necessity that emotion be widely experienced in a society, that the beliefs that trigger the emotion be widely shared, that the cultural products of the society express the emotion and the beliefs to which it is connected and that the emotion and beliefs are part of collective memory. Public hope is hope that is articulated or held by actors acting politically in relation to societal goals. Public hope need not be collective hope and in fact only a few may be aware that it is operating. Officials may make policy decisions based on hope without the public ever

being aware of it. Hope can still be public hope if only a few individuals acting in their official capacity as members of a society's political institutions express, invoke, or act on the basis of hope in relation to a societal goal. Trades involving public hope can take place without the public being aware of it. A hope can be simultaneously private, public and collective. Individuals in a society may hope for peace. This may also be a collective hope and a public hope that helps to bring about a peace negotiation. Collective hope, however, may not be public hope if it does not have political representation. Our purpose behind distinguishing these three types of hope is to try and isolate the way in which hope functions in political contexts. The argument of the paper is that public hope functions in ways that are different and far more dangerous to a society than does private hope for an individual. Public hope may turn out to be destructive of social institutions thereby disappointing both individual and collective hopes. The dangers of public hope need to be checked by "cold analysis" (Braithwaite, 2002, ix). The final section of the paper identifies four principles that, if used, make it more probable that public hope will be checked by cold analysis. The argument is developed using the recent history of trade negotiations between the US and developing countries concerning intellectual property rights, as they relate to life-saving medicines for AIDS.

The remainder of the paper is divided into three parts. In order to sharpen the contrast between public and private hope a brief account of private hope is developed in the next section. This account presents hope as an energizing and sustaining force, something which is valuable to individuals in dealing with the future. The following section presents the history of the negotiations showing the role that public hope played

in those negotiations. Public hope worked out, as we shall see, rather badly for developing countries. In the final section, the paper outlines the dangers of public hope and suggests some principles for checking public hope in order to prevent it from becoming a disabling or destructive force in a society.

PRIVATE HOPE

Hope is generally said to be one of the emotions (Elster 1989). Individuals through introspection can report on whether they feel hope and its intensity. Psychologists have devised the Hope Index that they use to measure changes in individual hope. So, for example, data measuring hope, which was gathered from students at a mid-western university and their parents during the weekend of the invasion of Iraq in 1991 showed that hopes for peace rose compared to data gathered in 1988 (Staats and Partlo 1993). Increased hopes for economic productivity were also reported during the recession in 1992 in the US. Outside threats affected the needs for peace and security, thereby triggering increased levels of hope.

Why it is that increased levels of hope as opposed to wishing were triggered is less clear, but it does suggest that hope is the more important psychological mechanism in times of serious threat or adversity. Wishing is the simpler mechanism, involving a desire for X to happen. Hoping involves an additional mental act, namely that of an expectation or anticipation that X will happen. It is this additional mental act, in some ways not quite understood, that makes hoping, at least in many cases, a more important

psychological resource for individuals than simply wishing. Hoping is a forward-looking emotion in a way that wishing is not. One can wish that World War II never happened but not hope for that, since it is an event that has already occurred. It is this mental act of creating a sense of expectation or anticipation about the future that seems to make hope an important psychological resource for dealing with a future made uncertain by a threat of some kind. The expectation that the individual forms is something that is presently accessible on a day-to-day basis. In many cases it becomes the subject of daily processes of introspection. Individuals can possess and access the expectation, even if the event to which the expectation relates is highly uncertain. This may in fact be the only certainty in times when the threat is very great. Alternatively, the certainty that hope generates may help to combat what seems, at least inductively, a certain and depressing fate. A number of years ago when I was a member of a law faculty we were visited by a group of judges from Czechoslovakia. After the official talk and over lunch conversation turned to the period of the Russian occupation. It turned out that one of the members of the delegation, the Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court had, like many other critics of the Soviet-controlled regime, been imprisoned for a number of years. He had been sent to work in an uranium mine. The authorities did not give the prisoners working in these mines protective clothing and so many died. Surely I asked you must have given up hope. “No”, replied the judge, “we never gave up hope. We always knew we would win.”

On inductive grounds the rationality of the judge’s hope seems irrational. Yet at least some of the prisoners in these mines felt themselves to be in possession of an

emotionally known truth that ultimately enabled them to see off the Soviet tanks that had so crushingly ground their way through the streets of Prague in earlier years.

Václav Havel (1990), who spent time in prison because of his participation in the Czech human rights movement, describes in a prison letter to his wife the primary importance of individual hope:

The more I think about it, the more I incline to the opinion that the most important thing of all is not to lose hope and faith in life itself. Anyone who does so is lost, regardless of what good fortune may befall him. On the other hand, those who do not lose it can never come to a bad end. This doesn't mean closing one's eyes to the horrors of the world – quite the contrary, in fact: only those who have not lost faith and hope can see the horrors of the world with genuine clarity. Which may sound like a paradox and probably requires explanation, but that would mean writing a new letter, so for the time being you'll have to accept it as an axiom or an invitation to further thought. (141)

The expectation about the future that forms the basis of hope carries the individual forward to the time of the hoped for outcomes. The expectation forms an internal resource for an individual that can be drawn upon at anytime to help deal with an unknown future or a seemingly known but bad future. Linked to this expectation is an instrumental rationality. Hope triggers pathway thinking (Snyder, 2000). Individuals begin to plan ways and means for achieving the hoped for goal. Planning and hope in

Moltmann's (1971) words "live with each other and for each other" (178). Planning produces action the outcomes of which feed back into planning and expectation. New, greater hopes may be formed or hopes may be adjusted to more realistic levels. The process of hope leads into a cycle of expectation, planning and action that sees the agent explore the power of her agency.

So far, the positive case being developed for the individual act of hoping is of an instrumental kind. It can, for example, help cancer patients to deal with their disease as well as give individuals the inner strength to survive the apparently impossible odds of a slave labor camp. Hope in these kinds of cases turns out to be causally efficacious. The individual by placing himself in a state of hope begins a process that brings to realization a desired state of the world. This "enabling function of hope" is key to the success of many individual projects and can be key to the survival of the individual (Bovens 1999, 670). There is mounting evidence that individuals high in hope gain psychological, physiological, cognitive and behavioral advantages in comparison to those who hope less.² Hope may also have, as Luc Bovens argues, intrinsic value because the process of understanding and changing our hopes leads to better self-understanding.

The section that follows this one presents in summary form an account of several decades of international negotiations between developed and developing countries concerning intellectual property rights. The focus of this account is on the way in which the emerging global regime of intellectual property has directly affected the access of citizens to affordable medicines. At the end of this section I shall suggest that public hope on the part of the developing countries played an important role in these

negotiations. My reasons for making this claim are mainly based on the fieldwork that John Braithwaite and I undertook in our study of global business regulation (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000; Drahos and Braithwaite 2002). Even in the absence of our fieldwork it would nevertheless be plausible to assume that public hope played a vital role in the outcome of these negotiations. The role that hope plays in international negotiations between weak and strong actors is generally neglected, largely because the study of international relations proceeds on the assumption of states as rational rather than emotional actors. The assumption of rationality has led to the dominance of calculative approaches in international relations, with game theory providing the dominant structure of calculation that is used to study decision-making. Yet the assumption that states in certain circumstances are emotional actors is no less plausible than the rationality assumption. In fact it may be more plausible. Massey (2002) in a recent review of the evolutionary evidence points out that emotionality preceded rationality in evolutionary time and that it remains a dominant force in human behavior. Given the centuries of empirical evidence of different kinds of hatreds keeping conflicts alive amongst states, the use of emotions such as fear, greed and hope to understand state behavior is comparatively undeveloped.

PUBLIC HOPE: THE CASE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES

Following the end of World War II many developing countries shed their colonial status and become sovereign states. Most faced serious problems of poverty, illiteracy, ill health and unemployment. India, Pakistan and Indonesia, for example, entered independence with less than one fifth of their populations being literate (Myrdal 1968, 1693). As colonies they had for the most part functioned as sources of raw materials. Economic development was, therefore, high on their agenda.

One area in which developing countries desperately needed technology was pharmaceuticals. Developing countries had no research and development capability in the pharmaceutical sector. They either imported drugs or left their citizens to rely on varieties of traditional medicine. The problem in importing drugs lay with their expense. In the 1960s India, for example, despite having one of the poorest populations in the world had some of the highest drug prices. There were a number of reasons for this, including the fact that Western pharmaceutical companies formed cartels that affected drug prices in developing countries (Braithwaite 1984). Another problem was that pharmaceutical manufacturers in the west were not doing research into the tropical diseases that affected poor people in developing countries because those people would not be able to pay for the products that came out of the research. Faced by continued high drug prices developing countries like India embarked on a reform of the patent rules they had inherited from their colonizers (India acquired its patent law in 1856 while under British colonial rule). In India two parliamentary enquiries were set up to investigate the effects of the patent system. They concluded that the system had failed “to stimulate

inventions among Indians and to encourage the development and exploitation of new inventions” (Vedaraman 1972, 43).

The response of Indian policy makers was to draft another patent law. Passed in 1970 the new law followed the German system of allowing the patenting of methods or processes that led to drugs, but not allowing the patenting of the drugs themselves (Vedaraman 1972). Patent protection for pharmaceuticals was only granted for seven years as opposed to 14 years for other inventions. This law opened the path to a highly successful Indian generics industry which began to produce essential drugs at a fraction of their price in Western markets (Kettler and Modi 2001). During the 1970s other developing countries such as Argentina and Brazil also made changes to their patent law giving limited or no protection to the pharmaceutical products. As these policies began to bite, global pharmaceutical companies like Pfizer were faced with unprofitable operations in these countries. In the words of Edmund Pratt, the CEO of Pfizer from 1972 to 1991, “[w]e were beginning to notice that we were losing market share dramatically [in developing countries] because our intellectual property rights were not being respected in these countries” (Santoro 1992, 6). Essentially developing countries were adjusting the rules of the patent game to serve their local industries in exactly the same way that Western states had done.

Pfizer and other large pharmaceutical companies reacted to these developing country initiatives by forming a strategy that would ultimately see all developing countries adopt patent laws that matched US patent law. The core idea behind this strategy was to develop a code on intellectual property protection that required, amongst

other things, protection of pharmaceutical patents and then make this code an obligatory part of the world's trade regime (at that time the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and now the World Trade Organization (WTO)). Since most developing countries were or wanted to join the trade regime it would mean that they would have to bring their patent law on pharmaceuticals in line with US law.

In 1981 Edmund Pratt, the CEO of Pfizer, became Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Trade Negotiations (ACTN). ACTN was a very influential committee that provided trade policy advice to the US government from a private sector perspective. Under Pratt's leadership ACTN produced a series of papers urging the US government to obtain a negotiating mandate on intellectual property in the forthcoming Uruguay Round of trade negotiations. Predictably developing country leaders resisted US proposals because they saw that it would have serious implications for their pharmaceutical sectors. However, the US placed trade pressure on these countries by threatening to suspend the duty free trading privileges many developing countries had in the US market under a preferential trading scheme known as the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). In 1986 at a Ministerial Meeting at Punta del Este, the members of the GATT agreed to a negotiating mandate that included the negotiation of an agreement on the trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights. When the Uruguay Round was concluded in 1993 the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) was one of the key agreements of the new WTO regime. Under its terms all members of the WTO have to recognize patents on pharmaceutical products and processes. Compliance with TRIPS can be enforced under the WTO's dispute resolution mechanism.

During the course of the Uruguay Round negotiations (1986-1993) TRIPS received very little publicity in the mainstream media. The spotlight remained largely on agriculture. The intellectual property issues were technical and portrayed largely as an attempt to deal with the problem of piracy and counterfeits. There was little discussion of the impact of stronger patents rights on the public health systems of developing countries. In many developing countries there was no discussion of TRIPS. This is especially true in Africa, the continent now most severely affected by the AIDS pandemic. African trade negotiators were not part of the key negotiating groups that decided the final shape of TRIPS (Drahos and Braithwaite 2002). Intellectual property was simply seen as not relevant to commodity-based economies. In countries like India there was a debate, sparked largely by the Indian pharmaceutical industry, but it was debate that gathered intensity far too late into the negotiations. By the end of 1991 a draft of the TRIPS had been all but finalized.

The comparative anonymity of TRIPS began to disappear as the AIDS crisis in Africa and other developing countries began to grow to a scale no-one could really comprehend or ignore. In the West, hope in the case of a treatment for HIV/AIDS arrived at the end of the 1980s in the form of anti-retroviral therapy. At first the treatments involved the daily administration of a combination of drugs involving sometimes 20 tablets to be taken at specific times of the day. During the 1990s the treatment progressively improved. Current anti-retroviral therapy can take the form of a triple drug combination taken as one tablet a couple of times a day. The shift to a one-tablet-a-day treatment is not far off. Anti-retroviral therapy is aimed at halting the replication of the

HIV in the individual and allowing the immune system to recover. The treatments have proven to be highly effective. They do not remove HIV infection, but with proper management they may allow a person to achieve a normal life-span.

When patented anti-retroviral therapies first appeared they were expensive (in the range of US\$10,000 to \$15,000 per person per year). For people in developing countries living on one or two dollars a day the price of anti-retroviral therapies represented a king's ransom. The only possibility for poor people in developing countries was that developing country manufacturers of generic drugs would make those drugs at a fraction of the price that US and EU pharmaceutical companies were charging and then ways would be found to meet that cost. As AIDS activists and health non-governmental organizations (NGOs) began to study the issue of access to medicines and AIDS drugs in particular they began to better understand the impact of intellectual property rights, especially TRIPS on access to medicines. Once a developing country included patents on pharmaceutical products in its domestic law and large overseas pharmaceutical companies took out patents on pharmaceutical products in that country, it meant that the local generic industry could no longer copy the drugs. All other things being equal the price of drugs would go up since the overseas company would follow a strategy of monopoly pricing, that being the whole point of the patent system. Developing countries were given a transitional period in which to apply the provisions of TRIPS, but here another disturbing fact came to light. The US was at the bilateral level exerting pressure on those developing countries, such as Brazil and Argentina, that had local pharmaceutical industries to apply the provisions of TRIPS before they were required to do so.

Moreover, the US was applying trade pressure on countries to move to higher standards than those contained in TRIPS (Drahos 2001).

In 1997 the South African government, which has the biggest HIV-infected population in Africa, introduced a bill that gave the health minister some discretion in setting conditions to ensure the supply of affordable medicines. The bill was signed by President Mandela on December 12, 1997. It specifically allowed the importation into South Africa of patented medicines which had been put onto another market with the consent of the patent owner. The response of the US officials was to turn the passage of the South African bill into a trade matter. Agencies of the US government such as the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), the Department of Commerce and the State Department, with the assistance of officials from the European Commission began to pressure South Africa to change the bill. In 1998 the pressure on South Africa intensified. The USTR listed South Africa under its trade law for possible trade sanctions if it did not comply with the demands of the US pharmaceutical industry. In February 1998, 41 pharmaceutical companies began proceedings in South African courts against the South African government, naming Nelson Mandela as first defendant. The trade dispute continued to climb up the totem pole of political importance. Senior officials from the US and the EU continued to draw attention to South Africa's obligations under TRIPS. Sir Leon Brittan, the then Vice-President of the European Commission wrote Thabo Mbeki, at that time the Deputy President of South Africa drawing his attention to South Africa's obligations under TRIPS.³ US Vice-President Al Gore also became involved in

communicating the concerns of the US government about South Africa's attempts to secure access to cheaper medicines for its HIV/AIDS population.⁴

In March 2001, 39 pharmaceutical companies came to the Pretoria High Court armed with most of South Africa's intellectual property barristers and a barrage of arguments against the Medicines Act. In April 2001 the pharmaceutical companies withdrew from the litigation and the case settled. What had happened? The answer lies in the power of publicity. For almost a decade a few activists, the most prominent being James Love had been doing work on the links between intellectual property rights and the price of pharmaceutical drugs. Out of a meeting in 1996 in Bielefeld, Germany, organized by Health Action International (a network of public health workers, with members in more than 70 countries) there grew a coalition of health activists and organizations who began to mount a global campaign against the impact of patents and trade rules on access to medicines. The campaign grew and was joined by other prominent NGOs like Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and Oxfam. The publicity this coalition of NGOs gave to the plight of South Africa was also accompanied by good public policy analysis that at its core raised a fundamental issue – could the world community continue to rely on a patent-based R&D system that contributes heavily to a situation in which only 10% of global health research investigates the causes of 90% of the world's disease burden?⁵ For the first time mass publics in the West learnt that their governments had in the 1980s participated in trade negotiations that globally strengthened patent monopolies, that obliged developing countries to recognize product patents on pharmaceuticals and reduced their sovereignty over health regulation. In the face of growing international moral outrage

trade ministers and officials in the US and European Commission and the large pharmaceutical companies began to re-calculate. The companies withdrew from the litigation. The real worry for the large pharmaceuticals was no longer the South African law, but the fact that the access to medicines campaign had triggered a much broader discussion about the links between patents, the price of drugs, the price of research and the risks that the companies took. People were beginning to question the claims the industry made about the cost of researching and developing a new drug. Questions were being asked about just how much actual risk the companies took when so much drug research was in fact done in the public sector.⁶ Activists like James Love had been raising these issues for a long time, but now others were raising them and worse still expressing scepticism about the industry's claims. The worst of all possible worlds was one in which the debate over the price of patented drugs for the poor in developing countries spilt over into the price of patented drugs in the US. If the price of prescription drugs in the US had tripled in the last decade might they not triple again in the next? How many more US citizens would be unable to afford what the patent system was offering them? The bureaucrats who had been supporting the pharmaceutical establishment went into damage control mode. The European Commission began to talk about the differential pricing of drugs for poor countries.⁷ At a special meeting of the TRIPS Council in June 2001, developing states pushed for the recognition of a reading of TRIPS that permitted them to deal with health crises. Ultimately this produced the Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health at a WTO Ministerial in November 2001.

The campaign was instrumental in bringing down further the price of anti-retroviral treatments. It provided support for generic manufacturers in two key developing countries, Brazil and India to make offers to other developing countries looking for anti-retroviral drugs their populations could afford. In most cases these drugs were not under patent protection in Brazil or India, this having much to do with the fact that prior to TRIPS these countries did not recognize patents on pharmaceutical products. Brazil especially was a key player in showing the world what a government could do if it was serious about combating HIV. Despite enormous trade and political pressure from the US and the large pharmaceutical companies, Brazil had delayed introducing changes to its patent law on pharmaceutical products until 1996. With the encouragement of civil society Brazil went down the path of providing free anti-retroviral therapy. In those cases where the drugs it needed were under patent, it threatened the use of compulsory licensing in order to bring the price down. The anti-retroviral Nevirapine, for example, which is of great importance in the prevention of mother to child transmission of HIV, is available from the Brazilian generic manufacturer FarManguinhos at US\$0.59 cents per day. The results speak for themselves. Brazil does not face the HIV/AIDS crisis that African countries do.

The Indian generic firm, Cipla, was also important in triggering price reductions for anti-retroviral drugs for the poor. At an international meeting in Brussels in September 2000 the CEO of Cipla, Yusuf Hamied, publicly stated the prices at which he could provide anti-retrovirals to developing countries, prices that at that time worked out at around a couple dollars a day. The pharmaceutical executives of major companies

“listened agog to Hamied’s matter-of-fact price list for chemical equivalents of Glaxo’s Epivir, Boehringer’s nevirapine and Bristol-Myers’s Zerit.”⁸ The crucial thing though was the very public nature of the offer – at an international meeting with the media in attendance. The large pharmaceutical companies had also been making offers to developing countries, but only to some countries on some drugs and in secret with lots of conditions attached. Once the generics went public with their price, developing countries knew whether the secret price discounts that they were being offered by the large pharmaceutical companies were good deals or not. (A good example of how public hope can be quietly traded under the public’s nose.) Today the price of anti-retroviral therapy that generic companies are able to offer comes in at well under a dollar a day.

Hope was a constant presence during the TRIPS negotiations and in the decade that followed. Developing country dissatisfaction with the developed world’s trade rules in the form of the GATT had led to formation of the UN Conference on Trade and Development in 1964 (UNCTAD). UNCTAD itself was responsible for a number of important trade initiatives, including the design of a system of preferential trade rules favoring developing countries known as the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP). The UNCTAD architects of the system were “hopeful that the system would some day amount to something worthwhile” (Murray 1977, xi). The GSP was introduced in a number of developed countries including the US in 1971. In an evaluation of it published in 1977, Murray concluded that even with the “most charitable evaluation criteria” the GSP was “insignificant as a new trade policy” to benefit the 150 developing countries that were in receipt of GSP benefits (149). Even worse for developing countries though

was that in the 1980s the US used their beneficiary status under the US GSP program to threaten them with loss of GSP privileges if they did not enact standards of intellectual property that were adequate and effective (Sell 1995). In some cases developing countries did suffer GSP penalties, and in other cases even where they complied with US wishes they ended up losing their GSP status. Here we have a good example of where public hope kept developing countries engaged in a global institution that on cold analysis they should have re-negotiated or perhaps left.

During the TRIPS negotiations India and Brazil led the opposition to the US agenda for a code on intellectual property. Indian opposition to the US agenda, however, faded at crucial moments leading to a vigorous internal debate in India about the failure of Indian leadership. One critic, Chakravarthi Raghavan (1989), has suggested that Indian officials “showed a pathetic faith in Dunkel and his Indian aides” (20) at a time when a more cold-blooded reading of the situation showed that there were genuine opportunities to form a strong coalition of developing countries that would have made it difficult for the US “to ride rough-shod over them” (23). Elsewhere John Braithwaite and I have argued, based on our fieldwork, that many delegations including Australia were driven by the delusional belief that in signing TRIPS they eventually would become net intellectual property exporters and therefore winners from the agreement (Drahos and Braithwaite 2002). Countries signed TRIPS, in other words, hoping that things would work out in their favor. Yet cold analysis in Australia before TRIPS suggested precisely the opposite. A number of government committees, which had examined the role of intellectual property rights in the Australian economy, had concluded that Australia, as a net

importer of such rights had little to gain from increased international protection for intellectual property.⁹ Moreover, cold analysis since TRIPS shows massive wealth transfers taking place from many developed and developing countries to the US (Maskus 2000).

Public hope has continued to play a totemic role after TRIPS. The International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associations (1998) has continued to argue that strong patent protection offers any society the best chance of medical progress and industrial development. Large individual pharmaceutical companies have also made it clear that patents and the TRIPS framework offer all countries the best hope of medical discovery. “Eliminate patent protection” reads a Pfizer Press Release of July 19, 2001 “and the discovery of new medicines for Alzheimer’s, cancer, diabetes, malaria, heart disease slows to a trickle”. The corporate merchandising of this public hope is bundled together with analysis that claims to show that patents are not, for example, the reason behind the crisis in the US over the price of prescription drugs or that patents are not a factor in inhibiting access to medicines by poor people. Pfizer, for example, sponsors a series called *Economic Realities in Health Care Policy* in which it publishes analyses of this kind.

PUBLIC HOPE

The dangers of public hope

In the second section of the paper we saw that a strong case can be made in favor of a personal process of hoping. Hope can trigger in individuals an instrumental rationality that leads them to a desired goal. It helps individuals to solve problems and, at times, overcome the seemingly impossible odds dealt out by the forces of nature or the forces of men. But hope has its hazards. Intense hope carries with it the danger of intense disappointment. The imagining that accompanies individual hoping, if unchecked by reason and evidence, can lead the individual into fantasy thinking, irrational action and finally failure rather than success. Avoiding these dangers of personal hope depends in large measure on an individual being able to create an inner dialectic in which reason checks and assesses the possibilities for the future that the individual through hoping begins to imagine as concrete possibilities.

The private hopes of an individual can be facilitated by the institutions of which the individual is a part. Social institutions are important influences on individuals when it comes to private hope. Private hope is based on the capacity to imagine the fulfillment of a future goal for oneself or others. If, for example, an individual who has been diagnosed with cancer lives in a society where the health system has a very good track record in the treatment of cancer, that will very likely have a positive impact on that individual's hopes for recovery. The medical profession by communicating improvements in survival rates and treatment advances is very likely to raise individual hopes for recovery. But, as Sasha Courville and Nicola Piper show in their paper in this volume, if social institutions such as health, education, employment and financial security have broken down, then those institutions slowly cease to be seen as sources of hope. People will no longer plan

their futures based on, for example, a banking system, that is unable to maintain the value of their savings. Individuals disengage from such institutions, and their hopes turn elsewhere or despair replaces hope. In the words of a poor person from Armenia: “People place their hopes in God, since the government is no longer involved in such matters” (Narayan et al. 2000, 79). The instrumental reasoning with which hope is linked sees individuals turn to other sources of help (see Courville and Piper, this volume) or organize in different ways (organized crime being one example). As the private hopes of a majority of individuals within a society become less and less linked with state institutions, the prospects of a society maintaining or achieving well-functioning institutions become slimmer and slimmer. One reason for this is that institutions become cut off from the individual initiatives that characterize hopeful thinking and thus their capacity to adapt to changing circumstances is reduced.

When social institutions remain open to private hopes they also allow for the possibility of a bottom-up process in which they help to fulfill the goals and plans of individuals. Political theories that see virtue in maximizing individual liberty ought also to see virtue in private hope. Private hope depends on basic freedoms to be meaningful (career hopes, for example, depend on freedoms such as the freedom of employment, freedom of communication, freedom of movement, freedom from discrimination) and at the same time it encourages the use of those basic freedoms. One may push this line of argument further and conclude that when hope and social institutions are fully integrated the possibility of tyranny is largely removed (Dauenhauer 1984).

Does what we have said about links between private hope and social institutions apply to public hope? Private hopes may, as we suggested in the beginning of this paper, become public hopes. Individual hopes for peace when shared by many become the basis of mass movements and social politics that may eventually become represented as public hopes within the political system. But as our case study shows public hope may exist and exert an influence on policy without members of the public being aware of it. Raghavan's (1989) observation that Indian officials, at crucial stages in the TRIPS negotiations simply hoped that things would work out for the best when instead they should have been organizing developing country resistance to the US and EC TRIPS agenda shows how public hope and private hope can be very different. Most Indian citizens would not have been aware that these public hopes were exerting an influence on Indian strategic thinking. In fact most citizens in all countries were in a state of ignorance about the TRIPS negotiations and its far-reaching effects on the cost of pharmaceutical products. This was certainly true in the case of African states. The public hopes of officials in India and very probably in other countries concerning the outcomes of the negotiations in TRIPS would not have been widely known by the publics that the officials in these countries were meant to be representing. Yet these hopeful public actors steered their populations towards an agreement that will see the supply of generic drugs to developing country populations progressively reduced as the deadlines for the implementation of patent protection for pharmaceuticals begin to bite.

Public hope that is kept private by officials and therefore not exposed to scrutiny can contingently lead to bad outcomes. The same is also true of public hope that is

articulated. Public hope can be invoked by political actors without those actors necessarily personally feeling the hope they describe or even believing that the program of action to which the hope relates will produce a better future. Pharmaceutical companies spend millions of dollars every year on lobbying activities in an effort to persuade politicians and officials of the virtues of strengthening the patent system. Even if individual politicians who publicly argue that the patent system offers a society the best hope for the future are privately sceptical about this claim it does not follow that public hope is not at work. Irrespective of their private beliefs and motivations when political actors invoke hope they are engaging in speech acts. Sentences, pointed out the philosopher J.L. Austin (1962), do not simply convey meaning. When uttered they may also have effects and perform actions such as the action of marrying somebody or warning them of some danger. When political figures invoke hope in some public context they are engaging in an action. They are not simply describing hope, but rather trying to give hope. In Austin's terms they are using the language of hope with illocutionary force, a force that is intended to produce emotional effects in their audience and place them in a state of hope. The likelihood of success of this action in the case of public hope generally depends on the hope being linked to a plan. The plan must offer an indication of the pathway to the hoped for goal. This need not always be the case. Political leaders may tie the hope to a religious metaphysic intending that the audience's beliefs about supernatural agency make the feelings of hope robust. Within secular political contexts, however, hope is almost always bundled together with a policy agenda that is the means to the achievement of the invoked public hope. When public hope is used with

illocutionary force its effects may be contingently good or bad. Basically this will be determined by the outcomes of the policies that the language of public hope is used to promote.

There is also another important feature about public hope that makes it a more ambiguous servant of the good. Private hope we saw earlier encourages an individual to action. In the case of public hope, however, agency responsibility for hope typically does not lie with the many citizens that have been persuaded by the illocutionary language of public hope to accept a set of policies, but rather by the executive arm of government. The risk of hoping, but not being the agent bearing responsibility for the fulfillment of that hope is that it is difficult to evaluate progress towards the hoped for goal or indeed whether it remains a realistic goal. The feedback that is present in the case of individual action towards the hoped for goal is delayed in the case of public hope and its extent is determined by social mechanisms of transparency, monitoring and reporting. The language of public hope may sometimes simply be a way of obtaining emotional assent to a set of policies that then run unchallenged.

Both the public hope that affects a few key decision-makers (the case of the Indian officials hoping for a good outcome) and the public hope that is openly invoked to affect a public (the use of hope by large pharmaceutical companies to prop up support for the patent system) can lead to adverse outcomes for a society (reduced access to drugs, higher cost of drugs). A more general conclusion of this paper is that a danger of public hope is that it becomes a tool of manipulation, an emotional opiate that political actors use to dull critical treatments of decisions and policies that serve private rather

than social interests. It is not a conclusion of this paper that public hope should be banished from political life. When the private hopes of a Nelson Mandela or a Václav Havel become public hopes and then the collective hopes of a people they can lead to the hope-emancipation dynamic described by John Braithwaite in this volume. How then should we deal with the dangers of public hope?

Principles for checking public hope

Our case study suggests some principles for checking on public hope. One clear lesson from our case study is that there has to be a strong connection between public hope and the available evidence that relates to the probability of the hoped for goal. In the case of the GSP there was evidence that developing countries were not gaining from its implementation. They stuck with the system and it was used to cajole some of them into accepting intellectual property standards that were unsuitable for their stage of economic development. Similarly, the use of hope by the large R&D pharmaceutical companies to support policy initiatives for strengthening and globalising the patent system is an example of public hope that looks increasingly irrational in light of evidence that the patent system does not deliver what it promised in terms of pharmaceutical innovation for developing countries. A recent UK government commission which looked at the question of the role that intellectual property plays in stimulating R&D on developing country diseases concluded that “[a]ll the evidence we have examined suggests that it hardly plays any role at all, except for those diseases where there is a large market

in the developed world” (UK Commission on Intellectual Property Rights 2002, 33).

This, however, is hardly news, for Edith Penrose (1951) in her much earlier analysis of patents for developing countries had come to the same conclusion. In the case of the patent system, public hope and justificatory evidence for that hope parted company a long time ago.

So our first design principle for checking public hope is that when public hope is used to orient citizens towards a particular goal, the public beliefs about the probability of the hoped for event must be checked against the evidence. Stating the principle more abstractly, public hope must be judged by truth. This design principle suggests another. If public hope is to be checked by probabilistic judgments based on evidence it follows that that evidence has to be gathered. By implication another design principle to check public hope is that social processes of evidence gathering and knowledge acquisition should be guided by public hope. All other things being equal a society should devote its scarce resources to the pursuit of knowledge that is relevant to its hoped for goals. In more abstract terms public hope should guide the search for truth. The principle seems obvious enough and yet it was not followed in the case of TRIPS. Before and during the negotiations there were no commissions like the UK commission reporting on the implications of TRIPS for poor people, for health, for agriculture and so on. It is only since TRIPS has come into operation that empirical work on the actual effects of intellectual property has gathered apace.

There is a third principle to be derived from the our case study concerning public hope. The evidence of the problems that TRIPS was causing and continues to cause in

the area of access to medicines did not come from governments or industry, but rather from activists and NGOs like MSF, who working in developing countries saw the problems that the strengthening and globalization of intellectual property rights brought (Sell 2002). The first response of governments to the access to medicine crisis was, as we saw, to support the pharmaceutical industry when it sued the South African government for passing legislation aimed at obtaining cheaper medicines for its citizens. Without the intervention of civil society actors it is certain that the public hopes that were being expressed in favor of stronger intellectual property protection would never have been the subject of testing in the way that they are now being tested. As our case study shows NGOs combined cold analysis with a global campaign strategy that eventually saw the price of anti-retroviral drugs fall sharply. This suggests that social arrangements that maximize the opportunity for different groups to test public hope are more likely to arrive at the truth about public hope. One reason for believing this to be the case is that the process of evidence gathering will be carried out by groups that do not have a direct interest in the outcome. Large pharmaceutical companies, for example, have a very direct interest in the conclusion that global patents do not cause a problem of access to medicines. Interests can affect the collection of evidence in relation to a hypothesis. It follows that if we rely on the efforts of pharmaceutical companies alone to arrive at the truth about the patent system and access to medicines, we may well have a less reliable guide to the truth than if rely on evidence from a range of groups. As the case study illustrates, it is precisely because civil society groups came forward with the evidence about the problem of TRIPS and access to medicines that a re-thinking of TRIPS

principles as they relate to medicines is taking place. In the abstract, if truth is to judge hope, we need social arrangements that maximize the opportunity for bearers of truth about public hope to come forward. Public hope needs to be the subject of processes of societal cross-examination.

Correlative to this third design principle is a fourth: those who are capable of giving private hope to those in need must be encouraged and provided with resources to turn that hope into public hope. The response of the global pharmaceutical industry to the NGO campaign on patents and the price of drugs was to argue that price was not the issue, but rather that the real problem lay in the lack of infra-structure in developing countries and the possibility of poor people following treatment regimes. Individual doctors, who managed to obtain expensive anti-retroviral drugs through donation, showed that poor people could be treated in community-based health clinics in the rural areas of deep poverty. These individual success stories made it very difficult for the large pharmaceutical industry to continue to claim that there was no hope of treating AIDS in resource poor settings. The industry's story of a lack of hope in being able to tackle the AIDS crisis lost some of its power. Stories of hope of treating AIDS patients in resource poor settings began to circulate. One such initiative led by a couple of doctors in the squatter settlement of Cange in rural Haiti led to the direct involvement of the Haiti's First Lady in the campaign to obtain cheap drugs and treatment for Haitians. In 2002 Haiti was successful in obtaining money from the UN's Global Fund to treat thousands of patients rather than the 100 or so the Clinique Bon Sauveur in Cange had managed. A micro story of private hope had become transformed into public policy and public hope.

In the abstract, public hope take its lead from those who genuinely inspire widespread private hope.

CONCLUSION

This paper has argued that in addition to individual and collective hope we need to recognize a third category of hope, public hope. Public hope is hope that is articulated by political actors in the context of exchange relationships of various kinds. All three types of hope have dangers, but public hope is potentially the most dangerous because it allows political actors to harness emotionally collectivities to economic and social agendas that are poorly understood by those collectivities and that are ultimately destructive of the social institutions upon which actual private and collective hopes depend. Or public hope may be secret hope that drives policies that escape public notice till it is too late. Intellectual property rights and the access to medicines issue are full of examples of the manipulative aspects of public hope. African countries had no real idea about the consequences for their populations of signing onto TRIPs. The promised technology transfer benefits of TRIPs have not materialized, but the problems of access to medicines have. Indian negotiators hoped that things would work out when they eventually agreed to TRIPs. Almost a decade later the Indian pharmaceutical industry faces a watershed as Indian generic manufacturers must decide whether to target the more profitable markets of Europe and the US. Public hope in the hands of a Nelson Mandela, as the paper by Clifford Shearing and Michael Kempa shows, can lead to collective hope and

emancipation. But perhaps more often than we would like to admit, it is the wellspring of betrayal of private and collective hope. People do not, as Valerie Braithwaite shows in her paper, stop hoping as a result. Their hope finds expression outside of traditional arrangements in sub-cultures, counter-cultures and subversive cultures.

Public hope is likely to be a contingent force for the good when it is checked by the four principles proposed in the last section of the paper. Such an outcome has its best chance when public hope is judged by the truth, it is the subject of cold analysis, it is underpinned by social arrangements that maximize the opportunity for bearers of truth about public hope to come forward, and it is developed and led by those who inspire private hope. However, for that to be a real rather than just a symbolic possibility some serious attention, as Valerie Braithwaite points out, will have to be paid to reforming the way that current institutions work. Democracies that purport to take the hopes of their citizens seriously will have to find more direct and less manipulative forms of communication and dialogue.

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ENDNOTES

¹ Dr. David McGibney, Senior Vice-President, Medicinal R&D, Pfizer, Europe, from a talk delivered to the Royal Society of Arts, Manufactures & Commerce (RSA), February 2, 1999. Available from <http://www.pfizer.com/pfizerinc/policy>.

² See the essays in Part II of Gillham, 2000.

³ See Oxfam Background Briefing, 'South Africa vs. the Drug Giants: A Challenge to Affordable Medicines', available from www.oxfam.org.uk/cutthecost

⁴ The details of this international effort are described in 'U. S. Government Efforts To Negotiate the Repeal, Termination or Withdrawal of Article 15(c) of the South African Medicines and Related Substances Act Of 1965', United States Department of State, Washington D.C. 20520, February 5, 1999.

⁵ See *Fatal Imbalance: The Crisis in Research and Development for Drugs for Neglected Diseases*, Médecins Sans Frontières Access to Essential Medicines Campaign and the Drugs for Neglected Diseases Working Group, September 2001, 10.

⁶ On the importance of public sector funding to drug discovery see Maxwell and Eckhardt, 1990.

⁷ See, for example, Communication From The Commission To The Council And The European Parliament: Programme For Action: Accelerated action on HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis in the context of poverty reduction (COM (2001) 95).

⁸ For a report of the meeting see Barton Gellman , ‘A Turning Point That Left Millions Behind’ Washington Post Staff Writer, Thursday, December 28, 2000; Page A01, <http://washingtonpost.com>.

⁹ Interestingly this conclusion is still relevant. See the *Review of intellectual property legislation under the Competition Principles Agreement*, Final Report by the Intellectual Property and Competition Review Committee, Commonwealth of Australia, 2000, 83.

HARNESSING HOPE THROUGH NGO ACTIVISM

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ABSTRACT: This paper explores the relationship between hope and agency in the contexts of migrant rights activism and alternative trading relationships created through social and environmental certification systems. Using interviews with key respondents from non-governmental organizations (NGOs), hope is assigned a positive role in the complex process of social change, providing that common goals can be agreed and achieved along the way. Two main layers of analysis emerge in this paper. The first explores the relationship between hope and agency, with a particular focus on power, both enabling and coercive. Powerful groups can hijack hope, but also hope can be used to mobilize various marginalized groups to find a collective voice, eventually leading to empowerment. The power relations among groups determine how competing collective hopes play out in action. A second layer to the relationship between hope and action is the way in which hope effects social change. Through conceptualising hope within the context of the change process, we address the relationship between hope, agency and time. An important ingredient linking hope, agency and time in a sustainable manner is the notion of empowerment.

Keywords: hope, agency, power, empowerment, time, social change, NGO activism

*Work without hope draws nectar in a sieve,
And hope without an object cannot live.*

“Work without Hope” (1828)

by Samuel Taylor Coleridge 1772-1834

Contemporary globalization processes have been celebrated for their ‘positive’ outcomes by pointing to certain ‘freedoms’ such as free flows of capital, goods and ideas, but increasingly attention is being shifted to their ‘negative’ implications, particularly as far as marginalized groups in the less developed regions are concerned (Afshar and Barrientos 1999; Arden-Clarke 1992; Ekins, Folke, and Costanza 1994; Gills and Piper 2002; Ropke 1994). Through these processes of trade liberalization guided by values of economic competitiveness, the power of multinational corporations is increasing while the capacity of the nation state to govern in a way that protects core values of a caring society is being eroded. At the same time, individual states are re-asserting their national sovereignty in the field of border control and the tightening of visa and immigration policies, resulting in a lack of mobility of labor as opposed to the free movement of capital and goods.

In the larger context of these processes revolving around globalization, people in the ‘developed’ as well as ‘underdeveloped’ world are feeling disenfranchised and powerless, lacking trust in their governments to address societal goals of social justice, environmental protection and economic equity. Against the backdrop of enormous global problems, the ability of one person to achieve change appears a hopeless undertaking. However, when individuals come together with a common vision of social change and when these groups join forces in networks and alliances

within and across national boundaries, hope can be revitalized into a motivating force for change by being transformed from individual or private to collective hope (Bar-Tal 2001).

CONCEPTUALIZING HOPE: ORIENTING CONCEPTS

The role of hope in social change is discussed in this volume across a wide range of national and international contexts, from Youth Development Circles and Robben Island to the global pharmaceutical industry and even to the Australian income tax system. In most of these stories of hope, the state plays a leading role, either as a vehicle for the capture of public hope by private actors, or as a potentially active player in the development of collective hope. This chapter begins with a different frame of reference. In the stories presented here, people have lost hope in the state and official political processes as a leading vehicle for social change; instead, they organize and network through non-governmental organizations and social movements that largely operate outside state-based structures. From such a perspective, collective hope and public hope take on more nuanced meanings.

As a starting point, we accept a basic definition of hope as a “desire for certain events to happen” (Australian Oxford Dictionary 1989). At an individual level of private hope, implementation is straightforward, a point made by Peter Drahos (this volume). At a group level, collective hope supposedly is expressed as a hope that is shared and owned by the collective. However, great care must be taken in discussing the boundaries of the ‘collective.’ In any society, there are sub-groups that have different hopes for the future, underlined by different pathways for change. For example, the hopes of the hill tribes in North West Thailand for recognition and

enforcement by governments of their human rights are very different from the hopes of mainstream Thai society that seek to exclude the hill tribes from rights associated with citizenship (Kampe and McCaskill 1997). At the international level, the range of different hopes for the future is even more significant. The hopes of smallholder agricultural producers in developing countries producing export crops are different from the hopes of French farmers in terms of the future negotiation of international trade law. If discussions about hope are to lead to social change, we must be clear about whose hopes we are examining and how different hopes are evaluated. The concept of collective hope can indeed be a very powerful tool for change; however, from a non-state centric social activism perspective, it is rare that there will be one single collective hope. The use of the word collective hope could conceal minority views and visions if not managed carefully. Just as hope theory is criticized for failing to take into account how group relations impinge on the hope of individuals (see Valerie Braithwaite, this volume), collective hope needs substantiation in cases where there are alternative collective hopes that are in competition with each other.

Linked to a more nuanced perspective on the boundaries of the collective, a second orienting concept for this chapter is power. While it is important to acknowledge that the hopes of one group can dominate the hopes of others (Valerie Braithwaite, this volume), we need to ask how and why this occurs. Different groups in society have varying degrees of access to financial resources, to social networks, or to political influence – even more so in a trans-national setting (e.g. the age old ‘North-South’ problem). The power relations between these sub-groups will be a factor in determining whose collective hopes are dominating others. In Peter Drahos’ account of public hope, hope is espoused in the public domain by private powerful actors, possibly for the private actors’ own benefit. Public hope is contrasted to

collective hope that is shared and owned by the collective. Embedded within public hope is an explicit power relationship absent in collective hope. We will argue that power is a factor in all social change processes and hence will be a factor in discussions on the role of collective hope in social change.

The third orienting concept of the paper is agency. As illustrated in our opening quote, there is a critical feedback relationship between hope and agency. Although agreeing with Tori McGeer (this volume) that “there is always an aura of agency around hope,” we argue that in the context of achieving social change, it is not a matter of “in thought *or* in deed” (ibid.; our emphasis) but an issue of in thought *and* deed. We illustrate this point by introducing the notion of empowerment. This relationship between hope and agency is deconstructed in this paper, using examples from the world of NGO human rights activism. In reacting against the hopelessness of current global governance by states and intergovernmental organizations, people are creating their own alternatives through new social movements and non-governmental organizations, drawing on international human rights and environmental instruments and frameworks. In this way, they are trying to reclaim a certain level of agency. By forming alliances with other civil society or social movement actors nationally as well as trans-nationally, this type of action creates alternatives to state/governmental policies and practices.

This paper presents a two-layered analysis of hope, in particular collective hope, although as we will show, it is not always easy to separate public from collective hope. The first layer is an exploration of the relationship between hope and agency, with power, both enabling and coercive, as a central explanatory concept. This provides conceptual space for teasing out the dynamics of hope and agency. The second layer explores the role of hope in the process of social change. We ask: does

hope diminish over time if action is not forthcoming? And can it be transferred from an individual to a group, to organizations or to institutions? The paper concludes that hope is indeed a powerful resource for social change. Hope can provide a motivation for change and for belief in the possibility of an alternative future. However, such hope needs to be channelled through concrete action, specifically aimed at empowering the marginalized.

This paper is largely based on our own ideas derived from having worked in the area of NGO activism for some time, blended with perspectives from a small number of interviews with senior representatives of key NGOs in the two subject areas of migrant rights' advocacy and social and environmental certification systems¹. The interviews were conducted by means of a questionnaire with open-ended questions about the role of hope in social change.

Before delving into these issues, we need to provide the context in which our exploration of hope is grounded: trans-national human rights and environmental activism against the backdrop of globalization processes of the late twentieth century, early twenty-first century.

GLOBALIZATION AND NGO ACTIVISM

While the visible part of globalization-from-above draws attention to global trade talks and the free flow of capital and goods, the invisible part of globalization resides in the struggle of workers and small producers at the bottom end of industrial and economic reorganization processes. With the decline of the social-democratic welfare state model and the rise of neo-liberal thinking, governments have been relatively unable or unwilling to link economic activities such as production and

consumption with social justice and environmental issues. The reasons are complex, but include concerns about reducing national competitiveness in international trade by imposing stringent regulatory requirements, and the high costs of enforcement of traditional top-down regulation.

With the globalization of the economy, the power to integrate social and environmental objectives into economic activities is moving out of the realm of the nation state and into new spheres. Frustrated by the lack of governmental progress toward sustainability, new actors such as social movements, non-governmental organizations and private corporations are creating alternatives to fill this regulatory vacuum (Gereffi, Garcia-Johnson, and Sasser 2001; Pearson and Seyfang 2001). As a result a plethora of non-governmental initiatives, tools and projects has emerged over the past two decades that seek to integrate environmental and human rights issues into economic activities (Consumer Protection in the Global Market Working Group 2002; Courville 2003; Jenkins 2001).

On a broad level, we thus conceptualize globalization as social change. We place an emphasis on the dialectic as well as dynamic nature of globalization as it involves the interplay of various actors shaping outcomes. An increasing number of studies indicate that while neo-liberal economic globalization gathers pace, so do dissenting social and political movements, which resist the current trend of marketization, privatization, liberalization and deterioration of labor standards (Gills 2000). In this sense, fair trade issues or foreign migrant worker issues are directly ingrained in the processes of globalization. Moreover, the very nature of global trade and globalizing labor markets is assumed to stimulate trans-national activist responses on the part of NGOs to address issues of socio-political and economic injustices. In other words, the forces of economic globalization that “de-politicize” the processes of

social change at the national state level give rise to the necessity to “re-politicize” them on a non-state level².

When non-governmental organizations and/or social movement organizations extend their interests from the domestic or local arena to beyond state borders, trans-national activist networks³ emerge (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Trans-national political activism challenges conventional understandings of civil society and social movements as well as international relations⁴. On a general level, trans-national advocacy networks that involve non-state actors have been described as becoming an increasingly viable force in international politics at the end of the twentieth century and beginning of the twenty-first. Not surprisingly, there is a growing literature that examines such networks relating them to the global spread of human rights and environmental discourse (Lipschutz 1992; Macdonald 1994; Scholte 2000).

Activists have noted that the struggle against undemocratic, exploitative and discriminatory conditions will become increasingly ineffective if marginalized groups and civil society remain isolated and disconnected, while global capital and exploitative forces become integrated and inter-connected. Regional and global coordination of social justice and environmental movements has been aided in part by significant developments in communications technology. Thus, we can witness a rapid growth of cross-border issues and cross-border initiatives in most, if not all, parts of the world (see for example, Macdonald 2002 and Dominguez 2002 on the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement between Mexico and the US; Piper and Uhlin 2003 on Asia). Environmental groups, the women’s movement and general human rights movement have been particularly successful at global alliance formation.

To press for social change, the existence of hope itself is a necessary but not sufficient ingredient. Hope needs to be harnessed through action geared toward social

justice objectives. Without concrete action, the energy and enthusiasm created by hope may become destructive (as when resources are provided for a community initiative but there is no follow through to deliver an outcome). Likewise, without hope, action cannot be sustained: The fight for human rights can sometimes seem hopeless in the larger context of the global political economy. However, there is also a dialectic relationship between hope and hopelessness. Even in situations that many would characterise as hopeless, people take action. While these actions can be regarded as hopeless, the fact that they happen can inspire hope, even in the direst of contexts.

Our two main case studies serve to illustrate our points above. The first case (examining the reaction against global inequalities in current agricultural trade through the creation of alternative trading systems) represents a truly global example of ‘action’. The other case looks at the role of hope in a trans-national rather than global context⁵, and that is migrant worker rights activism by Filipinos in their country of origin and destinations. Both case studies are meant to provide a broader context within which to ground our arguments in the later sections of the paper.

CASE STUDY CONTEXT: MARKET-BASED SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL CERTIFICATION/LABELLING

One of the most important impacts of globalization at the end of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries is increased trade liberalization. Products are increasingly produced in one country and consumed in another country bringing new choices and lower prices to consumers. Trade liberalization has brought many benefits through creating new market opportunities and generating wealth,

encouraging the exchange of information and technology transfers, among other impacts (Brack 1995; Cho 1995; Grossman and Helpman 1995; Wallace 1996). However, the benefits of international trade are inequitably distributed around the world (Evans 1989; George 1990; Gilpin 1987; Khor 1993; Redclift 1987; Thekaekara 1996). For example, one fifth of the world's people live in the highest income countries and have 86% of world GDP, 82% of world export markets, 68% of foreign direct investments and 74% of telephone lines. The bottom fifth of the world's people has about one percent for each of these sectors (United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 1999). Declining terms of trade for developing countries is a problem as many rely on exports of unprocessed commodities for foreign exchange earnings (Arden-Clarke 1992). Fluctuations in commodity pricing, a recurring phenomenon, has the potential to severely disrupt the economic stability of many developing countries (Sapsford and Morgan 1994). In attempting to diversify exports through value adding, developing countries have been faced with significant tariffs; while this is consistently acknowledged in multilateral trade negotiations, little in the way of improvements has been noted.

In terms of environmental impacts, trade liberalization can help to eliminate environmentally damaging agricultural subsidies that result in inefficient use of natural resources and environmental degradation (Repetto 1994). Freer trade can serve to encourage the spread of environmentally sound technologies and can promote more efficient use of resources by inducing countries to upgrade standards (Elliot 1995; Tussie 1999). However, much trade is damaging to the environment, which is being used as a source for material inputs and a sink for waste and pollution; land is degraded and eroded from overuse and resources are consumed unsustainably (Daley 1993; Morris 1990). As trade increases so does the environmental cost of an

international transport system built on fossil fuel consumption and the environmental costs of extra packaging to maintain products for longer distances; however, shipping and packaging costs do not reflect these externalities (Ritchie 1993; Ropke 1994).

Through globalization and trade liberalization, producers generally compete on price and quality. The social justice and environmental impacts of production are generally invisible given the long distances, lack of information, fears of reducing competitive advantage in trade, lack of government enforcement of domestic and international laws, and the inability of states to discriminate between products based on how they are produced (production and process methods).

Hope by many civil society actors for reform of the international trading system from *within* has diminished over time to the extent that highly visible global protests have been organized at every single multilateral trade meeting since 1999. Even before mass demonstrations became the norm, certain actors within the environmental, labor rights and global solidarity movements decided that instead of hoping and working to facilitate change within mainstream trading channels, they would create alternative trading mechanisms. Such initiatives would provide incentives for production, trade and consumption patterns based on respect for workers, smallholder producers in developing countries and the environment. By demonstrating that alternatives can be developed and implemented, these movements are providing leverage for wider scale changes within mainstream production, trade and consumption systems.

The Fairtrade movement grew out of the global solidarity movement. It has created alternative trading channels between producer organizations in developing countries and consumers in OECD countries based on fair prices and long-term trading relationships. In the consumer countries, these trading channels were initially

contained within the solidarity movement through personal, church and NGO networks. They eventually grew through fair trade shops and with the introduction of national Fairtrade certification and labeling initiatives of Max Havelaar in the Netherlands or Transfair in Germany. In 1997, the Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International (FLO) was established to coordinate the activities of these national initiatives and formalize the fairtrade system to facilitate participation of mainstream trading companies interested in selling Fairtrade certified products such as coffee or tea, among others. Currently FLO has 17 national initiatives in consumer countries and 315 producer groups from 45 countries representing over 900,000 families of farmers and workers (Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International 2003).

Similarly, organic agriculture developed as an alternative form of farming system compatible with natural systems whose origins can be traced back to the work of Rudolf Steiner and Sir Albert Howard in the 1920s (Geier 1997). This alternative gained prominence largely as a counter to the modernization of agriculture worldwide through the Green Revolution of the 1960s: It is now becoming mainstream in many countries, as an increasing number of producers and consumers are concerned about human and environmental health implications of chemical intensive agriculture. The International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements is the global umbrella organisation with over 700 member organizations in over 100 countries, including small-scale producer organisations, research communities, consumer groups, traders, extension organizations, and environmental NGOs.

In the 1990s, other initiatives with the goal of protecting worker rights and improving working conditions, were developed out of the labor rights movement. These were initially active in the garment and textile industries and with standards based on the International Labour Organization (ILO) conventions. They include

Social Accountability International's SA8000 standard and accreditation system for certification bodies, the Ethical Trading Initiative, the Clean Clothes Campaign and the Fair Labor Association, among others.

These systems all function by providing information to consumers about the environmental or social impacts of production, usually through a product label. Where these systems are supported by independent certification, products or production facilities are inspected by independent auditors to ensure that they are complying with the standards set by these initiatives, usually through widespread stakeholder consultation or by member decision-making, in the case of organic agriculture standards.

Social and environmental certification systems provide opportunities for producers in the world to gain market recognition for strong social and/or environmental performance and provide incentives for improvement. They also provide choices to consumers, enabling them to make informed purchasing decisions about the environmental and social impacts of the products they buy and use. In a globalized world where individuals can feel powerless to effect social change, these initiatives provide a vehicle to individual action that makes a difference. While they generally do not make up a significant proportion of world trade, their existence demonstrates that social and environmental improvements in production, international trade and consumption are possible; this can inspire change in other forums.

That such initiatives are growing stronger year by year is a testament to the strength of, and commitment to, the common values that the stakeholders of each initiative share. Complemented with a commitment to process that involves the creation and maintenance of meaningful spaces for debate and discussion of the core

standards and implementation tools of these systems, collective hope is mobilised, nurtured and maintained.

CASE STUDY CONTEXT: LABOR MIGRATION

Labor migration represents a basic hallmark of globalization processes, along with international flows of capital and goods. The number of international migrants (that is, those residing in foreign countries for more than one year) has grown steadily, from approximately 75 million in 1965 to an estimated 150 million in 2000 (International Organisation for Migration (IOM) 2000)⁶. Thus, “(w)ith the globalization of migration, international migration is now a shared experience of all the world’s regions” (Battistella 2002). However, the migratory flows of the so-called ‘unskilled’ (who numerically make up the bulk of migrant workers) are subject to serious restrictions at the receiving end, resulting in types and levels of vulnerability – widely reported by NGOs and academics alike (Cox 1997; Law Association for Asian and Pacific Human Rights Committee 1998) – not experienced by the privileged class of migrating professionals⁷. Being subjected to short-term contracts, often tied to one specific employer, with little recourse to legal protection, today’s unskilled migrant workers across the globe constitute a new type of ‘bonded’ labor, being channelled into a narrow range of jobs. For women, work is typically available in the informal labor market and in the service sector with the largest numbers laboring as domestic workers or workers within the sex and entertainment industries. Men usually work in construction or in small and medium-sized companies. Both sexes also labor as seasonal agricultural workers or in sweatshops, where they are often employed

illegally. Performing ‘women’s work’⁸ or being deemed ‘illegal’ also means that coverage by national employment or labor laws is out of reach.

The world’s largest exporter of migrant labor in numerical terms is Mexico, with the Philippines constituting the second largest. Filipino migrant workers distinguish themselves from Mexicans in that they are far more geographically dispersed, with an almost equal proportion of men and women taking up employment abroad. In this sense, Filipinos are the most globalized workforce in the world (Harris 1995). Another phenomenon that distinguishes Filipino migrant workers from any other national group is their level of political activism through NGOs or CBOs (community based organizations). Hence, this case study focuses on Filipino migrant workers’ activism on three levels: global, regional and local.

Based on the underlying assumptions that (1) migrant workers are largely marginalized and vulnerable as a result of their dual position as migrants and temporary, often ‘illegal’, workers; and (2) both the sending and receiving states lack political will (or ability) to deal with the protection or empowerment of migrant labor, activism by pro-migrant lobbyists or NGOs has gained great significance as a potential force for change. Based on their class, gender and ethnicity, migrants are typically trapped between the diplomatic concerns of elite and inter-governmental politics at both ends of the migration chain. Alternative mechanisms, therefore, are needed to enhance the benefits of migration for them. The trans-national character of labor migration is assumed here as stimulating trans-national networking to address issues revolving around the highly vulnerable existence of foreign migrant workers.

The Philippines have a long tradition as a vibrant civil society. The Philippine government has had labor export policies in place since the 1970s, resulting in the large-scale deployment of Filipino workers abroad. In response, NGOs have been

highly involved in migrant rights. Given that Filipinos are the most global workforce, it is not surprising that they have organized NGOs to support migrant workers, and migrant female workers in particular, all over the world. Unlike Indonesia – another major exporter of female labor – Filipino NGOs have been able to work within a more open political system and have access to elite allies within the government structure. This is not to say that there is not a lot of friction and conflict in government-NGO relations concerning labor migration (Villalba 1997). The point is simply that the number and strength of women and human rights groups is great in the Philippines.

Particularly since the Aquino government came to power, political activism from the grassroots – the so-called People’s Power movement – has grown dramatically. The Philippines has emerged as a country where political pluralism is more established as a result, but where the economic needs of citizens are still not being met; hence the rise in reform (if not revolution) oriented actions by NGOs. There is a widely shared understanding that the state has an important role to play in the distribution of resources (Shigetomi 2002).

Against this background, it is not surprising that migrant worker NGOs are such an active political force. Arguably the most successful in terms of its widespread grassroots support and its trans-national networks is MIGRANTE⁹. Being membership based, staffed by activists who were formerly migrants themselves, and supported from the grassroots level, MIGRANTE has been at the forefront of successfully translating private hope into collective hope. By trying to address the root causes of migration in the Philippines, the NGO and its networks are addressing migrant workers’ rights ‘at home,’ while their member organizations overseas are lobbying for protection of migrant workers at their destination.

At this point it should be noted that the intention is not to depict migrant worker activism as un-divided. There are in fact serious ideological rifts. At the same time, there is a plethora of NGOs taking on migrant worker issues: women's groups, general human rights groups, and church organizations to name a few. Despite differences in approach, the entirety of the mass-level force of pro-migrant worker activism in the Philippines has resulted in success stories such as the passing of a new Act (*the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act* of 1995) and the ratification of the *International Convention on the Rights of All Migrants and Their Families* (ICMR) in 1995. The latest development is the Absentee Voting Bill, giving overseas Filipinos the right to participate in national elections in 2004 for the first time. At the time of writing, the outcome of this initiative is not known.

International human rights instruments also deserve mention as an important conceptual source of hope for pro-migrant advocates in the Philippines (as well as elsewhere). International concern for the rights of migrant workers began with the establishment of the International Labour Organization (ILO) in 1919 (which became a UN specialised agency in 1946). There are a number of international conventions specifically relevant to migrant labor: two ILO conventions (nos. 97 and 143) and the above mentioned ICMR. The latter only reached its minimum number of ratifications in July 2003,¹⁰ allowing it to finally come into effect in July 2003. Nonetheless, the ICRM has gained little support, with no ratifications from labor receiving countries. This stands in stark contrast to other UN conventions such as the *Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women* (CEDAW) and the *Convention for the Rights of the Child* (CRC). The involvement of NGOs in the preparatory meetings is seen as one of the many reasons for the tremendous success of CEDAW and CRC

(Steiner and Alston 2000). But NGOs have been able only to access the UN (and thus shape collective hope at the international level) during the 1990s.

In the context of pro-migrant activism, the late 1990s have brought about changes related to (1) intensified civil society activism, notably in Asia which has the most advanced migrant worker NGOs and regional networks, (2) the launching of a Global Campaign to boost ratifications of the ICMR in 1998,¹¹ (3) the appointment of a United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants in 1999, and (4) the official launching of International Migrants Day (18 December) by the United Nations in 2000 (Taran 2000). Hope is implicated in all these endeavours and NGOs play an important role in collectivizing hope nationally and globally.

HOPE AND AGENCY

In this paper, we discuss the spaces of hope created through NGO activism. Important themes are agency and empowerment. We argue that hope without agency is false – we are left with nothing more than an illusion – or the worst form of Peter Drahos' (this volume) public hope. In other words, individual or private hope needs to be elevated to a collective level if it is to have a positive effect in building a better world. How this occurs depends on preferred strategies and the kind of infrastructure that is available. NGO activism constitutes one such strategy.

The notion of agency has been subject to much debate among social scientists, typically discussed in opposition to 'structures.' As part of this debate, feminists have contributed to rethinking the structure/agency dichotomy, qualifying the (often essentializing) depiction of women solely as victims: "In this sense, people can be, at the same time, both the subordinate objects of hierarchical power relations and

subjects who are agents in their own lives, capable of exercising power” (Cook, Roberts, and Waylen 2000, 9). A similar move away from the rigid agency and structure division is also offered by Giddens’ (1984) structuration thesis which views “structure as a set of rules and resources integral to the conduct of individual and collective actors” (quoted in Phizacklea 1998, 26). According to this model, structures are simultaneously constraining and enabling. As such, structures can both block social change and provide opportunities for change. Although it remains the case that both knowledge and power are unequally distributed, one can use Giddens’ claim (as suggested by Phizacklea) that “even the powerless have the capacity to mobilize resources and secure ‘spaces’ of control” (27) and proceed to argue for transformative politics from below. NGOs are a vital part of this process.

Also relevant and important to understanding change from below is social capital. When you do not have power, you have to invest in social capital more – since it could become an important resource for building a power base. But the social capital literature itself does not give much attention to addressing the concept of power, which is given centre stage in this discussion of hope and action. Power is explicitly recognised in the term we prefer to use instead of social capital – empowerment. Empowerment also captures the social process that allows change to take place through hope, the focus of the next section. Last but not least, our preference for ‘empowerment’ over ‘social capital’ is also an issue of representation: as the NGOs in our case studies (and beyond) refer to empowerment, so do we.

The concept of empowerment has particularly gained recognition in the development field (Presser and Sen 2000). It refers to the expansion of choice and action and is about individual as well as collective agency. It is through empowerment programs that the most marginalized are brought into the political arena, by raising

their consciousness through education and information campaigns as part of community-based projects.

In this context, Lange's (2002) analysis of emotions makes an interesting contribution to challenging the idea that structure and agency are two separate concepts. She argues that it is through emotions that one can help explain social dynamics aimed at change – and a full range of emotions, not just negative emotions of shame and fear (209), but also compassion or passion for equity, justice and fairness (205). The resulting feelings of moral solidarity can cross borders and instigate trans-national networks – as expressed in the following quote by an Indonesian activist:

[w]e cannot divide ourselves country by country. We have to come together. Because we believe our suffering has the same value as the suffering in other parts of the world. So we make an international link. For example, when I was a student, we had discussions with activists from the outside. So I think the suffering – the pain – is universal. Though we are divided by nation states, I think that because the emotional is universal, hope is universal too. We can share hopes and dreams.

In this sense, there is an analytical link between emotional and legal/cognitive processes, with emotions important “as enabling agency” (Lange 2002, 217). In addition, emotions are not only a source of agency, but they “can also help to establish social structure” (217), such as NGOs, based upon solidarity rooted in common experiences. Hope emerges as a shared phenomenon that crosses cultures and political boundaries. Furthermore, hope is embedded within a worldview that proposes

development, betterment, change – all underlined by emotional experiences – as possible and positive goals to work towards. NGOs typically report that migrants begin the journey to empowerment through sharing their own stories and experiences, for instance as migrant workers abroad, experiencing the emotion of being separated from their families, working in countries with unfamiliar languages and cultures.

NGO activists typically share a sense of solidarity that has been described by some sociologists as “a long-lasting emotion”(Lange 2002, 217) – an aspect we will return to when addressing the notion of process. Instead of it being “moods” which stabilize social action and constitute a source of “emotional energy” (ibid.), we would argue for hope being an essential ingredient, because it is hope that is “about taking an agential interest in the future” (McGeer, this volume). In the words of a respondent based in Germany:

It is quite obvious – if you follow the logic – there is an idea to the better, there is hope that the better can be achieved; this usually then leads to action.

It is an essential part of this process – (one ingredient)

So far in this section we have shown that emotions are shared within NGO circles and these shared “long-lasting” emotions become social glue that allows the empowerment process to begin. It is the link between hope and agency that can lead to organising and activism by NGOs or larger social movements. Such initiatives can then serve as a source of hope to counterbalance processes of globalization from above. The NGOs in our case studies typically give voice to marginalized people and attempt to construct alternatives that are based on the actual experiences and activities at the grassroots. In doing so, possibilities for change emerge harnessing hope – as

illustrated by the following quote by the director of a migrant worker NGO which is called 'Hope Migrants' Center':

We call the Center 'Hope' because we try to give the workers a sense of hope amidst the misery and sufferings of their working conditions. Their hope for more just and equitable working conditions lies in their courage to stand up for their human dignity and rights.

In this way, NGO activism can facilitate an enabling form of power. For example, social and environmental certification systems can create a vehicle for producers in developing countries or anywhere else in the world to meet or otherwise interact with like-minded people from other parts of the world through trade, through stakeholder discussions on standards revisions, or through conferences. Participation in these networks can increase producers social capital, enabling them to expand their professional networks, gain capacity and new skills. In fact, Social Accountability International, The Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International and the International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements have specific mandates for capacity building of workers and smallholder producer organizations. By demonstrating that social or environmental performance can complement economic performance, these movements provide challenges to the status quo as illustrated below:

Social and environmental certification systems provide a source of hope. They challenge international trade rules; they make bridges between producers and consumers. Yes, they are small – some say

insignificant – but the fact that they exist, function and are growing challenges the status quo. This sends ripples into the water.

One of the most significant threats to activism for social change in this context is the possibility (and reality) that certain corporations will create façade social and environmental initiatives, or at best initiatives with weaker standards and less stringent verification systems. With their larger advertising budgets and media access, there is risk that they will convince governments and consumers of their being as effective and credible as the stakeholder-based initiatives. This example of public hope as defined by Peter Drahos (this volume) is seen in the following quote by a fairtrade respondent:

If our action, our way of working cannot counter these, we might end up having a system in place that releases the power from our system and introduces a light version of it – but [with] much more advertisement and promotion power behind it.

As described above, power dynamics play a critical role in struggles for social change. This quote illustrates the tensions between two different articulations of hope: the private hopes of powerful trans-national corporations to be transformed into public hope and the collective hope of the fair trade movement.

HOPE AND PROCESS

In order to understand how hope plays a role in social change, we need to conceptualise social change as a process over time. By examining the specific roles that NGOs take on in change processes, we then look at whether hope can be transferred to individuals, groups, organizations and institutions. Linked to the idea of transference, we also examine the importance of ideas in stimulating hope in social change processes. Finally, we explore the chronology of the relationships between hope and social change processes. In particular, we ask: Can hope be sustained over time?

One way to understand the role of NGOs in social change is as ‘bridges’ or facilitators, helping to bring the process forward. This may occur incrementally or in a more piecemeal manner. Keeping in touch with the grassroots is one of the key elements in this role as facilitator, and this is also one way in which hope is sustained – as expressed in the following quote by a labor migration expert based in the Philippines:

When I returned to the Philippines in 1990, one of the things that helped me readjust to life here was meeting ‘ordinary’ people in the provinces [in the course of doing research] and getting a surge of inspiration from various acts of commitment, generosity, and kindness in doing good for their communities and other people. This is one of the things that keep my hopes alive about this country.

Process is something that NGOs also experience as an organization in terms of their evolving ‘expertise’ or reorientation of aims and objectives to sustain hope. For example, many pro-migrant worker groups started through service provision

functions, offering immediate ‘crisis relief’ assistance. Many of them then gradually began to engage in advocacy and also empowerment programs. This is partly related to changes within the migration process itself and the prolonged stay of migrants overseas making NGOs realize that a different type of action was needed to increase the benefits for individual foreign workers. The next step from rights’ advocacy was the search for broader solutions to migrant problems (the root causes). This has somehow evolved into what is now current philosophy among some advocates: that more than just the provision of social and legal services is needed, and that is the mobilizing of migrants’ communities to recognize their basic economic and political strengths. The latest developments in this respect are so-called ‘reintegration saving programs’. The idea is that the replication of such saving programs in all overseas communities could potentially offer solutions that, in the long term, will end the vicious cycle of repeat or circular migration through the development of a vibrant local economy. Ground breaking work on such thinking is already being done in Asia. Because of their novelty, it is a matter for future research to explore how these ideas translate into practice, and more importantly into success stories. Important for NGOs’ role as facilitators of social change (which also functions to sustain hope) is hence the empowerment of their ‘constituents’.

If you want to fight for migrant workers, you should be part of them. It is a matter of empowerment – you are concerned for certain people, and in my opinion, to really know about their situation, to understand their real situation, you have to talk with them and share with them. You do not have to be like them, but you have to share and discuss – in my opinion.

The role of activist is seen here as keeping up hopes held by grassroots people by translating them into some kind of action.

Everybody has hopes and dreams, but without power nothing changes.

Ordinary people have no idea how to change things. So I think this kind of situation means the role of the activists is to support them to find alternatives – for those who have dreams and hope, but do not know how to change the situation.

Translating individual hopes and dreams into collective action is achieved through a process of empowerment. According to Kukita (1998; cited by Inaba, Oguya, Ogasawara, Tanno, and Higuchi, 2001), the process of empowering by NGOs can be divided into four stages: (1) gaining access to resources; (2) consciousness-raising; (3) participation in decision making; and (4) influencing others. In the context of migrant worker NGOs, not all engage in empowering through organizing and collective action; however for those that do engage in empowerment activities, education programs have been crucial.

Individual activists have typically also undergone a process in terms of having a history of involvement in some kind of ‘organising’. They often were engaged in political activism as students, women, or workers within a more localized labor movement allowing them to build up experience and skills which they can then mobilize to empower others:

[A]t that time (under Suharto's regime), the movement in Indonesia was very suppressed and on the campus at the University of Indonesia, there was an attempt to build a student movement. At that time, I did not see the student movement raise issues of women's oppression at all. In 1995, I set up a student women organization with my friends – a working group for women at the University of Indonesia. And we also had a women's NGO outside of the campus – a discussion group. In 1998 when the student movement became bigger, I still did not see the women's issues arise as part of the student movement. And the decision making process was totally dominated by men. The president of the student movement and all presidents were men. All decisions were made by men. And also the organization of demonstrations, all dominated by men. Then we set up a communication and action of women group. And then I always thought that to more articulate women's issues, I should be one of the decision makers. Then I proposed to be the President of the Political and Social Faculty at the Uni of Indonesia and then after that I was elected.

A few years later, this activist became involved in a women's solidarity group which specifically advocates on behalf of female migrant workers who constitute the bulk of Indonesia's labor migrants (60% of all migrant workers are women).

In order for hope to play a critical role in social change, there needs to be some mechanism by which it can be used as a tool for encouraging other people. One possibility is that hope itself cannot be transferred, though there is a process of interaction involving hope that can effect change in others as illustrated in the following quote:

I can't transfer my hope to someone else. However, my action, communication, explanation and the demonstration of my hope can impact on other people for their own consideration, but hope grows individually.

Another view is that hope can indeed be transferred between people across time and space which is important to sustain hope in the often slow process toward achieving social change:

Hope can be transferred to others. I consider myself the fourth generation of social movement activists in the Philippines (at least since Marcos) and because I interact with people, publish materials, etc. ideas are passed on.

As to whether hope can be transferred or not, perhaps it is possible to reconcile the two positions stated above. One reason why hope is perceived to be less effective in moving through organizations and institutions than through interaction between individuals may be because hope does indeed "grow individually." While hope may not be transferred between people, ideas definitely are. If ideas are transmitted better between individuals (either in written, verbal or other forms), then the role of hope may be to inspire others that these ideas are possible and worth fighting for.

According to a respondent based in the USA, in the process of social change, "ideas are one of the bedrocks of activism and hope." This places ideas firmly into our framework for understanding the role of hope in social change. Ideas can be

transferred between people; these ideas can inspire hope in others. Even when personal experiences differ, according to this NGO activist, “ideas are the same. Ideas about dignity, survival and respect”. A respondent in Europe observed that, through personal interaction, hope is something that people can see reflected in others. While hope itself may not necessarily be transferred, a process can follow by which hope seen in others inspires changes in ideas and in thoughts about actions in ourselves.

One respondent explained that in his NGO’s publications and other materials, they use the word ‘vision’ instead of the word ‘hope’. We wondered about the significance of this. Vision may in fact refer to an idea that is supported by hope. Many organisations have vision statements; these are not simply articulations of objectives, but refer to a positive statement of what the organisation will accomplish or become. For example, the International Social and Environmental Accreditation and Labelling Alliance (ISEAL), of which SAI, FLO and IFOAM are members, has the following vision: a world where ecological sustainability and social justice are the normal conditions of business. Embedded in this statement are normative ideas about what business should encompass as well as the hope that this is indeed possible and will be achieved. Both ideas that articulate social change and the hope that such change is achievable are critical components of any normative framework for social change.

Adding a further dimension of time to our understanding of the role of hope in social change, the discussion above points to “an idea for the better” as the initial motivating factor. If so, then what is the role of hope in this process? As one respondent explained:

For me, hope has a particular role; it is the gasoline you need to get the motor running. It is not so much an initial motivating factor. It is more something that stays... the development element of our social life and this indicates that it needs an action factor and an idea factor. It is like blood in our body, without it we can't live but by itself, it has no meaning.

This perspective illustrates a functional role for hope within the process of social change. Its value is not measured by itself alone but as a necessary 'active' ingredient in any social change process. In baking a cake, baking soda must come into contact with liquid in order to fulfil its role as a raising agent; similarly hope must be combined with actions and ideas in order for social change processes to occur. At the same time, this functional role is dependent upon a certain level of basic needs being met. As one migrant rights activist explained, many migrants do not think of hope; they are concerned with survival and security. As they are unable to link hope and action, given other preoccupations, this is the role of NGO activists. If hope has a functional role in social change, part of this function is to enlarge the process, to gain a greater voice and power to effect change. This process is illustrated below:

In 1992, we envisaged one super NGO comprising of 50 groups. I was part of that initiative. We called it an 'alliance for hope'. Visionaries start this process with a few people but as soon as they sit together, they discuss a process of enlargement, how to get funds and resources and how to become a movement.

In order for hope to be sustained over time, key positive actions and examples of change appear to be necessary. This is a view reflected by all our respondents, exemplified in the following quote:

Hope cannot be sustained without changes in outcomes. Hope needs food to survive and food is constant feedback, constant progress. If it becomes stagnant, hope will start dying.

However, this does not mean that movements cannot suffer setbacks. In fact some setbacks may inspire further commitment to social change as one respondent noted, "...changes of all kinds feed hope. Such changes could for instance mean that more people join the movement and it gains more force." Learning about examples of positive social change in a different part of the world can also inspire hope within another. Therefore, while there is a temporal dimension to the relationship between hope and action, the spatial dimension is expanding through globalization and increasing ease of communication.

Hope may also provide a critical time buffer for social change. Taking political action aimed at change invariably involves opportunism, since external political and economic factors play an important role in mediating the timeframe of social change processes. The crucial role of hope is that it can sustain a movement until the timing is right to enforce change. However, if hope is never linked to taking agency, it will be wasted and hence never translated into action. If one relies on hope for too long and if change is not achieved at some point, then hope collapses into despair.

It appears that hope requires examples of social change every once in while in order to maintain or raise its 'stock' levels. Just as life and societies have cycles, there can be cycles of hope. There may be high points where hope levels surge forward supported by the translation of ideas into action resulting in social change. There may be low points where people focus on survival, rather than any grand ideas of social change. When the timing and conditions are ripe, perhaps a dormant or low level stage in the cycle of hope can be renewed. Perhaps hope can be understood as a renewable resource for social change.

CONCLUSION

In this paper, we have explored the relationship between hope and agency in the contexts of migrant rights activism and alternative trading relationships created through social and environmental certification systems. Using interviews with key NGO respondents as a starting point for theoretical reflection, we have teased out a possible framework for understanding the role of hope within the complex process of social change.

The bedrock of this framework is the relationship between hope and agency. We have accepted a dynamic understanding of this relationship borrowing from Giddens (1984) and Lange (2002). As seen in various examples, through the actions of NGOs, hope can be harnessed. These actions can lead to an enabling form of power whereby participation in NGO-created activities can help marginalised people expand their networks, build capacity and gain new skills – and ultimately empower them. At the same time, NGO activism is bound to challenge the status quo. In this framework, the power dynamics of social change processes cannot be taken for

granted. As NGO activism is, by its very nature, focusing on change, there will generally be other actors who will resist this change, perhaps through the use of “public hope” (Drahos, this volume), thereby creating a clash of hopes.

Understanding that social change is a process over time, the next layer involves teasing out the dynamics of that process and the role of NGOs within it. It has been seen that the role of NGOs can evolve with changes in circumstances. NGOs can play a critical role as ‘bridges’ between people, translating individual hopes into combined efforts of action through organizing. We have theorized that while hope cannot be transferred directly from person to person, ideas can. Ideas play a critical role in the process of social change. Ideas can be transferred between people while the hope within individuals can be strengthened through sensing hope in others. This process is most effective between individuals and becomes more diffuse as relationships become less direct, through groups, organisations and institutions. The vision that combines ideas for the better and hope that these ideas can be realised is a necessary ingredient in social change processes through NGO activism.

Hope in this framework takes on a functional role; it is the ‘gasoline’ that keeps the motor running. It can help sustain a movement until the time is right and the opportunity for change appears. Examples of change are important in helping to maintain levels of hope, whether they take place in a neighbouring village or on the other side of the world. Accepting that the role of hope is functional, removed of any specific values, beliefs or context, it can then be understood to be universal. The only ingredient that needs to be present for hope to exist is a worldview that proposes that development, betterment, and/or change is possible. How hope is expressed in particular cultures and contexts will undoubtedly vary though the function of hope will be the same. Human beings may be ‘hard-wired’ for hope; hope is therefore

proposed as a functional characteristic of our humanness. While it may lie dormant for periods, hope can be renewed opportunistically through positive examples of change, through transference of ideas and through sensing hope in others. As articulated by one respondent:

...[W]e all hope we can make a difference and... fairtrade is an instrument for that. ... Only if you see success in entering markets and in positive impacts on the producer side, then there is enough gasoline in the tank to keep on going.

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¹ When quoting directly from the interviews, we will not disclose our respondents' name and affiliation to protect their privacy.

² We do not necessarily suggest a total de-linking from the state here. A synergy between NGOs and the state, an argument advanced by Grugel (2003), might be more realistic and successful.

³ Activism can be transnational in several respects. First, it may focus on transnational issues, for instance related to the environment or health problems. Second, the actors themselves may be transnational, either in the strong sense of having an organizational structure that is not territorially bounded and including citizens of more than one state (like transnational advocacy networks), or in the weaker sense of being concerned with issues in a country other than where the activists are citizens (as solidarity groups supporting an independence movement in a foreign country). Third, transnational methods and strategies may be applied. Fourth, the targets of activism may be based in one or several countries other than where the activists themselves are located, thus requiring cross-border interaction. Finally, the activists may hold transnational world views and consider themselves as "global citizens" (Piper and Uhlin 2003:5).

⁴ 'Transnational' in this context refers to transnational relations, defined as "regular interactions across national boundaries when at least one actor is a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf of a national government or an inter-governmental organization" (Risse-Kappen 1995:3).

⁵ Following Piper and Uhlin (2003:5), 'transnational' is here preferred because "many cross-border interactions do not extend across the world but are much more geographically limited". Filipino migrant worker NGOs have extended their networks mainly into Asia, North America and Europe – hence not globally in a strict sense of the term.

⁶ By contrast to images of 'floods' often evoked by governments of receiving countries, this global figure means that fewer than three per cent of the world's population have been living outside their home countries for a year or longer (IOM 2000). At the same time, migration tends to be concentrated in certain localities so that on a micro scale, this phenomenon appears grander than from a macro scale.

⁷ This is also reflected in public discourse whereby professionals are referred to as 'expats' and not as 'migrant workers' (Lee and Piper 2003).

⁸ The labor or employment laws in many countries explicitly exclude domestic work. Sex work is also not recognized in many countries as ‘proper’ work worthy of protective labor legislation.

⁹ See their website for more information at www.migrante.org.

¹⁰ The minimum number of ratifications differs with each UN convention. The requirement for the ICMR is twenty. All of the existing ratifications so far are from labor sending countries.

¹¹ The Campaign Steering Committee includes 16 leading international bodies on human rights, labor, migration and church organizations. See for more detail the Global Campaign website at: www.migrantsrights.org

A MUSEUM OF HOPE:
A STORY OF ROBBEN ISLAND

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ABSTRACT: This paper explores hope as a technology of collective governance through an exploration of the work that is being done to celebrate and promote a hope for a New South Africa at the Robben Island Museum – former prison to the political opponents of apartheid that is situated on a small island off the coast at Cape Town.

Keywords: Robben Island, hope, governance, reinvention

Hope is widely acknowledged as a desirable state of individual being, but less attention has been paid to its potential as a collective sensibility that can be steered in various directions by governing agencies. The manipulability of hope as a technology of governance raises normative issues that pertain to the authenticity and desirability of various states of hope consciousness. We draw upon Peter Drahos' analysis (this volume) to develop normative measures for evaluating hope-constituting initiatives through a case study of an initiative that the South African Government is promoting through the Robben Island Museum in South Africa.

WHAT IS HOPE?

We begin by relating this paper to the project of which all the papers in this volume are a part by asking "What is hope?" "Hope" to Thomas Aquinas, as John Cartwright notes, "is directed to a future good which is hard but not impossible to attain." This simple definition is one around which the papers in this volume coalesce. Peter Drahos in his paper takes up both elements of this definition in arguing that hope should be understood as a forward-looking sensibility or emotion that keeps us moving ahead in the face of adversity.

Philip Pettit (this volume) adopts a similar conception. Hope, Pettit argues, allows us to maintain a "fixity of purpose", a "cognitive resolve" that enables us to avoid falling prey to the ebbs and flows of evidence.

This conception of hope identifies it as a technology of governance that can be used both to govern the self – what Nicholas Rose calls “governing the soul” (Rose 1991) – and to govern collective life. As a technology of governance hope is a sensibility that shapes “the flow of events” to use Christine Parker and John Braithwaite’s (2003, 119) phrase, at both the individual and the collective level.

In suggesting that we think of hope as a technology of governance we are doing more, we hope, than simply rephrasing what the others we have mentioned have said. In seeing hope in this way we are flagging that hope can be, and is, deliberately constituted by various governing agents and agencies to regulate the flow of events. This, as Peter Drahos notes in his paper, raises the possibility that hope can be manipulated. This in turn raises the possibility that hope can be used as a device for exercising power over others.

In keeping with such questions, Peter Drahos concludes his paper by asking whether a hope that is politically constituted at the public level can be a force for good in the same way as both he and Philip Pettit argue it can be at the individual level. His answer is that it can, provided certain conditions are met. We want in our remarks to explore this question of what a technology for cultivating hope that meets these conditions might look like.

In talking about hope as something that can potentially be cultivated to promote a collective good, our focus will be on the ways in which the South African Government, in collaboration with Robben Island Museum’s designers and managers, have sought to promote a hope sensibility, through the museum exhibits, that will inspire South

Africans. Our focus will be their intentions and technologies as programmers of hope. The issue of whether their attempts to promote a hope sensibility are successful is beyond the scope of this analysis. Similarly, our focus is not on the South African reality but on a vision that those who are promoting it hope will inspire South Africans to move forward as they tackle the very difficult tasks they face in building a New South Africa.

CULTIVATING SENSIBILITIES

There is a sizable literature on the cultivation of collective sensibilities. It has been widely acknowledged that liberal modes of governance that attempt to govern through the freedom of subjects are dependent upon constituting political actors who are capable of exercising such freedom responsibly (Garland 2001; O'Malley 1992; O'Malley and Palmer 1996; Rose 1996; Rose and Miller 1992). Thus, liberal governments are constantly engaged in constituting sensibilities in their citizens that will enable them to govern with efficiency and a light touch – though Barry Hindess (2001) reminds us that this light touch can quickly become a heavy fist when governments are faced with those actors who have failed to assimilate the requisite sensibilities. As scholars drawing upon the work of Michel Foucault have detailed so well, the cultivation of sensibilities for responsible liberal citizenship is often achieved through governmental mechanisms such as systems of surveillance, sanctions and rewards which shape the mind through shaping conduct and conversely shape conduct through shaping consciousness (see for example Burchell, Gordon and Miller 1991; Dean 1999; Foucault 1977; 1991). Other theoretical

traditions, such as that inspired by the work of Pierre Bourdieu, in taking up the theme of the shaping of conduct through shaping sensibilities remind us of the importance for liberal governance of technologies that seek to act on the figurative plane to shape consciousness – through mobilising such symbolic resources as stories and iconic images with the intention of promoting desired ways of thinking and feeling (see for example Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992; Shusterman 1999; see also other traditions such as those represented by Augusto Boal 2000).

One of us explored this latter line of thought some time ago with Richard Ericson (Shearing and Ericson 1991), through examining the way in which older police officers used parables and anecdotes (that is, figurative resources) to shape the sensibilities of new recruits. The shaping of new police officers, Shearing and Ericson argued, did not involve providing them with sets of rules to follow but rather involved the constitution of a “way of being” out of which action would then flow. The principle underpinning this approach to shaping new recruits was that correct action would flow automatically from correct sensibilities.

The example that had motivated this line of thinking was a statement by a veteran police officer to a novice that the new officer should “always act as if he were on vacation”. What kind of instruction was this? It was certainly not a rule as to how to act of the “if X do Y” sort. Shearing and Ericson concluded that what the veteran was saying to the rookie was something like the following: “You know that feeling of being laid-back that you have when you are on holiday, well that is a sensibility you need to cultivate if you want to act effectively as a police officer.”

Similarly, it has been suggested that governors mobilise emblematic stories – concerning national heroes, great events and public initiatives of history – with a view to communicating a generalised “way of being” to citizens that it is thought will promote a well functioning society (see for example Leman-Langlois 1999; Leman-Langlois and Shearing 2003). Particularly important in transitional political environments that are faced with significant growing pains in the form of economic dislocation and rising crime that accompanies political reinvention is the engendering of a degree of hopefulness that things will improve providing the fledgling democracy is supported (for example Brewer 2003b; Deegan 2000; see also Courville and Piper this volume for an analysis of the importance of hope in transitional economies).

In exploring Peter Drahos’ question of whether constituted hope – and in particular a politically constituted hope in the form we’ve just outlined – can be a positive force, we examine the work that is being undertaken at the Robben Island Museum in South Africa. As we have already intimated, the Robben Island Museum is one of the initiatives that the South African government is supporting to promote a hope sensibility within South Africans in the context of that country’s ongoing political transition from apartheid to what is hoped will be a fully established, inclusive and prosperous democracy.

Like most museums Robben Island is a site for the preservation and exhibition of objects thought to be of lasting value. But as a site designed to promote a hope sensibility it is also more than that. It belongs to a class that we might think of as “governance museums” – that is, museums that are concerned with promoting sensibilities

rather than with simply exhibiting valued objects. In these museums the exhibits are intentionally vehicles for shaping consciousness. Another example of a governance museum, that we will have more to say about later, is the Museum of Tolerance in Los Angeles that exhibits and interprets the Holocaust. If we think beyond museums to symbolic sites more generally we might think of Robben Island as a site of “figurative governance” – that is, as an instance of figurative sites designed to shape sensibilities that it is hoped will promote a desired future by promoting certain ways of thinking and therefore acting across the population. Another way of putting this is to say that we will be exploring the way in which the South African government in collaboration with the management of the Robben Island Museum is seeking to shape the identities of South Africans as part of what John Brewer (2003a; 2003b) has termed “citizenship education”.

To return to Drahos, we will be exploring the extent to which “public hope” can incorporate some of the positive features that he identifies in instances of “private” and “collective hope”. For Peter Drahos these positive features have to do with the authenticity of private and collective hope – authentic in the sense that they are constituted by individuals who make the choice to hope themselves rather than having hope imposed on them. Drahos refers to this sense of authenticity when he talks about people either alone or collectively “placing” themselves “in a state of hope.” This can be contrasted with a situation where individuals are *placed* in a state of hope through the use of manipulative technologies. There is, of course, a fine line between an authentic facilitative technology of governance that permits people to choose to hope and a process

in which hope is imposed as Sasha Courville and Nicola Piper (this volume) observe in their paper. Our concern will be with this fine line and how it perhaps can, and should, be drawn. We turn now to probe these issues through examining the intentions and actions of the designers and managers of Robben Island.

ROBBEN ISLAND AND THE ROBBEN ISLAND MUSEUM

Robben Island has a long history as a place of exclusion, having served a variety of carceral purposes over its history including the confinement of mutinous sailors, lepers, the mentally ill and tribal leaders who fought against the colonisation of Southern Africa (see Buntman 1996a; 1996b; 1997; Deacon 1996; Strange and Kempa 2003). The apartheid government put the site to use as the prison where it attempted to isolate the leading political opponents of apartheid. This is where Nelson Mandela spent 18 of his 27 years as a political prisoner.

Robben Island, as a prison, was designed as a place that would cultivate a sensibility of hopelessness amongst those who resisted, or who might resist, apartheid governance. It is worth noting that “apartheid”, in Afrikaans, means “separateness”. It is this foundational rationality of separateness between people with ostensible “racial differences” that underpinned all of the policies and technologies of governance that were enacted by the government of the old South Africa. Seen in this light, the technique of isolating the political opponents of apartheid at Robben Island can be understood as consistent with a broader ideology of governing through “separateness” – in this case, by

isolating the leaders of the resistance to apartheid, the government sought to “crush the spirit of the people” by “crushing the struggle itself” (Interview Ahmed Kathrada, August 1998). Ahmed Kathrada (at present the Chair of the Robben Island Trust) was one of the earliest and highest profile political prisoners on the island. He was jailed in 1963 along with Nelson Mandela. Looking back to this time, Kathrada noted in his interview with us that “this [sensitivity] was summed up by a senior prison official...who told us in so many words, that in five years’ time, no one in the world would remember the name of Nelson Mandela” (Ibid).

As history has shown, the strategy of governing through separateness has proven to be a spectacular failure. The history of the island through the apartheid years is one of sustained resistance and surprising political activity amongst the prisoners and, surreptitiously, between the prisoners and the struggle movement back on the mainland (for academic accounts see Buntman 1996a; 1996b; 1997; Deacon 1996; Hutton 1994; Rioufol 1999; 2000; for prisoners’ accounts see Alexander 1994; Dlamini 1984; Mandela 1994). Embodying the slogan of “each one teach one”, the prison gained the moniker of the ‘University of Robben Island’ amongst those involved in the struggle, as many people learned to read and write, while others went on to attain ‘diplomas’ in history, economics and law signed by Nelson Mandela. The island remained throughout a centre for political debate – and it is widely reported by former inmates and acknowledged in academic accounts that the philosophy of inclusive governance that eventually came to form the basis of the new democratic South Africa was refined between groups at Robben Island (see Buntman 1996a; 1996b).

The failure of governance through separateness nicely illustrates the point we made earlier about keeping distinct the question of what governmental programmers intend and the technologies they design and deploy to realize their intentions from the issue of whether their intentions are realized. As we will elaborate in a moment, Robben Island Museum celebrates and builds upon the failure of the apartheid designers' plans and programs to create the sense of hopelessness and acceptance of separateness between racial groups that was intended, as well as the triumph of an inclusive vision for governance that was refined within the walls of the prison.

It is important to note that the transformation of the site into a museum was largely a foregone conclusion within resistance circles as apartheid began to crumble in the late 1980s. The African National Congress government established the "Future of Robben Island Committee" in 1995, chaired by Ahmed Kathrada, which reviewed some 200 public submissions as to the fate of the island. In response, and drawing on discussions that had taken place at the University of the Western Cape in the last days of the National Party government of the apartheid era, the committee reported to the cabinet in September 1996 and recommended that the island become a museum. The government agreed. Along with an additional major initiative – The Truth and Reconciliation Commission – Robben Island was to be developed as a central pillar in the government's program of renewal, nation-building, and reconciliation. As President Nelson Mandela noted at the inauguration of the Museum in January 1997:

I am confident that we will together find a way to combine the many dimensions of the island, and that we will do so in a manner that recognises above all its pre-eminent character as a symbol of the victory of the human spirit over political oppression; and of reconciliation over enforced division....When Cabinet decided that Robben Island should be developed as a National Monument and National Museum, it set in motion its redevelopment as a cultural and conservation showcase for South Africa's democracy which will also maximise its educative potential.

As a museum, what is displayed are not simply the physical artefacts of the island but much more importantly the lives and experiences of the political prisoners. It is these lives and experiences, as much as the physical features of the island, that constitute the preserved and exhibited objects thought to be of lasting value by the South African government and the museum's directors and employees.

MANDELA'S HOPE

We turn now to elaborate upon the hope of the political prisoners of Robben Island – namely, a hope for a New South Africa that Mandela has come to epitomize. A critical feature of this hope was what a New South Africa should *not* be. As we have noted above, this negative vision was a key element in the resistance by prisoners to the technologies of Apartheid designed to promote hopelessness that is now celebrated in and

through the museum. What South Africa should not be is a place that responds in-kind to apartheid by mirroring apartheid.

The culture of political resistance that the museum celebrates was centred around a deliberate refusal by the political prisoners to respond in-kind to the actions of warders and their superiors. They refused to respond to hatred with hatred. They refused, as they have expressed it, to be less as human beings than they could be – a total rejection of the notion of separateness along lines of “difference” drawn across (imaginary) racial groups. It is this refusal, more than anything else, which Mandela has come to represent.

It is perhaps this refusal to respond to hatred with hatred that, more than any other single factor, made a negotiated transition in South Africa possible (Deegan 2000). It is this refusal that now stands at the centre of the vision of a new South Africa. This refusal is what the Robben Island Museum has been, and is being, designed to exhibit and through this to celebrate as a “way of being” worthy of South Africans. It is the hope that this sensibility will indeed become a defining sensibility of South Africans, and a sensibility that will spread and found a new non-racist, harmonious, and prosperous society, that is the hope of Robben Island.

This sensibility that the Robben Island Museum has been designed to constitute has been beautifully expressed by Ahmed Kathrada, in a statement made at the time that the Future of Robben Island Committee reported to Government in 1996. Kathadra (1997) stated:

...we will not want Robben Island to be a monument to our hardship and suffering. We would want it to be a monument reflecting the triumph of the human spirit against the forces of evil, a triumph of freedom and human dignity over repression and humiliation; a triumph of wisdom and largeness of spirit against small minds and pettiness; a triumph of courage and determination over human frailty and weakness; a triumph of non-racialism over bigotry and intolerance; a triumph of the new South Africa over the old” (10-11).

As this statement makes clear there is a positive as well as a negative side to the coin of meaning that Robben Island as a museum seeks to embody and express. This positive side that the refusal noted above draws forth is nicely captured by a southern African concept that expresses the “largeness of spirit” to which Kathadra refers. This is the concept of “ubuntu” – a concept that is deeply rooted in Nguni culture (that is the culture of southern Africans who speak linguistically similar languages including Xhosa and Zulu).

Archbishop Desmond Tutu – another totemic figure of the New South Africa who was the chairperson of another iconic institution (The Truth and Reconciliation Commission) – has expressed the meaning of ubuntu as follows. Ubuntu, he said, means that we all belong to a unified “bundle of life” – a person with ubuntu “is diminished when others are tortured or oppressed, or treated as if they were less than who they are” (Tutu 1999, 34-35).

What is important to note here, and this is something we will come back to, is that the hope of Robben Island is deeply grounded in the experience of South Africans – both through Nguni culture and through the experience of the islanders. Mandela's hope thus integrates a widespread African sensibility with a more specific socio-political one that is oriented towards a New South Africa.

This brings us back to the question of authentic hope and the possibility of authenticity where sensibilities are deliberately constituted through governmental programs. Does a politically cultivated sensibility that draws upon deeply rooted cultural sensibilities discredit these sensibilities or does this cultural embedding promote authenticity? Is it possible to constitute a sensibility that strives for a public vision, for a public hope, without diminishing the autonomy and freedom of those whose sensibility is being shaped? More generally, can a public hope be constituted towards political reinvention that is normatively desirable?

CULTIVATING HOPE

To answer these questions, we will now look in greater detail at the nature of the institution that has been established to give effect to the technology of hope that the South African government is seeking to promote in partnership with the management of the Robben Island Museum. In this examination we will rely on three sources of data collected in 1998 and 1999. First, interviews with the museum's founding Director and his management team; second, participant observation of tours of the island; and third, interviews with guides who conducted these tours.

The technologies employed by the museum were founded on a single overriding assumption. Namely, that the most persuasive reason that South Africans can have for maintaining a sensibility of hope and a vision of ubuntu during the difficult times that lie ahead, is the ‘fact’ that the prisoners who struggled against apartheid under extraordinarily difficult conditions were able to cultivate, sustain and practice a sensibility of ubuntu and a hope for a new South Africa that embraced this. From this assumption follows the premise that a museum experience that simply exposed South Africans to this prison ‘reality’ – rather than imposing it upon them – would be a powerful force in cultivating a hope sensibility for a New South Africa. Given this conclusion, the museum designers and managers have sought to structure visits to the island to promote as much as possible a direct experience of the prisoners’ hope sensibility and its accompanying “way of being”.

What is required, from this point of view, is an authentic and relatively unmediated experience of the hopeful life that was regarded as essential to the experience of the political prisoners – the experience of Mandela being the totemic instance. A critical reason for simply making the ‘reality’ of prisoners’ sensibilities available to visitors was also that to do otherwise would undermine the freedom and largeness of mind that ubuntu requires. To manipulate an acceptance of ubuntu would be to contradict the spirit of ubuntu. This attitude was expressed in the decision by museum’s management to open the island to visitors nearly immediately after it was declared a museum rather than wait until it had been fully developed in an institutional sense as a museum. As the

Director noted, “from Day One we’ve had people in the space, [experiencing] the sheer power of the space” (Interview December 1999).

The idea of facilitating a direct and unmediated experience appears, judging by other academic accounts, to be in sharp contrast to the experience designed by the management of the Museum of Tolerance where, as Lisus and Ericson (1995) observe, guides anticipate the visitors’ experience with a voice-over designed to interpret what they see before they experience it. Guides, they write, provide “moral interpretations of the exhibitry” in ways that parallel the “journalist’s voice-over in television” (Lisus and Ericson 1995, 3). Indeed, the Director of the Robben Island Museum made clear that his team were aware of other museums that seek to shape a future rather than simply exhibit a past. One of these museums mentioned explicitly in our interviews with Robben Island management was the Museum of Tolerance. The Director of the Robben Island Museum and his staff appear to share the conclusions drawn by Nicola Lisus and Richard Ericson that at the Museum of Tolerance visitors were being “entertained into submission” (1995, 8) and that the site had become an “emotions factory” (1995, 18). The Robben Island Museum staff stood firm in the belief that this undermined the freedom to choose that they believed was essential to transmitting the message of hope in a gentle manner that reflected ubuntu values. Visitors, they insisted, should be free to respond to the experiences of Robben Island in the light of their previous experiences and history.

In commenting on lessons learned for the Robben Island Museum from their interpretations of the Museum of Tolerance, the Director of Robben Island noted that, for him, the other experience is:

like a tunnel, you follow the story of the Holocaust and there is no way of escaping out of the story. You come in the tunnel and you had to go out the other side and, if one is not feeling emotionally strong that day or you want out of it, you can't. And I think that's a lesson for me about Robben Island: you mustn't force a story onto people. You must allow people to opt out depending on where they are at (Interview, Director, December 1999).¹

Consistent with this approach, the management of the Robben Island Museum had, at the time of the research, refused to provide scripts for tour guides. Furthermore, rather than use exclusively professionally trained guides, the museum has undertaken an outreach program to employ ex-prisoners as guides and simply encouraged them to tell their stories. The use of ex-prisoners as guides has made, in the words of the Director:

concrete our vision of making [Robben Island] a living museum and a new kind of museum – a place of engagement and education rather than it being a fixed narrative [for] a passive observer (Interview December 1999).

Indeed, the tour guides we interviewed were unanimous in the expression of their own desire to communicate a narrative of inclusion, tolerance, and the triumph of the

¹ We do not wish to make claims about the Museum of Tolerance, which we have neither visited nor studied. Our interest here is simply in how it was seen by the designers and managers of Robben

human spirit. While this was repeated to us in almost all the interviews with different tour guides, this sentiment is best expressed in the following three statements:

As a peace-loving person, I would like us as South Africans to go beyond the pain and not to start doing the kinds of things that were done to us for all those centuries – that I do not want to see in South Africa. So for me, keeping the memory [of what happened at Robben Island] alive and allowing people to experience that, and also talking about the healing we went through as human beings, discovering the common humanity, those things must be the basis of whatever we say or do on Robben Island (Tour Guide #1, Interview May 1998).

And as the second tour guide expressed it:

If you know the South African society, you know that segregation – in the words of South Africans, apartheid – bedevilled the populace for centuries. And the result is that we are still a very divided society because of colonial rule. And I realised that here was an opportunity for me to talk about my experiences in jail, and how [the prisoners representing very different political views] found one another. How we had to learn to live together. How our common humanity was realised in jail. And I thought that this would be an appropriate message, to give to South Africans in particular, but (also) to the whole world. So that is what I've

Island: the way it contrasted with their museum and how their response to the Museum of Tolerance shaped their own museum technology.

been doing and I've been trying as much as possible to spread the message of the need for greater tolerance and less prejudice...And if I can convince 10 people out of 200 per day, then I think I am actually making a contribution to the healing of this very divided world we live in (Tour Guide #2, Interview December 1999).

And finally the third:

While we are talking about painful things [here on the island], at the end of the day, [Robben Island] should not be a symbol of hatred but of peace and justice. This is what we tell people. We must understand that we should not go back to our differences, we must throw away our differences. Let's go forward, all of us as South Africans. Because, at the end of the day, we want to build, so ours is to build not to destroy. That is why I make sure [visitors] understand that human forces have overcome evil forces. It is on that note that we are talking about reconstruction. It is on that note that we are talking about nation building. Ours is to build (Tour Guide #3, Interview December 1999).

As these quotes suggest – and as we observed as participants on the tours themselves – each story told by the guides is personal but it is also allegorical. This is to say that each tour narrative conveys a synthetic 'truth' about the island, apartheid, the lives of prisoners, their vision, and so on, through a patchwork of personal anecdotes that are grounded in the struggle against apartheid. While these stories are being told, persons taking the tours were able to ask particular questions. On several occasions when we

were on the tours, visitors presented particular interpretations with which they were familiar and asked of tour guides whether their own experiences supported or contradicted the visitors' own understandings.

In outlining the methods they were employing to inspire visitors into adopting a hope sensibility, the tour guides spoke of the importance of drama in their presentations and the need to tailor their narratives to their audience – to their political consciousness and their historical sophistication as these became apparent in the course of tours. One had, they emphasized, to talk to people who had supported apartheid (who were sometimes reluctant to acknowledge the brutality of apartheid) differently to foreigners who were often apocalyptic in expectations about South Africa's future. So too one needed to speak to black South Africans, who continue to live in the aftermath of apartheid, differently. A tour guide and former political prisoner elaborates:

[Some Afrikaners] come with a totally negative attitude, and you can see it, because the body language tells you. Instead of listening to you, the guy would turn his back, you know, or sneer, or walk away – show disinterest – or talk while you're talking. These are the tell-tale signs, and your question is now, "I want to reach that person, what am I going to do?" If it means altering slightly, so you actually snare that person, then you do so. You're not just like a parrot – that you turn on and then just babble. You learn to read your audience. You're not going to alter the facts, but you present the facts in such a way that you are able

to send over...positive messages, because the negative is always there (Tour Guide #2, Interview December 1999).

While the line may at times be fine between a process of invitation and an “emotions factory,” Robben Island, we suggest, remains consistently on the side of engagement and education at a pace appropriate to the state of preparedness of an individual visitor.

The understanding of the history that informs the museum’s objectives of assembling an inclusive narrative is of great importance in evaluating the nature of their program for inspiring hope. As the museum develops, it is very crucial to Robben Island that it:

remains a platform for critical debate and lifelong learning. Because that’s one of the big legacies that we inherited from Mandela and all those thousands of prisoners who argued amongst each other within [political] organizations, between organizations and obviously they contested the whole apartheid ruling class version of history.... So that notion of critical debate, contestation is very important (Director, Interview December 1999).

This insistence on the island as a space for deliberation that may and does lead to different conclusions is critical to the issue of constructing a sensibility that is authentic in the sense that Peter Drahos sees private and collective hopes as being authentic.

Authentic hope in Drahos’ sense is hope that “leads into a cycle of expectation, planning

and action that sees the agent explore the power of her agency”. This “enabling function of hope”, he writes, “is key to the success of many individual projects and can be key to the survival of the individual”. This was certainly true of many of the individuals who were prisoners on the island, as the Mandela image testifies. It was also true of the prisoners as a group who shared a collective hope – a “collective memory”. Our question is, is it also an accurate description of the hope that the Robben Island Museum seeks to inspire by telling the story of the lives of the prisoners? Drahos raises doubts about the shift from private and collective hope to public hope when he notes how “commercial actors understand that if they can link their products to the private hopes of individuals they will sell more of those products and gain consumer loyalty” and when he goes on to note how politicians can and do attempt to manipulate public hope in similar ways.

In evaluating the degree to which the museum’s invitation to “hope” is truly an invitation rather than an imposition, the degree to which room for alternate perspectives are being presented is relevant. In fostering an environment where there is a degree of openness – where one is not trapped in a tunnel – the Robben Island Museum has attempted (increasingly so as it has begun to mature as an institution) to create exhibits that broaden the presentation of the range of political perspectives that were represented amongst the inmates at the prison. One critical such exhibition is the “Cell Stories” Exhibit that was introduced at the later stages of our fieldwork in 1999, which features artefacts of importance to particular prisoners, which are presented in otherwise stark cells with a single placard on the wall (and in some cases button-operated digital recordings) that express the significance of those objects in the words of the owners of the

artefacts. Again in contrast to the Museum of Tolerance, these narratives are the words of the prisoners themselves, and the recorded voices are not those of actors, reading scripts, playing the role of inmates (Lisus and Ericson 1995). As a co-designer of the Exhibit explained, he selected the items so as to represent the broadest range of voices possible, so as to counter the idea that there was a single master-narrative of resistance during the years of the prison: there was real debate that resulted in conflict between members of different political groups that led in some cases to people altering their views. As he put it to us:

...there is a lot of myth surrounding political prisoners. ... [Cell Stories] unmask that: there is a lot of contradictions and opposing views within those stories that prisoners are telling you. If you look at the objects that are exhibited it's like a single object per person... We're...creating space for the multiple voices of Robben Island. You would find that different organizations were here, different people were here, and their thoughts were different...they represented different things (Exhibition Co-designer, Interview December 1999).

Other new exhibits are already extending this development. Notable among these is the Women's Exhibit being housed in one of the buildings that was used for the rare visitors' meetings with the prisoners at the island. Guided tours now also go beyond the prison itself to include a bus tour around the island as a whole, with a comprehensive travelogue outlining the histories of captives of the imperial project as well as the lepers

and others suffering from medical illness who were concentrated on Robben Island over the years.

As we have noted several times, the line between manipulating a response and allowing people to experience something that might inspire a response is a fine one. In considering the difficulty of balance in drawing this line, the Robben Island Museum Director had the following to say about the sort of engagement that he hoped visitors would experience:

There are two ways in which we think people can be affected in a way that makes them think about themselves and the world around them. The first one is simply travelling from Cape Town to the island. You've been taken out of your daily environment on a trip to an island that in itself is quite a special thing, especially for children and people who have never seen the sea before and you've got this beautiful view of Table Mountain. The other one is, of course, just coming to stand in the space where someone like Mandela spent 18 years in a very small space, which even ex-prisoners when they come back, say they never realized it was so small. And ordinary people just see this space, see what people must have been through and how they emerged from that and you can't be unaffected by that. And that to me is a notion of pilgrimage – pilgrimage goes through different stages: Your departure point; period of journeying; period of destabilization; a period of catharsis; a period of re-establishing yourself; and then arriving back again (Director, Interview December 1999).

While a “pilgrimage” to Robben Island may not be as orchestrated an experience as a visit to the Museum of Tolerance is regarded as being, it is clearly not an entirely unmediated experience either. Indeed, the very notion of a completely unmediated experience is an ideal type – there are very few if any such experiences. Rather the idea of an unmediated experience stands at an end of a continuum where the other end is an experience that is completely manipulated. Everywhere along the continuum our experience is constructed to varying degrees. So, the question is not whether our experience is constructed or not but rather how it is constructed and towards what ends? Is what is happening facilitation, in the sense that Drahoš has in mind when he talks about the need for “facilitative institutions” that can foster “good hope”, or is it about the constitution of a submissive consciousness?

Perhaps at this point it might be useful to reflect on what we take to be Foucault’s conception of freedom as a space for personal reinvention (Foucault 1997). It is such a space that we want to suggest that Drahoš has in mind when he talks of the possibility of public hope being “a contingent force for the good”. He suggests that hope is a force for the good when three conditions hold. First, it is “judged by truth”; second it is “the subject of cold analysis”; and third, it is “underpinned by social arrangements that maximize the opportunity for bearers of truth about public hope to come forward.”

If the above interpretation of the technologies used at the Museum of Tolerance is correct, then this would provide an example of a case where Drahoš’ conditions have not been realized. On the other hand, precisely because Robben Island is an orchestrated

setting that seeks to promote facilitative social arrangements that encourage inclusive deliberation and a direct experience, the museum might come close to meeting these tests. Our reasons for coming to this conclusion are not simply that Drahos' conditions are being realized within the museum itself, although this is part of the story. There is a deeper reason that has to do with the fact that the hope celebrated by the museum emerged out of the crucible of deliberation that the prisoners created during their periods of imprisonment – that is, that it is grounded in a collective memory.

If this analysis is correct then perhaps it is appropriate to characterize the Robben Island Museum as an institution grounded in a legacy of deliberation that has worked to transform private and collective hopes into a public hope through drawing on and extending collective memory. This deliberative grounding is deepened by the fact that the hope that emerged through the debate and engagement that characterized the life of prisoners on the island resonates with a deeply embedded and central value of Nguni culture. If this conclusion is accepted then it might give a new meaning to the phrase that is often used to refer to the tip of the peninsula on which Cape Town is located, namely that it is the “Cape of Good Hope.”

CONCLUSION

The major theme running through this paper is, to what extent can the political constitution of hope as a technique of governance be normatively desirable? Should governments and other governing agencies be seeking to promote hope in their

populations at all? And if the answer is yes, what types of hope and under what conditions are such endeavours acceptable? As Foucault (1997) might well remind us, the degree to which such practices constitute “authentic” identities is always an open question – indeed, the pessimist in Foucault would hasten to point out that such an enterprise being engaged in by governments is always dangerous, as by necessity it tends to close off other alternatives in thinking and being to citizens. We can certainly accept the point that these identities are not “authentic” in a (classical liberal) sense that they originate in some sort of pre-discursive human nature – they are of course, and by necessity, constituted precisely because neo-liberal approaches to minimal government are dependent upon a constituted “responsible” citizenry.

In considering the issue of authenticity we have looked to the conditions and technologies used to constitute a hope sensibility. We have seen how the hope being constituted on the island, as well as the conditions and technologies used, have deep deliberative roots in the history of the prison itself, the broader struggle movement against apartheid, and indigenous southern African culture more generally. In Drahos’ terms the public hope is deeply rooted in individual and collective hope. This is reflected in the work of the museum staff in their insistence that visitors should be invited (but not compelled) to share in the inspiration of the island and to experience the range of voices that comprised the islanders. To return to Foucault (1997), we conclude that the Robben Island Museum has been, and is being, constituted as a space that invites the possibility of personal reinvention, and through this, the collective reinvention of South Africans.

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EMANCIPATION AND HOPE

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ABSTRACT: It is concluded that the best way to trigger the reciprocal relationship between hope and emancipation is to innovate with institutions that jointly build hope and emancipation. Handouts to the poor without nurturing optimism to empower themselves to solve their own problems are not the solution. Nor is a psychologism that builds hope without concrete support and the flow of resources needed for structural change. Cognitive change in how people imagine a better world, micro-institutional change (illustrated here with the “Emancipation Conference”) and macro-structural change must be strategically integrated for emancipatory politics to be credible.

Keywords: hope, optimism, empowerment, restorative justice, child welfare

The structure of this paper will be first to discuss how hope has ceased being the virtue it once was and how this may foster disengagement and depression in late modern peoples rather than emancipation. A recursive relationship is posited between hope and emancipation as fundamental to explaining wealth and poverty in capitalist societies. Young people are especially at risk of never learning how to grasp hope through emancipation and emancipation through hope. Next the concrete Californian idea of an Emancipation Conference that applies restorative justice principles to future-building for young people in difficult circumstances is described. These conferences involve an explicit methodological commitment to identifying strengths and building out from them, as opposed to solving problems in young peoples' lives.

This strategy is then generalized in the idea of Youth Development Circles. It seeks to respond to what is conceived as the dual structural dilemma of human and social capital formation in contemporary economies. The first element of the dilemma is that with children whose families lack endowments of human and social capital, we rely on state-funded education systems to compensate. Yet we quickly run up against limits in the capabilities of formal education bureaucracies to make up for deficits that, particularly in the case of social capital, are profoundly informal. More informal, flexibly networked compensatory institutions are needed for human and social capital formation, and this is the idea of the Youth Development Circle. We can be evidence-based about experimenting with such ideas, learning by monitoring which micro interventions contribute to structural change (Dorf and Sabel 1998). A politics of emancipation (plans, resources for the poor and concrete social support) recursively linked to a politics of

hope, where hope happens through and with emancipation, rather than before it, and emancipation also occurs through hope, may be common elements between the daily micro practice of Nelson Mandela (see Clifford Shearing and Michael Kempa's paper in this volume) and Californian Emancipation Conferences.

HOPE LOST

I believe I recall when our editor discovered hope as an important topic for the social sciences. We were travelling in Europe with our young children. One of the games we played was guessing at which vices and virtues were represented in the sculptures and paintings of vice and virtue in medieval cathedrals and other places such art was found. We were all best at identifying gluttony. The one we persistently had most trouble with was hope. For citizens of the twenty-first century hope hardly seems a virtue at all. Worldly-wise cynicism or critique seem more plausible candidates than hope as late modern virtues. So, as John Cartwright in his paper in this volume points out, Medieval legends of hope are perfect for parody, as in Monty Python and the Holy Grail.

Most people assume that optimism and pessimism are opposite poles of a single dimension. Psychological research suggests this is not the case (Fincham 2000; Garber 2000, Gillham 2000). The factors that reduce one do not necessarily increase the other. Some people experience a lot of optimism and pessimism in their lives, some little of either, others much more of one than the other. It seems that there is not a strong negative correlation between optimism and pessimism as in the left side of Figure 1. The

right side, where optimism and pessimism are independent dimensions of our experience, is closer to the truth

Insert Figure 1 about here

It may be that moderns see hope as a vice because when forced to choose between hope and scepticism (which they read as realism), they would rather be realists and sceptics. But they are only on the horns of this dilemma because they falsely think of optimism-pessimism as bipolar. When we view optimism and pessimism as more orthogonal, we might decide we want to be in the top right hand quadrant of the two dimensional model in Figure 1. For example, if we are scholars, we are best to think our ideas brilliant when we push through our first draft; thinking our ideas dull puts us at risk of writer's block. Yet if we persist with a rosy view when we rework subsequent drafts, we will not learn from critics who do us the kindness of reading the draft. When we write second drafts we can try to cultivate pessimism just as assiduously as we cultivate optimism in the early stages of a project to prevent ourselves from killing ideas in the womb. Neither persistent optimists nor persistent pessimists make good scholars. However, in the scholarly practice of supervising PhD students I am convinced that the vice of persistent pessimism is the more common one. Writer's block born of hopelessness is the pre-eminent cause of collapsed doctoral projects. And the most common error of their supervisors is too high a ratio of critique to encouragement.

Indeed, it is a more generalized pathology of late modern social science that the incentives in the academy for staying in the bottom right hand corner of the two

dimensional model in Figure 1 are too strong. Critique induces less vulnerability than creating something laid open to critique. When the construction site is abandoned because everyone works on the deconstruction site, we find ourselves surrounded by rubble. The good thing about the critique game is that it reveals to us the downside of innovative ideas. It allows us to be more systematic about cataloguing the costs of a new policy, for example. But playing “the believing game” (Tannen 1998) equally has the advantage of enabling us to be more systematic about exploring the benefits of a new policy. It is alternating between the believing game and the critique game as an institutionalized practice of the academy that allows us to be most systematic about discovering all the positives and all the negatives about an idea. The want of hope to play the believing game in criminology was extreme in Robert Martinson’s (1974) review of rehabilitation programs that (wrongly) concluded in its title “Nothing Works”. “Nothing Works” was the most influential article of the 1970s in this field. Sadly, Martinson committed suicide soon after writing it.

There are, even in the academy, ways of institutionalizing hope, rewarding work on the construction site. The Nobel Prize is an example; you won’t win one with a devastating critique. Martin Seligman (2000) is of the view that a social science of hope is a way off because the academy is part of late modern society and therefore part of the problem. He points out that in the last three decades of the twentieth century there were 46,000 published psychological papers on depression and only 400 on joy. Moving toward the topic of this paper, racism, sexism, ageism are more popular topics than emancipation. Seligman’s plea is for a science of human strength and virtue to balance the science of social problems and vice.

Seligman deplores a world that sheds few tears for the death of Mother Teresa at the same time that it wallows in grief at the victim-hood of a Princess Diana – bulimic, anorectic, suicidal, victimized by the infidelity and indifference of Prince Charles, blaming of others for her victim-hood as manifest in her brother's intemperate, admired speech at her funeral (Seligman, 2000, 424-6). For Seligman, the fact that late moderns wallow in such a pessimistic focus of grief (or cannot see hope as a virtue depicted in medieval art) are part of what explains why the risk of depression in US children increased at least ten-fold during the past half century (Seligman, 2000; 2002), why youth suicide rates have increased sharply throughout most of the Western world. In addition to correlating negatively with depression, optimism correlates positively with happiness (Myers, 2000). Here the data are not so gloomy as with depression and suicide; after rising strongly in the US until 1956, happiness has been edging down only slightly for the past half century (Layard, 2003). Yet this is surprising given that the improvement in wealth, leisure time and particularly in health has been extraordinary in this period of history.

HOPE SOLVES PROBLEMS

Want of hope is implicated in our learning to be helpless in the face of adversity (Seligman 1975). Hope is not much use on its own. Satterfield (2000) argues that it is most adaptive when combined with integrative complexity, that is, the capacity to contemplate the complexity of problems, seeing them from multiple perspectives. One reason high-hope people overcome helplessness is that they more clearly conceptualize their goals than low-hope people (Snyder et al. 1991). They also cope more adaptively

because they generate alternative paths to their goals, especially when the path they try first is blocked (Irving, Snyder and Crowson 1998; Snyder et al. 1991). Most critically from the perspective of integrating the critique and believing games, the psychologists tell us that optimists have a superior ability to attend to and elaborate negative information and to then use this information to revise their coping strategies (Aspinwall and Brunhart 2000). Hope engenders more active coping, reduces denial and prevents disengagement from stressful situations (Alloy, Abramson and Chiara 2000).

Paradoxically for those obsessed with the virtues of pessimism for correcting errors, the adaptiveness engendered by hope means that optimists are actually quicker to disengage from unsolvable laboratory tasks (Janoff-Bulman and Brickman 1982). It follows from this that optimists need their pessimistic side. What seems to lead people to become depressive and helpless is not so much pessimism, which is contingently healthy, as “pessimistic rumination” (Satterfield 2000, 354-5), an inability to flip out of pessimism into optimism.

Learned helplessness, disengagement in the face of stress, failures of active coping and failures of persistence are particularly prevalent among the poor and the oppressed. This is the first connection we make between emancipation and hope. Emancipation is about freeing people who are weakened by domination so they become strong. The strategy I seek to explain for enabling the emancipation of dominated people is to institutionalize spaces that cultivate and celebrate their strengths. Such spaces might recursively institutionalize hope and emancipation.

THE RECURSIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HOPE AND EMANCIPATION

Nelson Mandela was to many people the most inspiring leader of the twentieth century because of the extraordinary circumstances of 27 years of imprisonment in which he kept the flame of hope burning within his heart, kindling embers of hope in those around him. Clifford Shearing and Michael Kempa's paper in this volume reminds us of the form and significance of Mandela's hope in emancipating the people of South Africa from Apartheid. Hope in the face of overwhelming odds of oppression is a vital part of the make-up of the political vanguard for emancipation. Yet the mass of peoples under the yoke of long-term oppression only experience the hope of the political vanguard in very partial ways. For them, the political dynamic needed is more one of emancipation breeding hope than of hope breeding emancipation. This is the much longer running struggle, that Mandela well understood, and that South Africa still faces today – genuinely tackling the poverty of black people so they might have a sense of optimism about their future.

Both the “hope⇒emancipation” and the “emancipation⇒hope” dynamics are important in the politics of liberation, with the former more important for the political vanguard, the latter for transforming the conditions of the masses. The anti-slavery movement of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries infected its activists with the, at first, implausible hope that slavery could be overthrown. Finally it was, or mostly was. Yet still in the twenty-first century within the nation that is the world's economic powerhouse, large proportions of its former slaves remain in despair because of remorseless poverty. Drug abuse is one widespread response to the hopelessness of long-term unemployment. Crime is another. While short-term unemployment has an

equivocal relationship with crime, long-term unemployment is among its strongest predictors (Pratt, Braithwaite and Cullen forthcoming). One reason for this is that short-term unemployment does not necessarily engender hopelessness – indeed it actually generates some benefits for crime prevention through improved guardianship of homes (Cohen and Felson 1979). But when unemployment persists, people eventually give up on their own futures and, more importantly for crime, on the futures of their children.

It follows that any society with an incomplete transformation from slavery to emancipation, apartheid to liberation, colonial oppression to independence, must invest in institutions that nurture the reciprocal building of emancipation from hope and hope from emancipation. What form might such institutions take? That is the question this essay seeks to address. I will argue that institutions designed to confront long-term unemployment among the young, as well as educational disadvantage when it first sets in, are of particular importance.

The challenge of designing institutions that simultaneously engender emancipation and hope is addressed within the assumption of economic institutions that are fundamentally capitalist. This contemporary global context gives more force to the hope nexus because we know capitalism thrives on hope. When business confidence collapses, capitalist economies head for recession. This dependence on hope is of quite general import; business leaders must have hope for the future before they will build new factories; consumers need confidence before they will buy what the factories make; investors need confidence before they will buy shares in the company that builds the factory and bankers need it to lend money to build it; scientists need confidence to innovate with new technologies in the hope that a capitalist will come along and market

their invention. Keynes' (1936) *General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* lamented the theoretical neglect of "animal spirits" of hope ("spontaneous optimism rather than ... mathematical expectation" (Keynes 1936, 161)) in the discipline of economics, a neglect that continues to this day (see also Barbalet, 1993).

None of this is to deny the point in Peter Drahos's contribution to this volume that public hope must be grounded in truth rather than falsity. To flourish, capitalism must *enculturate optimism*, an attitude that risk-taking will pay off frequently enough to justify taking risks. But equally it must *institutionalize pessimism*. When optimism is enculturated, individuals are cognitively optimistic about economic success; when pessimism is institutionalized, the economy is transparent, so that optimistic claims about particular investments are subject to open public critique by analysts who are informed by accurate audited accounts. When the accounts are proved false, law enforcement is institutionalized. Enculturated optimism engenders a vibrant innovative economy, institutionalized pessimism an economy where the choices about which innovations to back can be grounded in data of reasonable quality, or at least something better than mere spin. Institutionalized pessimism most critically requires a rigorous social science that tests the empirical speculations in papers like this about what works in emancipating people from poverty.

Given the nature of contemporary capitalist economies, hope is not only important at the commanding heights, it is also vital for any underclass that seeks to throw off the shackles that persist in holding them down (see Sasha Courville and Nicola Piper's paper in this volume). Just as confidence is imperative on Wall Street, likewise a remote Australian Aboriginal community needs hope to invest their energy in building a modest

tourism or fishing or arts and crafts business that might lift them out of poverty. They need it to invest in an ever-growing number of years of education for their children if those children are to lift the next generation out of poverty. As they look back on generation after generation of their ancestors' persistent poverty, that hope to invest in education is hard to muster. Many Aboriginal people in Australia stick with the alternative cycle of hopelessness that bequeaths substance abuse and crime. This in turn begets imprisonment and suicide or release with a criminal record that renders an Aboriginal person even more unemployable (a criminal record increases unemployment – see Hagan (1993), Western and Beckett (1999), Pager (2002)). Is there an alternative to this cycle of hopelessness and immiseration? A cycle of hope and emancipation? The beginning of an alternative we can glimpse is the appropriately named “Emancipation Conference” in Santa Clara County (Silicon Valley) in California. Given the difficulty of enculturating hope in the cynical conditions of late modernity among those who are poor, alone and vulnerable, the Emancipation Conference institutionalizes a special space to nurture hope.

We might say that the worry about capitalists with money to invest is to check their spontaneous optimism by institutionalizing the pessimism of audits and other devices to render transparent the manipulations of markets. The worry about welfare clients without money is that they are stigmatized by much spontaneous pessimism; this needs to be checked by institutionalizing optimism.

THE EMANCIPATION CONFERENCE

When in 2002 I attended a session of an American Humane Society meeting on Emancipation Conferences, I arrived with a misguidedly politicized interpretation of what emancipation meant in California. I learnt that it meant release of children from the supervision of the court in foster care cases. As two black teenagers explained their experience of their emancipation, at first I was amused at my misunderstanding. These young black women were not speaking of emancipation in a sense that had any resonance with the emancipation of their forebears from slavery. They were simply being emancipated from foster care so they could set themselves up in their own apartment, freed from the supervision of foster parents. But then as they and the program administrators explained the Emancipation Conference, my interpretation of the phenomenon flipped back to a politicized reading of the conferences as indeed an emancipatory practice.

Here is how they work. The young person basically sets the agenda for the conference, even deciding what food will be ordered – often pizza – empowerment that does not meet the tastes of all attending adults! Invitations to attend are issued to all the supporters nominated by the young person as people they would like to attend to support them and come up with practical strategies for their emancipation plan. Agenda setting occurs through the simple device of asking the young person to write down before the conference five goals they would like to set for themselves as they make their own way in the world. The conference facilitator “keeps the introduction simple:” “We’re here to find out what your goals are and see what we can do to help you achieve them.” Then the assembled stakeholders – foster families, natural parents, friends, welfare workers –

move through an agenda of the goals that were set by the young person generally in advance of the actual meeting.

In advance of the conference, the young person has also been asked to nominate either five strengths they have or five things they want in a friend – that they would want a friend to be like. Discussion of these opens the conference and very often leads to the conclusion that some or all of the five virtues that the young person values in their friends count among their own strengths. Participants sitting in the conference circle are then asked to add their thoughts on the strengths of the young person. This is the strengths-based philosophy of Emancipation Conferences. We all have strengths – hope and commitment issue by building out from those strengths. Many kindred restorative justice care and protection conferences for children have a strategy that combines the identification of *both* “strengths” and “concerns:” This would seem more consistent with being simultaneously optimistic and pessimistic as in the top right quadrant of the two dimensional model in Figure 1. However, when Santa Clara County experimented with an agenda of “concerns” as well as “strengths” to open the conference, it was found that adults in the circle focused too much on the concerns. Hence, there emerged a risk that instead of building out from strengths, the conference would start by pathologizing young people who have already experienced too much of that in their short lives. The tendency in such cases is for problems to overwhelm strengths. If the young person identifies fixing a problem as one of *their* goals, fine, then it becomes part of the agenda. In practice, the conference is thus conceived as a strategy for preventing the encounter from sliding down from the top right quadrant to the bottom right (high pessimism, low optimism) quadrant of the two dimensional model in Figure 1.

In training around these Californian conferencing programs, facilitators are sensitized to see strengths as well as concerns in the lives of vulnerable people. In one exercise, a picture of a family scene is presented to the training groups: It includes rubbish all over the floor, an unmonitored baby about to pull an iron down from an ironing board, pre-adolescents drinking and eating pizza. Unsensitized neophytes like myself find it hard to list many positives about the family that can be seen in the picture. We are obsessed with the obvious negatives. We find it a revelation when others point out that the fact that the iron is on means that there is electricity, so the family is probably paying its bills. The fact that the iron is out indicates some pride in appearance. The baby is recorded as looking well fed and healthy, the pre-adolescents are getting on well together, and so on.

The point here is that in these Californian restorative justice programs, there is both an explicit methodological commitment in the conference process and in training to being strengths-based. There are critics of this in the restorative justice movement. Some think that directing the conference to systematically catalogue strengths first involves too much domination of the structure of the agenda by the professional. If the stakeholders agree to focus on problems first instead of strengths, then they should, on this view. So how do we read the stories that Californian and Oregonian conference facilitators tell of families insisting “we have no strengths” and then being pushed into a process that ends with a photograph of the family in front of a long list of strengths they have written up? We can read them positively as strength-reinforcing, or negatively as stories of agenda-setting by professionals that is too directive, too disempowering of stakeholder process control. Ultimately, we can and should be evidence-based about this.

Cases can be randomly assigned to a strengths-based agenda versus conferences that are less process-directive in this respect, to test whether participants feel more or less empowered under the two approaches. Moreover, such research can test the hypothesis that by building out from strengths we actually solve more problems than by focusing directly on the problems.

Strengths of the youth having been identified, the discussion in Emancipation Conferences then turns to how the strengths can be deployed to achieve the youth's nominated goals. The needs that require support from others are identified. Next, emancipation options are written up on sheets of paper. In light of all this, the young person then presents his or her emancipation plan. Supporters in the circle discuss ways of strengthening the plan and offer support to realize it. Timelines are agreed and a follow-up conference is scheduled 30 to 90 days on. A crucial element of the support network is the Independent Living Program of the County of Santa Clara. Its goal is articulated as: "To empower foster youth by providing them the skills necessary to transition to independence." A wide range of skills training is available through this program from budget management to internet skills, preparing a resumé, safe sex, job interviewing and avoiding traps in rental housing. A scholarships fund is also available to young people participating in the program and an Emancipated Youth Stipend is available for use only on tuition, books, counselling, food, housing, car insurance, clothing for work, vocational training, items for children of the emancipated young person, and parenting skills. The networks of support from both other youth and adult specialists, combined with the emphasis on learning self-sufficiency skills, seemed impressive as a hope-building strategy. The best way to give a more concrete impression

of how the conference unfolds is to give an example of an actual Emancipation Conference Summary. This can be found in the Appendix.

In the literature distributed at the workshop I attended in California, it was explicitly stated that the purpose of the Emancipation Conference was to “provide the youth with hope, resources and a plan. It empowers the youth to determine and set their own goals.” For young people who were often on probation, troubled by substance abuse, abused in their past, teenage mothers and on a trajectory of inter-generational poverty, there seemed something inspiring in Santa Clara County’s attempt, as explained by the testimonials of young people who had experienced it, to secure hope through emancipation. While the feature of these conferences that I am finding attractive is the way the strength-based mobilizing of resources combines hope with emancipation, Victoria McGeer’s paper (this volume) might also provoke the thought that the empowerment features of restorative justice might avert the under-dependence on self of “wishful hoppers”, while its social support features might help avert the under-dependence on others of “wilful hoppers”. McGeer’s art of good hope is responsive hope – a way of hoping animated by care and interdependence. Responsive hope might be institutionalized by the creation of spaces where compassion is expected, where care for the self is nurtured by experiencing care from others.

EMANCIPATION FOR ALL YOUNG PEOPLE – YOUTH DEVELOPMENT CIRCLES

Stumbling into that California workshop at a restorative justice conference where I happened to be a speaker was yet another confirmation of how unimportant we intellectuals are in the global social movement for restorative justice where practice persistently proves to be ahead of theory. A year earlier I had published in the *Oxford Review of Education* (Braithwaite 2001) a proposal for “Youth Development Circles” that included many of the concepts the Santa Clara Emancipation Conferences were already implementing! It is nevertheless of some value to rehearse the theoretical framework I brought to a proposal for this kind of innovation. It was that hope and emancipation in the knowledge economy increasingly depend on human capital (the skills of people) and social capital (skills in interacting with others including dispositions such as trust and trustworthiness). For children whose families lack endowments of human and social capital, we rely on state-funded education systems to compensate. Yet we quickly run up against the limits of the capabilities of formal education bureaucracies to make up for deficits that are profoundly informal (especially on the social capital side): (a) nuclear families are isolated from extended families which used to compensate for deficits of nuclear families; and (b) formal education bureaucracies are too formal to compensate for the social aspects of deficits that thereby arise (Braithwaite 2001, 240). This was characterized as the dual structural dilemma of human/social capital formation in late modernity. It was proposed that a third institution beyond family and school – the Youth Development Circle – was needed to extricate us from the horns of this dilemma.

Implementation of this idea was envisaged as taking the following form. Twice a year from entry to high school at age 12 through to successful placement in a tertiary course or a job (modal age 18), the Youth Development Facilitator (operating from an

office in a high school) would convene a meeting of the young person's community of care. This meeting would be called a Youth Development Circle and would replace standard parent-teacher interview evenings.

The Circle would have Core Members and Casual Members. Core Members would be asked up front to commit as an obligation of citizenship and care to try to attend all conferences *until the young person is successfully placed in a tertiary course or a job* and to continue to be there for him/her should the young person subsequently request a conference, slide into long-term unemployment or get in trouble with the police or the courts. Core members would actually sign a contract to keep meeting and supporting the young person until that college or job placement was accomplished. Core Members would normally include: (a) parents or guardians; (b) brothers and sisters; (c) one grandparent selected by the young person; (d) one aunt, uncle or cousin selected by the young person; (e) a "buddy", an older child from the school selected by the young person; (f) a pastoral adult carer from the school selected by the young person (normally, but not necessarily, a teacher); and (g) a neighbour, sporting coach, parent of a friend or any other adult member of the community selected by the youth. Casual Members could include: (a) current teachers of the young person; (b) current girlfriend or boyfriend; (c) closest mates nominated by the young person; (d) professionals brought in by the facilitator or parents (for example, drug counsellor, employer from an industry in which the young person would eventually like to work); and (e) the victim of an act of bullying or delinquency and victim supporters.

Rather like Emancipation Conferences, it was proposed that the conference would commence with the Facilitator introducing new members and reading the youth's six-

month and long-term life goals as defined by him or her at the last meeting (six months ago). The youth would then be invited to summarize how he/she had gone with the six-month objectives and in what ways his/her life goals had changed over the past six months.

Normally, expert adults relevant to the six-month life goals would then be invited to comment (for example, the math teacher on a math improvement goal; the school counsellor on improving relationships). Members of the Conference who had undertaken to provide agreed kinds of help toward those goals would be asked to report on whether they had managed to deliver it (for example, an aunt reporting whether they had managed to get together for an hour a week to help with math homework).

In light of this discussion, the young person would be asked their thoughts on goals for the next six months and others would be invited to comment. Goals would be reset and a plan devised to meet them with nominated people to provide specific forms of support, as in the Emancipation Conference. Over the years, the emphasis on the conference would shift from educational and relationship challenges to the challenge of securing employment. With young people who were not doing well at school, special efforts would be made by the Core Members of the conference to bring in Casual Members who might be able to offer work experience, advice on skill training and networking for job search.

Youth Development Circles do not aspire to treat isolated individuals targeted because of their problems (and thereby stigmatizing them as individuals). It seeks to *help young people develop* in the context of their communities of care. The help would not stigmatize as it would be provided universally to young people in a school, not just to the

problem students. The young people themselves would be empowered with a lot of say over whom those supporters would be. Like Emancipation Conferences the aspiration was for a more holistic move to find something better than seeking to solve educational problems by one-on-one encounters with the school counsellor, drug problems by individual encounters with rehabilitation services, employment by one-on-one interviews at job placement services, youth suicide by public funding of psychiatrists.

If Youth Development Circles get commitments from the people who the young love and respect to meet and help regularly until they actually get a job or a college place, not only is it plausible that more of them will actually qualify for those jobs and places, but they might also be more enriched by their education along the way and more free of problems like drug abuse that drain their hope. Being a beneficiary of emancipatory care, of cooperative problem solving when one is young, may be the best way to learn to become compassionate democratic citizens who support the emancipation of others as adults. Such citizens who are creative in co-operative deliberation not only build strong democracies but also are able workforces that attract capital investment in the conditions of capitalist information economies (see Putnam 1993; 1995).

In good circles, hope would be nurtured by celebratory speeches around the circle about what the young person had accomplished toward their goals. The crucial skill of facilitators would be to elicit affirmation for accomplishment and offers of help (as opposed to criticism) when there was a failure of accomplishment. Hope would be sustained through the ritual interpretation of poor accomplishment as a communal failure to give a young person the support they need. As in the best families, hope can be sustained through unconditional support and burden sharing. But hope is also sustained

through emancipation into adulthood with a job, life skills and social support that are the best safeguards against poverty. The Youth Development Circle proposal is for a more universal approach to the amalgam of hope promoting emancipation and emancipation promoting hope that we see in Santa Clara with foster care cases.

DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENTALISM FOR HOPE AND EMANCIPATION

Such universalism would be an expensive new burden for a seemingly over-burdened welfare state. Yet the *Oxford Review of Education* article argues (see also Braithwaite 2002) for an experimental evaluation strategy that would reveal whether the fiscal savings from dealing with reduced levels of crime, drug abuse, welfare dependency and the like would in fact exceed the cost. Attempts are being made to launch pilot projects in the UK by Professor John Visser (J.G.Visser@bham.ac.uk) and in Vermont by Professor Gale Burford (gburford@zoo.uvm.edu) as first steps to such understanding.

Surely it involves a total failure of policy imagination for us to persist firmly in the belief that long-term unemployment is an inevitable fact of capitalism, that evidence-based policy experimentation cannot deliver cost-effective ways of lifting people out of long-term unemployment. One radical but hardly implausible possibility is a welfare state that invokes the contracted citizenship obligations of core Youth Development Circle members to reconvene a decade after they thought they had acquitted their responsibilities to a young person because in their late 20s that person has fallen into long-term unemployment. Youth Development Circles could never be a solution to long-term unemployment that befalls people late in life. But given that most of the roots of

long-term unemployment are in the first decades of a life, Youth Development Circles, if the experiments worked, might be no small partial solution.

The defeat of hopelessness and poverty of course also requires many more deeply structural solutions: a tax system that more effectively requires the rich to pay their fair share of the burden of providing hope to the poor through access to quality education and health care, rooting out racism through effective regulation of discrimination and various other measures, at the global level an IMF that eschews doing the bidding of the business elites of rich states in favour of policies that strategically uplift the poor (Stiglitz 2002), an intellectual property order that does not rip off the poor in information economies where the monopolisation of knowledge embeds wealth (Drahos, this volume), and more. As important as such macro-structural reform is, structural reform efforts will fail unless they are buttressed by a politics of hope. Obversely, as Peter Drahos (this volume) argues, a hope that is illusory or advanced only at the level of psychologism or slogans is crushing in its implications. The challenge is to forge institutions that marry hope to actual emancipation as Mandela partially did with institutions like the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In a more micro way, the County of Santa Clara also mutually reinforces hope and emancipation through its Emancipation Conferences. Democratic experimentalism (Dorf and Sabel 1998) might progressively uncover a path to linking such micro accomplishments to more macro, more universalist, approaches to confronting the big threats to full citizenship (like long-term unemployment). Learning about possibilities for macro-societal transformations by monitoring micro collaborations is the hopeful message of democratic experimentalism.

CONCLUSION

In Peter Drahos' contribution to this volume, the dangers of private hope are revealed. It can be exploited by the commercially and politically cynical. The result – failure, disillusionment, people in desperate circumstances who give up on their futures and the futures of their children. One remedy Drahos discusses is checking hope with reason and evidence: so that hope can be real because it is realistic. Emancipation Conferences accomplish this by the reality check of people who care about the future of the young person, and who have relevant kinds of specialized expertise, discussing Emancipation Plans to make them realistically achievable. So the young person with a poor high school record who says they want to go to Harvard can be given realistic advice on where they might get admission to higher education and what further steps would be a possibility later if they did extremely well. There are three features of the hope-building strategy of Emancipation Conferences that are a protection against the concerns voiced by Peter Drahos (this volume):

1. Hope-building is embedded in conversational reality-checking by bringing into the circle people with the relevant knowledge.
2. The target of hope-building is not selected by a commercial or political predator upon that hope. Rather it is the person whose hope is built who selects who will be targeted to assist in the hope-building by bringing them into the circle.
3. Hope is not built up as a purely psychological or motivational strategy. Rather it is built recursively with plans, social support and resources for highly concrete forms of practical emancipation. It is an emancipation-hope strategy rather than a hope strategy.

Conferences with these three features might be a possibility in the emancipation of every child from the confinements of adolescence, just as it might be a possibility as an emancipation-hope strategy with every adult released from a real prison, be they a Nelson Mandela or a common thief. None of them can find emancipation from the constraints that confine them without hope; all of them are at risk of a downward spiral into deeper hopelessness when dreams are dashed for want of institutionalized planning of emancipation strategies that are realistic. That downward spiral continues to be the legacy of slavery in the United States, violence and racism against Aboriginal people in Australia, Apartheid in South Africa. Its preventability is redolent in Mandela's scheming with both his colleagues and his jailers on Robben Island. Emancipation Conferences are just one example of a strategy for jointly institutionalizing hope and emancipation. Yet its institutional elements and its training strategies are evocative. Hopefully writing about it might inspire even more ambitious evidence-based institutionalizations of believing and critique toward emancipation.

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APPENDIX

SANTA CLARA COUNTY EMANCIPATION CONFERENCE SUMMARY

Youth's Name: Jane (not the real name)

Participants: List of 10 participants' names

PURPOSE: To develop an emancipation plan

YOUTH'S STRENGTHS:

- Jane is determined to finish high school
- Jane is fun and she is sweet
- Jane has most of her documents already
- Jane is loyal and makes strong bonds with others
- Jane enjoys the company of others
- Jane is independent and able to do things on her own
- Jane is creative
- Jane takes initiative
- Jane is caring and helpful
- Jane makes others laugh
- Jane is humble
- Jane shares with others
- Jane is trustworthy and is always there for her friends
- Jane gets embarrassed easily
- Jane encourages younger children and is a mentor for them
- Jane is determined to get where she wants to be
- Jane is not a follower

- Jane has strong options
- Jane has a big heart
- Jane is dependable and is on time to appointments
- Jane is motherly with small children
- Jane is able to face difficult situations and is able to move forward
- Jane is focused
- Jane has courage
- Jane is a fast learner and is good with Wicca
- Jane is a good writer and artist
- Jane is resourceful
- Jane likes to do craft work
- Jane likes to keep busy
- Jane sews well

GOALS:

- Jane would like to either join the army or attend college
- Jane wants to acquire a part-time job if in college
- Jane would like to live with one or two of her friends
- Jane wants to get a driver's licence
- Jane wants to live in Florida

YOUTH'S NEEDS:

- Jane needs the support of her family, friends and Marisa
- Jane needs a job in order to earn some money
- Jane needs lots of love

- Jane needs safe housing
- Jane needs auto insurance and a car
- Jane needs medical and dental insurance
- Jane needs to get a bank/savings account and money management skills
- Jane needs a phone, clothing and transportation
- Jane needs a high school diploma
- Jane needs to study for the military testing (ASVAB)
- Jane needs to continue getting mental health counselling

EMANCIPATION OPTIONS:

HOUSING:

- Live with friend #1 or live with friend #2
- Apply for transitional housing with Bill Wilson and/or Unity Care
- Alum Rock housing locator
- Shared housing
- Army
- Job Corp
- Live with Marisa and her grandmother

SCHOOL:

- Job Corp
- West Valley College
- Graduated high school - June 14, 2002
- Financial aid application
- Scholarships

- Yes program with ILP participation
- Army
- Driver's training (behind the wheel)
- ILP workshops

EMPLOYMENT:

- Army
- Job hunting (Jane's own search)
- ILP money management skills
- Job Corp
- Job Coach ILP
- Career testing
- Resume

MEDICAL/DENTAL:

- MediCal
- Mom's Insurance until 25 if a full time student
- Army
- Job Corp

DOCUMENTS:

- California ID
- Social Security Card
- Birth Certificate
- Insurance Cards
- Immunization Records

- Vision Plan
- Dental Card

CIRCLE OF SUPPORT:

- Marisa
- Mom
- Sister
- Jenny
- Margie
- Steve
- Sara
- Auntie
- Veronica
- Ron
- Zina


Emancipation Plan:

Things to do	By whom	Due to be completed by
Housing:		
Research Job Corps	Jenny, Jane Sarah	21 February 2002
Complete Transitional Housing applications	Jane, Mom and Marisa; EMQ Team will follow up	19 February 2002
Research the cost of shared housing expenses with friend 1 and friend 2	Jane	15 February 2002
Education:		
Apply for financial aid (FASFA)	Jane and Rachel	1 March 2002
Turn in application to West	Jane through High School	15 March 2002

Valley College	Program	
Attend ILP Workshops	Jane	Start 25-02-02, on-going
Driver's training	Jane and Rachel	After 16 classes
Study for the ASVAB (Air Force Test)	Jane and Steve	Start 22-02-02, on-going every other weekend
Employment:		
Job hunting	Jane	Start 16-02-02
Contact Sonja House, Employment Counsellor	Jane and Rachel	Last week in March
Medical and Dental:		
Remain on Mom's insurance until the age of 25 as long as Kimberly is a full-time student	Jane and Mom	Start 16-02-02
Other options –		
Apply for MediCal	Jane and Mom	As needed
Receive free medical care in Air Force or while in Job Corp		
Documents:		
California Identification		Completed
Social Security Card		Completed
Birth Certificate		Completed
Insurance Card (medical)		Completed
Dental Card and Vision Plan	Mom to give to Jane	8 February 2002
Immunization records	Jane will obtain records from her High School	As needed
Circle of Support:		
See above list	Jane	On-going and as needed
Follow-up Conference:	Jane and guests	End of March 2002

FACILITATOR'S COMMENTS:

It was a pleasure to facilitate this conference for Jane. We wish you much success on your plan and we look forward to seeing all of you again in March. Thanks for all of your hard work.



Bipolar Model

Two Dimensional Model

Figure 1: Optimism-pessimism as bipolar versus independent dimensions

THE ART OF GOOD HOPE¹

Victoria McGeer

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ABSTRACT: What is hope? Though variously characterized as a cognitive attitude, an emotion, a disposition, and even a process or activity, I argue that it is, more deeply, a unifying and grounding force of human agency. Since we cannot live a human life without hope, questions about the rationality of hope are properly recast as questions about what it means to hope well. This thesis is defended and elaborated in five parts. In the first three sections, I argue that hope is an essential and distinctive feature of human agency, both conceptually and developmentally. I then explore a number of dimensions of agency that are critically implicated in the art of hoping well, drawing on several examples from George Eliot's *Middlemarch*. I conclude with a short section that suggests how hoping well in an individual context may be extended to hope at the collective level.

Keywords: (wilful/ wishful/ responsive/ good) hope; agency; moral development; parental-scaffolding; peer-scaffolding

*The soul has an absolute need of
something hidden and uncertain for the
maintenance of that doubt and hope and
effort which are the breath of its life.*
(George Eliot, “The Lifted Veil”)

PRELIMINARIES – HUMAN LIFE AND THE CENTRALITY OF HOPE

Hope is a puzzling psychological phenomenon in two distinct respects. First, despite its centrality to human life, despite its constant recurrence as a theme in literature and art, despite even its importance in various classical works of philosophy and religion – Kant (1950), for instance, identified the question, “What may I hope?” as one of the three interests of speculative and practical reason² – the topic has received surprisingly little attention from contemporary philosophers and social scientists. In the opinion of one such philosopher, this fact alone is not just puzzling, it’s a positive “scandal” (Bovens 1999). Of course, this relative lack of theoretical attention may well explain the second, more substantial respect in which hope is puzzling: viz., in specifying what kind of psychological and normative phenomenon hope actually is, whether it occurs at the individual or collective level. Amongst the relatively few theorists who discuss hope today, there is no clear or agreed upon use of the concept. For instance, hope is variously identified as a special kind of cognitive attitude akin to, though perhaps also partly composed of, beliefs and desires (Bovens 1999; Pettit this volume), an emotion (Drahoš this volume; Elster 1989), a disposition or capacity (Gravlee 2000), a process or activity (Snyder 1995; V. Braithwaite this

say there is no agreement amongst theorists about how to think about hope – there are certainly a number of overlapping themes recurring in their discussions; but it is to say that such themes require more systematic integration if our aim is to use the concept of hope in a theoretically unified way across (and even within) different disciplines.

In this paper, I aim to do some of this work of integration. My claim will be that hope at the individual level presents itself in myriad different psychological guises (attitude, emotion, activity, disposition), not just because of ordinary language looseness with the term, though undoubtedly there is much of that. Hope involves a complex dynamic of all these things, because it is, more deeply, a unifying and grounding force of human agency (cf. Cartwright this volume). This view has strong implications: for instance, that hope – or hoping – is not an option for us *qua* (cognitively competent) human beings. To be a full-blown intentional agent – to be a creature with a rich profile of intentional and emotional states and capacities – is to be an agent that hopes; to be, in the words of Thomas Aquinas, an agent that characteristically directs mental energy towards future goods that are “hard but not impossible to obtain” (Aquinas 1964 2a2ae 17, 1; quoted in Cartwright this volume). Hence, I take consideration of one sceptical question with regard to hope – namely, whether a life without hope is always (or even sometimes) better than a life with hope – to be simply irrelevant for creatures like us (pace Bovens 1999).³ To live a life devoid of hope is simply not to live a human life; it is not to function – or tragically it is to cease to function – as a human being. Thus, of the dark days in a Nazi concentration camp, Elie Wiesel (1960) writes:

The instincts of self-preservation, of self-defense, of pride, had all deserted us. In one ultimate moment of lucidity it seemed to me that we were damned souls ... seeking oblivion – without hope of finding it.... Within a few seconds, we had ceased to be men (34; quoted in Gravlee 2000).

If hope is a condition for the possibility of leading a human life, questions of the rationality of hope must be relocated. If hoping is, or can be, irrational – epistemically or practically – this can't be a function of hoping *per se*, as if hoping were something one could rationally choose to forego, say under conditions where hope is judged to be forlorn. It must rather be a function of failing to hope well. But what is meant by hoping well?

In the psychological literature on hope, it is now commonplace to note the benefits of having a hopeful attitude or disposition. As C.R. Snyder (1995) summarizes,

The advantages of elevated hope are many. Higher as compared with lower hope people have a greater number of goals, have more difficult goals, have success at achieving their goals, perceive their goals as challenges, have greater happiness and less distress, have superior coping skills, recover better from physical injury, and report less burnout at work, to name but a few advantages (357-8).

Without doubting these advantages, the concept of “elevated hope” must be carefully examined. On a thin, quantitative reading, there may be reason to doubt the unalloyed benefits of such a disposition. For instance, elevated hope can lead to increased

vulnerability to disappointment or despair: one's goals may not be realized, or if realized, seem shabby in comparison to what one hopefully anticipated. Such a tendency may also slide into a proclivity for wishful thinking, compromising one's ability to think about either one's situation or one's own capacities realistically. It may thereby support practices of self- and other deception, leading one to exploit admirable traits like trust and confidence: for instance, one may be led to promise too much, or accept too easily the assurances of other people, by way of achieving or delivering the things for which one hopes. Elevated hope may lead to unacceptable compromises on other fronts as well: for instance, one may become so fixated on the hoped-for end that one may cease to think sensibly or morally about the means one employs to achieve it. For all these reasons, the concept of elevated or high hope must be explicitly tempered (as it is implicitly in Snyder) by the concept of hoping well. "Hope obeys Aristotle's doctrine of the mean," Bovens claims: "one should neither hope too much, nor too little" (Bovens 1999, 667). The thin reading of this "economy of hope" suggests that rational hope simply involves getting the quantity of hope right relative to "the circumstances, the objects of hope and character of the would-be hoper" (680). But if what I've said is right, the question of rational hope is more productively framed in terms of getting the quality of hope right: that is, given the nature of hope, given its essential role in supporting our capacities as self-directed agents, our question should be, not how much hope, but what kind of hope serves us best – and what can be done to develop our skills for hoping well?

My discussion of these themes will be divided into four remaining parts. In the following two sections, I make the argument that hope is an essential and distinctive feature of human agency, both conceptually and developmentally. I then explore a number of dimensions of agency that are critically implicated in the art of

hoping well. Here I will flesh out my discussion using a number of examples drawn, primarily, from George Eliot's *Middlemarch*, a novel both rich in detail, and realistic in its portrayal of the many facets of good and bad hope. I conclude with a short section that suggests how hoping well in an individual context may be extended to hope at the collective level.

HOPE AND THE LIMITATIONS OF HUMAN AGENCY

*Fare thee well; and God have mercy
upon one of our souls! He may have
mercy upon mine, but my hope is better;
and so look to thyself.*

(William Shakespeare, *Twelfth Night*)

Most writers on hope acknowledge an important – and positive – connection between hope and agency. For instance, according to hope theory as articulated by psychologists, hope is a cognitive activity that involves setting concrete goals, finding pathways to achieve those goals and tapping one's willpower or agency in order to move along pathways to the specified goals (Snyder 1995; 2000; V. Braithwaite this volume). I think there is something importantly right about this analysis, but I want to begin by emphasizing another, seemingly negative aspect of the connection between hope and agency, namely, the inevitable confrontation with agential limitation.

Hope arises in situations where we understand our own agency to be limited with respect to the things or conditions that we desire (Shade 2000). If our own agency were not so limited, we wouldn't hope for what we desire, we would simply

plan or act so as to achieve it. Hope signifies our recognition that what we desire is beyond our current (or sole) capacity to bring about – and, in the limiting case, it is beyond our capacity *tout court*: we hope for something that could not be in any way affected by our efforts to bring it about (for example, we hope that the weather will improve, we hope that our friend’s test results will be good, we hope that no one was injured in yesterday’s fire, and so on.)

Since we seemingly hope in situations where our own agency is irrelevant to the occurrence of the hoped-for end, this may suggest that an analysis of hope should downplay the connection between hope and agency. What seems more relevant is simply that we have a desire combined with a certain epistemic state – specifically, our belief that the end for which we hope is still an open possibility.⁴ I want to resist this deflationary move, not just because it articulates a concept of hope that is uninterestingly broad and superficial (Pettit this volume), but because it misses the background sense of agency that supports any experience of genuine hope. Hoping (as opposed to desiring or merely wishing) has “an aura of agency about it” (Bovens 1999, 679). In conditions where we believe our own agency is irrelevant to bringing about the hoped-for end, this aura of agency persists. The question is why? Bovens, who make this wise observation, goes off the rails, I think, when he explains this persistence in terms of a kind of illusion to which we fall prey: “My conjecture is that we attend to a feature of hope in circumstances in which hoping does affect our performance and does raise the probability of the occurrence of the projected state of the world and we mistakenly generalize this feature to hoping at large. What we overlook is that there are strict constraints on the domain in which hoping is instrumentally rational” (Bovens, 679-80). Worse, because hope carries with it “an illusion of causal agency”, according to Bovens, it can further compromise our

epistemic rationality by leading us to “overestimate the subjective probability that the [hoped-for] state of the world will come about” (680). I agree this can be a liability of hope: hoping may sometimes lead us to overestimate the likelihood of the hoped-for end. But there is no necessity in this, either as a consequence of hoping, or of hoping under circumstances where we cannot affect the relevant ends. Nor is the aura of agency surrounding hope necessarily illusory, again even under circumstances where we cannot affect the relevant ends. For, no matter what the circumstance, hoping is a matter, not just of recognizing, but of actively engaging with our own current limitations in affecting the future we want to inhabit. It is, in other words, a way of actively confronting, exploring and sometimes patiently biding our limitations as agents, rather than crumpling in the face of their reality. Thus, hope in the limit case is still about taking an agential interest in the future, and in the opportunities it may afford. It is about saying: though there may be nothing we can do now to bring about what we desire, our energy is still oriented towards the future, limitations notwithstanding. Our interests, our concerns, our desires, our passions – all of these continue to be engaged by what can be; hence we lean into the future ready to act when actions can do some good (for example, see Courville and Piper this volume). In sum, there is always an aura of agency around hope, because hope is essentially a way of positively and expansively inhabiting our agency, whether in thought or in deed.

The crucial thought contained in this last paragraph is that human agency is about imaginatively exploring our own powers, as much as it is about using them. Hence, it’s about imaginatively exploring what we can and cannot do in the world. To be effective agents, we must of course learn to negotiate this world within certain constraints. But equally, it seems, we must learn to experience our own limitations,

not just as limitations, but as something we can act constructively in the face of, often pushing beyond these limitations and so enhancing our capacities even as we act out of them. It is often remarked that those who hope well become even more determined when obstacles are put in their way: they adapt more easily to real world constraints without sacrificing their creative energy, they explore more pathways towards reaching their goals, and they often discover reserves of untapped power in the process. In explanation of this, I want to suggest that hope is the energy and direction we're able to give, not just towards making the world as we want it to be, but also towards the regulation and development of our own agency. In hoping, we create a kind of imaginative scaffolding that calls for the creative exercise of our capacities and so, often, for their development. To hope well is thus to do more than focus on hoped-for ends: it is crucially to take a reflective and developmental stance towards our own capacities as agents – hence, it is to experience ourselves as agents of potential, as well as agents in fact.⁵

BECOMING AN AGENT – LEARNING TO HOPE

If youth is the season of hope, it is often so only in the sense that our elders are hopeful about us; for no age is so apt as youth to think its emotions, partings and resolves are the last of their kind. Each crisis seems final, simply because it is new. (George Eliot, Middlemarch)

Experiencing ourselves as agents of potential is, I think, a distinctive and critical feature of human agency. Animals may experience themselves as agents-in-fact – at least in a functional, if not in a conceptual sense. That is, they may experience themselves as moved by desire for this or that, and of acting so as to satisfy their desires, perhaps even altering their behaviour in clever ways the better to achieve their goals. To be agents-in-fact – and to experience themselves as such – is just to be self-activated, moved to do something in the world, either by instinct, or by occurrent desires that are generated by something immediately present to the senses. To be a human agent, by contrast, is not just to be moved by instinct or occurrent desire. We have a capacity to disengage from, and even subvert, these immediate appetites, lifting ourselves out of the demanding present and directing our affective concern to possible future events and situations that exist only in the imagination. The question is: how does the imaginative representation of future possibilities become so gripping for us that we're sometimes able to act even against a range of current desires, beliefs, emotions and dispositions? How is it that we're able to invest these chimeras with such powerful motivational and regulative energy – in a word, with the energy of hope? (cf. McGeer and Pettit 2002; Pettit this volume)

My speculative answer to this question derives from the special way in which human beings develop any true agential capacities at all. Paradoxically, in comparison with other creatures, we come into the world with almost no capacity to act in self-supporting self-directed ways. Indeed, it's sometimes observed that, due to our large head size, our species has evolved a curtailed gestation period relative to other species, leading to infants that are born, in effect, nine months premature (Gould 1977). In addition to this, natural selection has favoured in our species a greater capacity for individual learning at the cost of a more prolonged period of post-natal

development. Consequently, humans are comparatively helpless in their infant state and are highly dependent on others, not just for their physical survival but, even more importantly, for the development of the self-standing agential capacities they lack at birth. One essential part of this developmental process concerns what Jerome Bruner calls “parental scaffolding” (Bruner 1983).

Parental scaffolding is a bootstrapping process that exploits a capacity human infants do have at birth – an impressive talent and drive for imitating others. For instance, even within the first few days of life, neonates will attempt to simulate a range of facial expressions assumed by adults, including those with which they have some difficulty, experimenting with their own faces until they succeed. Moreover, their pleasure in doing what others do is evident: When infants kinaesthetically experience a correspondence between what’s happening on their own faces and the facial expressions they perceive in others, their eyes brighten; when this correspondence fails – when they can’t imitate the facial gestures presented to them – they show distress (Meltzoff 1990; Meltzoff and Gopnik 1993; Meltzoff and Moore 1977; 1983; 1992). Parents and other caretakers immediately start capitalizing on this innate imitative facility, drawing infants into progressively more complicated imitation games specifically aimed at building up their agential capacities. Thus, within the first few months, infants learn to imitate their parents’ more complex body movements, then, at about 9 months, their simple actions on objects in a shared environment, until finally, at about 18 months, infants are imitating more complex goal-directed activities as such – they read through ‘failures’ in adult behaviour and so ‘imitate’ what actions the adults *intend* to perform instead of those that are actually performed (Meltzoff and Moore 1995).

This impressive trajectory is fostered every step of the way by parents' scaffolding their infant's activity. Scaffolding here involves a kind of hopeful pretence. It requires parents (or other caretakers) to engage their infants in activities that, however truncated, are meaningful from the adults' point of view in so far as they're structured in terms that presume mutual purpose and understanding among all of the participants. In these activities, parents thus treat their infants *as if* they're playing a meaningful role – parents treat them *as if* they're doing things in self-directed ways despite the fact that such self-direction is clearly beyond their current capacities or understanding. Hence, to keep the activity going, parents must themselves re-enact the infant's role by reading meaning and purpose into what infants do, often repeating these interpretations back to the infants in an exaggerated fashion and inviting their imitative response. For instance, in early 'conversational dances', child and parent trade vocalizations, gestures and expressions that the parent ensures are made 'conversationally relevant' to one another, not just by adjusting their own rhythms and affective tones, but also through responsive and interpretive imitation — for example, the baby says, "mamamama", the mother says, "ma-ma, did you say ma-ma? That's right – here I am, I'm ma-ma", the baby says, more distinctively, "ma-ma?" and so on (Brazleton and Tronick 1980; Kaye 1982; Trevarthen 1979). In these incremental ways, children's behavioural competence within these structures, whether linguistic or non-linguistic, gradually increases, allowing them to assume more and more responsibility for intentionally maintaining their side of the interaction, even as these interactions are modified by the parents in increasingly complex ways. At the same time, children's experience and understanding of their own agential contributions increase, primarily because whatever behaviours they initiate are treated by their parents as intentional

contributions to the exchange, hence taken up and elaborated by parents in appropriate meaning-enhancing ways.

What is the significance of this form of development for hope's becoming an integral part of human agency? In light of my earlier discussion of hope and the limitations of agency, the first thing to note is that early human development involves a constant confrontation with such limitations. Consequently, and perhaps not surprisingly, distress, frustration and anger are dominant emotions throughout this period, with children melting into tears and tantrums when the actions they try to perform simply outstrip their current capacities. Under the regimen of parental scaffolding, this frustration may even be heightened since part of its point is to expand the child's understanding and so push for further development. However, there are two mitigating factors that allow the developing child to continue its efforts in spite of these frustrations, thus paving the way for the psychological development of hope as a fundamental stabilizing and directive force in adult agency.

The first involves the regulative side of parental scaffolding. Parents are able to use their infants' imitative drive, not just to challenge them cognitively, but also to provide them with emotional comfort when needed. For instance, studies show that a mother may comfort a distressed child by, first, adopting in face and voice expressions that are recognizable to the child as mirroring its own distress, then modulating these in a way that expresses the easing of distress. The child, carried along by its innate proclivities for imitation, will often follow the direction of the mother's expressive modulation, experiencing the easing of its own distress in consequence (Gergely 1995; Gergely and Watson 1996). In this way, parental scaffolding can play a dual role in babies' lives, allowing developing children to experience challenge in a way that is paced with emotional support and regulation, so

that frustration comes to be understood as something that can be held and tolerated by them, an expectable emotional pause punctuating the rhythm of on-going effort.

The second factor that allows developing children to contain and tolerate frustration in the face of their limitations concerns the transformative consequences of parental scaffolding. Naturally, given their initial helplessness, infants must begin by experiencing their own agential capacities through the mediation of others: what they are able to do, and what meaning it has, is supported by something beyond them, something outside of their control. Yet, under appropriately generative conditions (that is, good enough scaffolding), this dependence does not prove debilitating. On the contrary: despite the groping, vaguely focussed nature of babies' efforts, these have the effect of eliciting structured responses from others that give new direction and determination to what they do. Hence, the experience of groping towards something future and indeterminate becomes, for them, affectively associated with the exhilarating effect of self-transcendence. As this association is solidified, the need to draw upon external resources for tolerating frustration and uncertainty itself decreases. Effort against limitation and in the face of uncertainty may still generate various negative emotions, but there is now an offsetting positive association with the anticipated enhancement of agential powers; hence, frustration comes to be internally regulated by children's growing confidence in their own capacity and promise. Paradoxically, then, under a good enough regimen of parental scaffolding, any initial experience of limited and dependent quasi-agency will migrate into an energizing sense of potential agency: that is, an energizing sense that one can, through effortful interaction with a suitably responsive world, enhance one's own powers to live more capably, more expansively, more richly in that world despite the many challenges it

presents. Thus, from its earliest beginnings, human agency is structured in terms of future promise and infused with the energy of hope.

Before leaving this discussion of the developmental precursors of hope in human agency, there is one last point that deserves special emphasis. According to the account I've given, hope is a deeply social phenomenon. One could not become a properly human agent, and therefore an agent who hopes, without the scaffolding of others. It is others who invest us with our sense of how we can be in the world – who literally make it possible for us to take a hopeful, constructive stance towards the future – by initially enacting our potential for us. They are the keepers of our hope until we are enabled, by their hope in us, to become agents of hope in our own right. But what does it mean to become agents of hope in our own right? From what I've said so far, it is, minimally, to internalise the idealizing work of others with respect to ourselves: to become self-scaffolders instead of always being scaffolded from the outside. But, even after we've developed this capacity, there are limits to how much self-scaffolding is possible in the absence of others' continuing support. The world must be somewhat responsive to keep our capacity to hope alive, else we plunge into despair and forgo the human quality of our existence. To become well-formed hoppers – that is, agents persistently able to energize and regulate ourselves through hope – is thus not to lose our dependency on others; it is rather to transform how this dependency works. In fact, as I will argue in the next section, the difficulties in accomplishing this transformation are various and constitute a series of challenges to hoping well. It turns out that in order to meet these challenges successfully, and thereby foster the art of good hope, we need to become more than self-scaffolders; we need also to become the supportive scaffolders of others. Good hope, in other words,

involves empowering ourselves in part through empowering others with the energy of our hope. In this way, too, hope is a deeply social phenomenon.

THE ART OF GOOD HOPE

*There is no human being who having both
passions and thoughts does not think in
consequence of his passions – does not find
images rising in his mind which soothe the
passion with hope or sting it with dread.
But this, which happens to us all, happens
to some with a wide difference (George
Eliot, Middlemarch)*

Let me review my argument thus far: Human agency as such is distinctively an agency of potential and therefore infused by the energy of hope. Hope is deeply constitutive of our way of inhabiting the world, orienting us towards a future of self-expanding possibilities despite the existence of limitations and constraints. Without it, though we might still be able to function and even fight to survive, as animals do, in the present-tense manner of agents-in-fact, we could not lead a fully human existence. Thus, hope is not really an option for us, in the sense of something we could rationally choose to forego. But, tragically, it is something we can lose, either partially or completely. How does this happen?

As I mentioned above, maintaining hope requires a somewhat responsive world – where for most of us and in most circumstances this means a somewhat

responsive social world – a world of others who, in some way or other, support our hopes. By this I do not mean a world that *satisfies* our hopes, at least as initially formed: Hopes for particular ends may be dashed without compromising our basic ability to live in the light of hope. Indeed, it is characteristic of those who hope well to resolutely shift their target of hope when the world proves adamant with respect to some hoped-for end (Shade 2000; Snyder 1995). Under particularly difficult circumstances, when choices of ends are highly restricted, this may even involve shifting the focus of our hopeful energy onto the manner with which things are done. For instance, a terminally ill patient may give up on the hope of prolonging her life, only to invest this energy in meeting the challenge of dying well – with courage, say, and at peace. We continue to hope just in case we invest our efforts towards some state or condition that has meaning and value for us (Gravlee 2000). A responsive world is a world that in some way or another recognizes and supports the meaning and value we give to our efforts. Keeping our capacity to hope alive in the absence of such endorsement requires considerable inner strength and imagination – strength to resist the indifference or disparagements of others and imagination to understand and enliven the transformative value of what we do. How long this can last is surely dependent on a number of factors including our own character and background, our beliefs and commitments, and the power, extent and quality of the indifference or antagonism with which we meet. And even though history and literature redound with heroic cases of individuals maintaining hope against all odds, it's noteworthy that in most of these stories there is usually some mention of a responsive other to whom these individuals turn – perhaps only in imagination and at critical moments – for support and endorsement of their hopeful struggles.

Inspiring as these stories are, I want to turn now to examples from literature for a different purpose. While an unresponsive world may conspire to defeat our hopes, and worse our capacity to hope, we too can play a role in undermining this capacity in consequence of hoping *badly*. So far I've argued that hoping is an essential feature of human agency. But now I want to suggest that hoping *well* is an art: It is an art like reasoning well, or imagining well, or caring well for self and others; in fact, it is an art that involves all of these things and more. Hope is often derided as a "delusive mine" (from Samuel Johnson's poem, *On the Death of Dr Robert Levet*, 1783), a "dangerous thing...[that] can drive a man insane", or more picturesquely still, a tiger let loose willy-nilly to roam a person's mind (King 1982, 51-52). In the excoriating words of Lord Byron, hope is "nothing but the paint on the face of Existence; the least touch of truth rubs it off, and then we see what a hollow-cheeked harlot we have got hold of" (Marchand 1973, Letter to Thomas Moore, 28 October 1815). Hope wreaks its damage through rosy-hued delusion: it makes the impossible seem possible, and the possible seem far more desirable than it often really is. As George Eliot cautions, "Signs are small measurable things, but interpretations are illimitable, and in girls of sweet, ardent nature, every sign is apt to conjure up wonder, hope, belief, vast as a sky, and coloured by a diffused thimbleful of matter in the shape of knowledge" (*Middlemarch*, 23)⁶. These are indeed liabilities of hope, but as I will argue, they are liabilities that can be reduced, if not completely banished by developing the art of good hope. However, in order to develop this art, or at least understand it, we need some systematic account of how we fail to hope well.

In this section, I offer the beginning of such an analysis, building on the account sketched in the last section of the developmental precursors of becoming agents who hope. For my claim will be that hoping badly is, in fact, related to this

developmental history in so far as we fail in some respect to transform the dependencies inherent in childhood relations with others to dependencies that are more appropriate for self standing adults. In my analysis, there are two major failures in this regard. The first, which leads to what I call *wishful hope*, is a failure to take on the full responsibilities of agency, and hence to remain over-reliant on external powers to realize one's hopes. The second, which produces *wilful hope*, is more complicated. It involves the recognition of one's own responsibilities as an agent to contribute to the realisation of one's hopes, but it goes too far in investing one's very sense of identity in actually achieving the hoped-for ends. So fixated, therefore, does one become on these ends that other people become mere instruments to them; failing to recognize others as self-standing agents in their own right, and thereby undermining the supportive role one needs them to play even in maturity. My argument will be that both these forms of hope are highly vulnerable to collapse, leading to the real possibility of despair and, eventually, resignation. Recovery from either of these conditions is difficult, usually depending once again on the generous scaffolding of others. But in this recognition of one's on-going dependency on others is the possibility of discovering a new form of hope – *responsive hope* – that bears all the hallmarks of hoping well. I discuss each of these forms of hope in turn, illustrating my discussion with examples drawn from George Eliot's *Middlemarch*, a novel that could well be described as a study in the promise, defeat and resurrection of our human capacity to hope.

Wishful hope: the hope of desire

FRED VINCY... had a debt on his mind, and though no such immaterial burthen could depress that buoyant-hearted young gentleman for many hours together, there were circumstances connected with this debt which made the thought of it unusually importunate.... The total debt was a hundred and sixty pounds. Bambridge [the lender] was in no alarm about his money, being sure that young Vincy had backers; but he had required something to show for it, and Fred had at first given a bill with his own signature. Three months later he had renewed this bill with the signature of [his friend and guarantor] Caleb Garth. On both occasions Fred had felt confident that he should meet the bill himself, having ample funds at disposal in his own hopefulness. You will hardly demand that his confidence should have a basis in external facts; such confidence, we know, is something less coarse and materialistic: it is a comfortable disposition leading us to expect that the wisdom of providence or the folly of our friends, the mysteries of luck or the still greater mystery of our high individual value in the universe, will bring about agreeable issues.... Fred felt sure that he should have a present from his uncle, that he should have a run of luck, that by dint of "swapping" he should gradually metamorphose a horse worth forty pounds into a horse that would fetch a hundred at any moment... And in any case, even supposing negations which only a morbid distrust could imagine, Fred had always (at that time) his father's pocket as a last resource, so that his assets of hopefulness had a sort of gorgeous superfluity about them. ... But it was in the nature of fathers, Fred knew, to bully one

about expenses: there was always a little storm over his extravagance if he had to disclose a debt, and Fred disliked bad weather within doors..... The easier course, plainly, was to renew the bill with a friend's signature. Why not? With the superfluous securities of hope at his command, there was no reason why he should not have increased other people's liabilities to any extent, but for the fact that men whose names were good for anything were usually pessimists, indisposed to believe that the universal order of things would necessarily be agreeable to an agreeable young gentleman (Middlemarch, 215-16).

Fred Vincy is the very paradigm of a wishful hopper. Born into a well-to-do but imprudent manufacturing family, he is raised on a diet of indulgence and ambitious expectation – expectation that he will lead the life of a proper gentleman, either by inheriting property from a rich and temperamental uncle or, if that fails, by passing his exams and becoming a clergyman. Fred himself pins all his hopes on the inheritance, since he has no taste for study and sermonising and every taste for gentleman farming. In keeping with this desired outcome, he gives up his studies and hangs about at home, waiting for the turn of events that will secure his future. To pass the time, he engages in all the leisurely pursuits of a young man of means, borrowing against his prospects when necessary and getting into debt. He also spends some time fitfully pursuing his long-time love, Mary Garth, herself a hard-working and perceptive young woman who, despite her real affection for Fred, will have nothing to do with him unless he foregoes illusion and begins to do something useful with his life. Instead, he asks Mary's father to guarantee a loan, and when Fred can't repay it, the Garth family, principally Mary and her mother, are forced to give up their

meagre savings. When Fred visits the Garths to apologize for the debt, his happy illusion about how a good-natured universe necessarily works to his convenience suffers its first significant blow:

Curiously enough, his pain in the affair beforehand had consisted almost entirely in the sense that he must seem dishonourable, and sink in the opinion of the Garths: he had not occupied himself with the inconvenience and possible injury that his breach might occasion for them, for this exercise of the imagination on other people's needs is not common with hopeful young gentlemen. Indeed, we are most of us brought up in the notion that the highest motive for not doing a wrong is irrespective of the beings who would suffer the wrong. But at this moment he suddenly saw himself as a pitiful rascal who was robbing two women of their savings (*Middlemarch*, 233-4).

Though Fred is somewhat sobered by this revelatory moment, he is not significantly changed by it – that is, not changed in his habits of wishful hope. He passively awaits a more obliging future in which he inherits his uncle's property and repays the Garths, only tipping into despair when the uncle finally dies and is found to have left his money and property elsewhere. Fred is eventually saved from this despair, not by his own family who are incapable of hoping well either for themselves or for others, but by the continuing good offices and good example of the hard-working Garths, as well as a beneficently self-sacrificing neighbourhood vicar appropriately named Farebrother. With Fred's best interests at heart, they keep him from flagging in his program of reform as he begins to develop a capacity for genuine hard work towards a hoped-for end that is finally reasonably formulated in terms of his own agential

capacities: namely, carving out a useful, self-supporting life and winning the promised love of Mary.

Fred's story ends happily enough, thanks to the wise and generous support of others who enable him to redirect his hopeful energy towards developing his own powers of agency – though, as George Eliot remarks in the closing pages of *Middlemarch*, “I cannot say that he was never again misled by his hopefulness” (780). Habits of bad hope are hard to break. To see why, it is useful to understand both the kind of incapacity involved in wishful hope and how, developmentally, such an incapacity might arise.

The most glaring defect of wishful hope can be summarized as a failure to take on the full responsibilities of agency in both formulating and working towards the realisation of one's hopes. One's capacity for formulating hopes is corrupted through becoming attached in undisciplined ways to pure desire; and one's capacity for realising hopes is corrupted by an over-reliance on external intervention to secure one's hoped-for ends. As developing capacities of good hope depends on a good enough quality of parental scaffolding, so too a failure to develop these capacities may result, as in Fred Vincy's case, from parents who indulge rather than scaffold their children – hence, who fail to challenge their children to produce those very behaviours that lead them to be self-standing agents in their own right, with powers for directing and regulating their own achievements and development (self-scaffolding). Wishful hoppers' early experience of agency will thus be corrupted in two ways: First, they will experience their 'powers' as limitless in so far as desire is continually met by parental indulgence; and, secondly, they will experience their 'agency' as consisting merely in the expression of desire, while the work of satisfying those desires is completely externalised – a kind of abracadabra agency. Not

surprisingly, then, wishful hoppers will grow up with a confident sense of their own centrality in a universe that is fundamentally geared towards satisfying their desires, in some way or another.

Wishful hoppers thus generate hopes that are fanciful in so far as they are not grounded in any real understanding of how they will be realized; they are simply the direct output of desires and so undisciplined by knowledge of the world. Moreover, because wishful hoppers have a high dependence on external powers for bringing their hopes about, this generates a kind of passivity with respect to invoking their own powers of agency for realising their hoped-for ends: Wishful hoppers await their future goods; they do not constructively work towards them. Consequently, wishful hoppers fail to take a regulative or developmental stance towards their own agential capacities: their own limitations are no more relevant to the prospects of their hopes than are real conditions in the world. No wonder then that wishful hoppers act out of rosy-hued illusion, exposing themselves (and others) to the loss of material and psychological goods when the hoped-for ends on which they bank do not (magically) materialise. While the loss of material goods, their own or other people's, can indeed be grave, the loss of psychological goods can prove even more punishing. For these may include a loss of trust, friendship, and esteem from others, as well as, in wishful hoppers themselves, a loss of their very sense of self when they are suddenly confronted with an alien and unyielding universe. Thus, wishful hoppers are highly vulnerable to despair. Because their hopes are unrealistic, they're quite unlikely to be realized; and because in their view the realization of their hopes follows 'logically and morally' from their own centrality in the universe, wishful hoppers will have developed little capacity to tolerate the frustration of their hopes or, indeed, to recover from these frustrations by redirecting their hopes in terms of better, more productive ends. Such

is the fate of Fred's sister Rosamund who, even more than her brother, is deeply sunk in the illusory world of wishful hope. When her turn comes for disappointment, the consequences are dramatic: "the terrible collapse of the illusion towards which all her hope had been strained was a stroke which had too thoroughly shaken her: her little world was in ruins, and she felt herself tottering in the midst as a lonely bewildered consciousness" (*Middlemarch*, 734).

Wilful hope: the hope of fear

The service... [Nicholas Bulstrode] could do to the cause of religion had been through life the ground he alleged to himself for his choice of action: it had been the motive which he had poured out in his prayers. Who would use money and position better than he meant to use them? Who could surpass him in self-abhorrence and exaltation of God's cause? And to Mr. Bulstrode God's cause was something distinct from his own rectitude of conduct: it enforced a discrimination of God's enemies, who were to be used merely as instruments, and whom it would be well if possible to keep out of money and consequent influence. Also, profitable investments in trades where the power of the prince of this world showed its more active devices, became sanctified by a right application of the profits in the hands of God's servant.

This implicit reasoning is essentially no more peculiar to evangelical belief than the use of wide phrases for narrow motives is peculiar to Englishmen. There is no general doctrine which is not

capable of eating out our morality if unchecked by the deep-seated habit of direct fellow-feeling with individual fellow-men.

But a man who believes in something else than his own greed, has necessarily a conscience or standard to which he more or less adapts himself. Bulstrode's standard had been his serviceableness to God's cause: 'I am sinful and nought – a vessel to be consecrated by use – but use me!' – had been the mould into which he had constrained his immense need of being something important and predominating. And now had come a moment of in which that mould seemed in danger of being broken and utterly cast away (Middlemarch, 582).

Nicholas Bulstrode is one of the visionary characters in *Middlemarch* – a man whose overriding hope is to bask in divine glory by extirpating, or at least hindering, the sinful and promoting causes that are favoured by God. Although we are introduced to him rather late in his career, Eliot gives a fine description of his early beginnings in London as a young and promising banker's clerk, who, though orphaned and educated at a commercial charity-school, finds community in a Calvinistic dissenting church where he discovers his evangelical potential and comes to see himself as intended by God for "special instrumentality". His hopeful energy and commitment to God's work is initially directed towards becoming a missionary. However, before he can act on this intention, he is taken under the comfortable wing of the Dunkirks, a prosperous business family in the congregation: "That was the setting-in of a new current for his ambition, directing his prospects of 'instrumentality' towards the uniting of distinguished religious gifts with successful business" (*Middlemarch*, 578). Bulstrode becomes increasingly involved in the

family's affairs, soon discovering that the business is actually a front for fencing stolen property. Bulstrode suffers pangs of conscience for these ill-gotten gains, but manages to argue and pray himself into the conviction that God has provided him with such financial opportunities precisely to further his divine mission. His ambition fuelled by this hopeful reasoning, Bulstrode eventually takes control of the family business, courting Dunkirk's widow after Dunkirk himself dies. An older woman, she is won over by Bulstrode's piety and dependability; however, she refuses to marry him until an attempt is made to find her long lost daughter, who had run off some years before to escape the taint of the family business, but on whom the widow still wants to settle her fortune. Bulstrode orchestrates the search, and the daughter is "not found" – or so he tells his wife to be:

It was easy for him to settle what was due from him to others by inquiring what were God's intentions with regard to himself. Could it be for God's service that this fortune should in any considerable portion go to a young woman and her husband who were given up to the lightest pursuits, and might scatter it abroad in triviality – people who seemed to lie outside the path of remarkable providences?" (*Middlemarch*, 580-1).

Bulstrode rationalises his deception by invoking his hope for doing God's work, and buys the silence of a seedy character named Raffles, the only person besides himself who knows of the daughter's existence. The widow marries in ignorance, dying a few years later and leaving her entire fortune to Bulstrode.

By the time we meet Bulstrode, much time has passed. Married again, he is rich and influential – a respected banker and businessman in the town of

Middlemarch, though not particularly well-liked. Though a public benefactor – he is instrumental in establishing a new hospital – he is viewed as mean and narrow in his business dealings, hence hypocritical in his piety, or at least ungenerous in the way he treats others who don't share his particular moral and religious outlook. Still, he pursues his goals with determination, wielding his money and influence as God's chosen servant, until this hopeful vision is suddenly shattered by the reappearance of Raffles, who torments him with the thought that his disreputable past, including the circumstances of his first marriage, will be revealed, shaming him before others and making a mockery of his special place in God's divine plan:

Strange, piteous conflict in the soul of this unhappy man, who had longed for years to be better than he was – who had taken his selfish passions into discipline and clad them in severe robes, so that he had walked with them as a devote quire, till now that a terror had risen among them, and they could chant no longer, but threw out their common cries for safety (*Middlemarch*, 663).

Bulstrode's worst fears are soon realized. His secrets are revealed to one and all – worse, he is implicated in the death of Raffles – and he is forced to leave Middlemarch in disgrace, a broken and blighted man, with the despairing conviction that he is now singled out by God for divine retribution, “cast out from the temple as one who had brought unclean offerings” (*Middlemarch*, 582).

Bulstrode is the unhappy extreme of a character disordered by wilful hope. Such hope is, in some sense, an improvement over wishful hope, in so far as wilful hopers take on many responsibilities of agency in both formulating and working towards the realisation of their hopes. However, wilful hopers invest all their energy

in the achievement of their ends, having little understanding of the self-aggrandizing passions that often drive them to those ends. Wilful hoppers are therefore quite disciplined in the way they reason from means to ends, developing plans to ground and direct their activities in light of their hopes. However, they are also quite unreflective, and sometimes unscrupulous, about the impact on self and others of the means they use, always justifying these in terms of the ends pursued. Moreover, they are also quite unreflective, indeed often self-deceived, about their reasons for valuing such ends.

As with wishful hoppers, it is interesting to speculate on how wilful hoppers develop as such. In the novel, Bulstrode is an orphan, as are a few other characters who struggle with wilful hope. This suggests a contributing cause of unbalanced or neglectful parental scaffolding, with rewards given for successful agential achievement, perhaps, but little or no reassurance or comfort offered when efforts fail. If so, the early experience of agency for wilful hoppers would be corrupted in two ways: First, they would experience the external recognition of themselves as agents to be entirely contingent on the success of their efforts in achieving whatever ends are endorsed as meaningful or worthwhile; and, second, receiving no external support when their efforts fail, they would form a fairly insecure sense of self, experiencing themselves as highly vulnerable to erasure when the prescribed ends are not achieved. Hence, the underlying impetus to the agential activities of wilful hoppers would not be self-satisfying desire, as with wishful hoppers, but rather self-protective dread or fear – fear that they won't matter or count for anything in the absence of achievement, specifically in the absence of achieving something great or noteworthy. Consequently, though wilful hoppers may have rather grandiose hopes or ambitions,

their hopeful activities, in contrast with wishful hopers, mask a deep uncertainty about having any place at all in the universe.

The ego-anxiety of wilful hope can lead, as we have seen in Bulstrode's case, to a number of epistemic and moral liabilities. First, wilful hopers' fragility in their sense of self militates against a direct and realistic confrontation with their own limitations, leading to a wilful over-dependence on their own powers and plans for bringing about their hoped-for ends. Driven mainly by the need to prove themselves effective agents in the world, wilful hopers tend toward a kind of agential solipsism. Second, though wilful hopers, unlike wishful hopers, are often quite proficient in means-end reasoning, their ego-anxious solipsism makes them blind to the psychological springs of their own behaviour, encouraging a tendency to rationalize that behaviour to self and others. Third, because of this solipsism, wilful hopers also tend to treat others as means to their all-important ends, rather than as self-standing agents in their own right. Consequently, in the practical domain, wilful hopers fail to anticipate how others, with powers and projects of their own, might contribute – positively or negatively – to the realization of the hopers' ends; and, in the moral domain, wilful hopers show little care for the concerns of others, leading them badly astray in their interpersonal dealings and exposing them to the potential loss of friendship, trust and esteem. As if these liabilities weren't enough, wilful hopers' fixation on achieving their hoped-for ends as a way of supporting their sense of self also makes them highly vulnerable to despair. When these ends are thwarted, they have little capacity to respond flexibly and imaginatively to the world having lost the only thing that gives their actions meaning and purpose.

Scaffolding hope

'I have wished very much to see you for a long while, Mr. Lydgate,' said Dorothea when they were seated opposite to each other; 'but I put off asking you to come until Mr. Bulstrode applied to me again about the Hospital. I know that the advantage of keeping the management of it separate from that of the Infirmary depends on you, or, at least, on the good which you are encouraged to hope for from having it under your control. And I am sure you will not refuse to tell me exactly what you think.'

'You want to decide whether you should give a generous support to the Hospital,' said Lydgate. 'I cannot conscientiously advise you to do it in dependence on any activity of mine. I may be obliged to leave the town.'

He spoke curtly, feeling the ache of despair as to his being able to carry out any purpose that [his wife] Rosamund had set her mind against.

'Not because there is no one to believe in you?' said Dorothea, pouring out her words in clearness from a full heart. 'I know the unhappy mistakes about you. I knew them from the first moment to be mistakes. You have never done anything vile. You would not do anything dishonourable.'

It was the first assurance of belief in him that had fallen on Lydgate's ears. He drew a deep breath, and said 'Thank you.' He could say no more: it was something very new and strange in his life that these few words of trust from a woman should be so much to him.

'I beseech you to tell me how everything was,' said Dorothea, fearlessly. 'I am sure that the truth would clear you.'

Lydgate started up from his chair and went towards the window...

'Tell me, pray,' said Dorothea, with simple earnestness; 'then we can consult together. It is wicked to let people think evil of anyone falsely, when it can be hindered.'

Lydgate turned, remembering where he was, and saw Dorothea's face looking up at him with a sweet trustful gravity. The presence of a noble nature, generous in its wishes, ardent in its charity, changes the lights for us: we begin to see things again in their larger, quieter masses, and to believe that we too can be seen and judged in the wholeness of our character. That influence was beginning to act on Lydgate, who had for many days been seeing all life as one who is dragged and struggling amid the throng. He sat down again, and felt that he was recovering his old self in the consciousness that he was with one who believed in it (Middlemarch, 716-17).

In the foregoing analysis of hoping badly, we have seen that there are two extremes to be avoided: The first, wishful hope, involves a over-dependence on others in supporting our hopes, and a consequent under-dependence on our own powers of agency; the second, wilful hope, involves the reverse – an over-dependence on our own powers of agency, and a consequent under-dependence on others. Both ways of hoping involve insensitivity to the conditions that govern our real situation in the world. Consequently, we are bound to hope badly, and act badly because of our hopes. This may involve the problematic and even immoral treatment of others. But,

just as likely, it will involve problematic and even destructive consequences for oneself. For, as we have seen, insensitivity to real conditions in the world can engender an inability to anticipate and adjust reasonably to difficulties as these arise, as well as an inability to tolerate the frustration of hoped-for ends without crashing into the despair of a lost sense of purpose and agency. As Eliot says, “we are on a perilous margin when we begin to look passively at our future selves, and see our own figures led with a dull consent into insipid misdoing and shabby achievement” (*Middlemarch*, 736).

To steer clear of this perilous margin – or to draw back from it when we are teetering at its edge – requires discovering in ourselves a capacity for *responsive* hope. Most obviously, this capacity involves being responsive to real world constraints on formulating and pursuing our hopes. But being responsive in this way involves, as I will argue, being responsive to others in a way that acknowledges the importance of “peer scaffolding” in reviving and supporting our own sense of hopeful agency. Like parental scaffolding at an earlier stage of development, peer-scaffolding is a particular mode of engagement in which individuals are supported in their capacity to hope, not primarily by way of material aid, but rather by way of psychological aid. That is to say, individuals are reinforced in their own sense of effective agency by having their hopes recognised and respected as critical to that sense of agency. Still, the difference between parental scaffolding and peer scaffolding is profound. In parental scaffolding, the child is not initially capable of formulating and pursuing hopes in its own right. Part of the parent’s job, therefore, is to teach the child how to hope – specifically how to direct its aims and activities in order to become a self-scaffolding agent of hope. By contrast, peer-scaffolding involves responding to the agent as someone who is already a self-scaffolder – that is,

as someone who can and must take the lead in articulating their hopes for their own lives and whose own powers of agency must be the powers that get them there if any powers can. As Mary Garth says to Fred Vincy when he tries to off-load the responsibility of self-scaffolding onto her: “that is not the question – what I want you to do. You have a conscience of your own, I suppose” (*Middlemarch*, 131).

Since the point of peer-scaffolding is not to take over responsibility for directing another’s life, but rather to stimulate that person’s confidence in their own hopes and capacity to realize their hopes, it is the kind of scaffolding that must reinforce a person’s sense of their own self-directive agency if it is to do any good at all. But how is this reinforcement to occur if scaffolding involves a kind of dependence of one person on another? The answer lies in the way this dependency is experienced under the regimen of effective peer-scaffolding: not as essentially uni-directional, but instead as potentially bi-directional. Specifically, a person must have the sense that, through such scaffolding, their agency is supported by others with the kind of respect and acknowledgement that enables and encourages them to energize these others with their own hopeful energy in turn. Thus, in effective peer-scaffolding, individuals are naturally drawn into a kind of community of mutually responsive hope in which each person’s hopes become partly invested in the hopeful agency of others and vice versa. Existing within such a community may not make individuals any more likely to realize certain specific hopes; but at least it will make them less likely to slide from disappointment into the passivity of on-going despair.

Before analyzing this dynamic further, let me illustrate its development with a final pair of examples from *Middlemarch* involving two of the main characters, Dorothea Brooke and Tertius Lydgate. Though they traverse separate narrative paths in the novel, he of town and she of country, they come together at critical moments to

give each other a taste of responsive hope, leading to the kind of developmental breakthrough on each of their parts that precedes the explicit pursuit of practices of good hope.

Both Dorothea and Lydgate begin their *Middlemarch* lives with something of the ego-driven blindness of wilful hope. Dorothea, the martyrish niece of a well-to-do landowner, yearns to dedicate her life to great and beneficent works, but finds no easy outlet for her young passion until she meets and marries Edward Causabon, a man more than twice her age, who is professed to be a learned and important religious scholar embarked on a revolutionizing theological compendium, *The Key to all Mythologies*. Dorothea envisions a life of scholarly devotion to Causabon and his Great Work, thus becoming “wise and strong in his wisdom and strength” (*Middlemarch*, 198). However, her hopes are dashed as she begins to realize that he is dusty, narrow-minded, and morbidly insecure, jealous of his ideas without really having any, and certainly incapable of rising above the footnote to produce anything worthwhile. Dorothea struggles with crushing disappointment, but manages to replace her own ambitious hopes for her husband – and for herself – with pity based on a “waking presentiment that there might be a sad consciousness in his life which made as great a need on his side as her own” (197). Fortunately, he dies rather early in their marriage relieving her of his claustrophobic presence; and though she remains dedicated and loyal during his life, she refuses to carry on his researches after his death, writing on the notebook of instructions he left for her: “I could not use it. Do you not see now that I could not submit my soul to yours, by working hopelessly at what I have no belief in?” (506-7). Turning her back on Causabon’s dead and deadening scholarly pursuits, Dorothea’s hopes begin to be revived in a more genuinely responsive mode when she discovers in Lydgate an energetically hopeful

soul with whom she can share the kind of interest that “has slipped away from me since I have been married” (412). As the family’s attending physician, she is fired by Lydgate’s enthusiasm for finding better, more scientific methods of treating the sick, and when he asks her to help with funding Bulstrode’s new hospital, she is only too happy to oblige: “I am glad you told me this, Mr. Lydgate... I am sure I could spare two hundred a-year for a grand purpose like this. How happy you must be, to know things that you feel sure will do great good! I wish I could awake with that knowledge every morning.” (413). It is the beginning of her own awakening into the energizing dynamic of responsive hope: experiencing the effectiveness of her own agency in supporting the meaningful hopes of others, her own hopes for doing something worthwhile are given new life and concrete direction. More and more, she comes to trust her own judgement about how to direct her hopeful energy, even as she comes to understand that her own capacities for achieving her hopes, let alone keeping them alive, are crucially dependent on others’ recognition of their meaning and value in turn.

Lydgate’s trajectory of development is not unlike Dorothea’s. An orphan like her, he begins his own life with grand purposes driven largely by a psychology of wilful hope. Inspired by an early “conviction that the medical profession as it might be was the finest in the world; presenting the most perfect interchange between science and art; offering the most direct alliance between intellectual conquest and social good” (*Middlemarch*, 136), he arrives in Middlemarch at the age of twenty-seven, “an age at which many men ... are hopeful of achievement, resolute in avoidance, thinking that Mammon shall never put a bit in their mouths and get astride their backs” (133). Educated as a physician in London, Edinburgh and Paris, he dreams of making a ground-breaking contribution to medical knowledge by studying

the “special cases” he will come across in his Middlemarch practice. He is also bent on pursuing an ambitious program of medical reform, both with respect to the treatment of diseases and with respect to professional conduct, little caring what enemies he may make amongst his older and more conservative colleagues along the way. Well born though not terribly well off, Lydgate lives in some arrogant confidence that he will build a solid practice over time, eventually achieving respectability and enough financial security to support a wife and family. Until then, he has no intention of getting married. Unhappily for these hopeful plans, he meets Fred Vincy’s stunningly beautiful but deeply selfish sister, Rosamund, whose only ambition is to marry someone like Lydgate, a cut above her mercantile roots. Lydgate on his side considers her to have “just the kind of intelligence one would desire in a woman – polished, refined, docile, lending itself to finish in all the delicacies of life, and enshrined in a body which expressed this with a force of demonstration that excluded the need for other evidence” (153). Eventually succumbing to her charms and stratagems, as well as to his own unexamined prejudices about the way women should contribute to a life well lived, Lydgate marries her, and they set up an expensive household according to Rosamund’s hopeful expectations of what marriage to Lydgate should bring: a life of ease and prestige, without care or concern for how these conditions are met. Lydgate soon discovers in Rosamund a complete lack of interest in his work and in their real financial situation. As debts mount, his various attempts to economize are thwarted by her absolute refusal to “come down” in their neighbours’ eyes. Eventually things come to a crisis. Harried by creditors, and worn down by Rosamund’s persistent obstructionism, Lydgate applies to Bulstrode for a loan of a thousand pounds. Bulstrode piously refuses at first; but when Raffles shows up on his doorstep raving from alcohol poisoning, Bulstrode panics about what he

might reveal about his own disreputable past. Calling on Lydgate to treat Raffles, Bulstrode offers to stand him the loan after all, hoping to secure Lydgate's sympathy by creating in him a strong sense of personal obligation. Unaware of Bulstrode's past or his current motivations, Lydgate accepts the money with relief and delight, "thinking of his life with its good start saved from frustration, its good purposes still unbroken" (664). However, it soon transpires that Bulstrode's caution is all for nought: Raffles has already revealed the story of Bulstrode's first marriage and fortune-securing deceit to a local horse-dealer. And when Raffles dies unexpectedly, the gossips of Middlemarch suspect that Bulstrode has helped him to an untimely end, and then bought Lydgate's silence with the thousand pound "loan". Bulstrode and Lydgate are disgraced together. Although no charges are brought, they are shunned by the townsfolk; and even Lydgate's friends are loathe to broach the subject with him – all except Dorothea, who is eager to hear his clarifying explanation: "Mr Lydgate would understand that if his friends hear a calumny about him their first wish must be to justify. What do we live for, if it is not to make life less difficult to each other? I cannot be indifferent to the troubles of a man who advised me in *my* troubles, and attended me in my illness" (691). Her circle of family and friends try to discourage her from getting involved in something that may turn out to be quite unsavoury. But Dorothea will have none of it:

I should not be afraid of asking Mr. Lydgate to tell me the truth, that I might help him. Why should I be afraid? I might do as Mr. Bulstrode proposed, and take his place in providing for the hospital; and I have to consult Mr. Lydgate to know thoroughly what are the prospects of doing good by keeping up the present plans. There is the best opportunity in the world for me to ask for his

confidence; and he would be able to tell me things which might make all the circumstances clear. Then we would all stand by him and bring him out of his trouble. People glorify all sorts of bravery except the bravery they might show on behalf of their nearest neighbours' (*Middlemarch*, 692-3).

Dorothea's bravery is the bravery of responsive hope. In standing by Lydgate – in particular, by reassuring him of her continuing investment in the hopes he has for his own life, Dorothea rescues him from despair, eliciting from him the beginnings of a hopeful response to his own situation and thereby restoring his confidence in his own powers of agency. Though done less self-consciously, Lydgate's interaction with her in her own time of trouble has a similar supportive structure when, numbed by Casaubon's painful and foreclosing egotism, she finds fewer and fewer outlets for enacting her own powers of hopeful agency. In fact, this dynamic is repeated between various characters in a number of places throughout the novel, as Eliot investigates the conditions surrounding the loss and revival of our human capacity to hope. Many of her characters begin with high hopes, but relatively little sense of how to hope well, leading to despair or resignation when their hopes are thwarted and a corresponding loss of their own sense of agency. Recovering hope depends on discovering some new way of relating to others, specifically a way that recognizes the interdependence between self and other in generating the best conditions for keeping hope alive. Once this interdependence is recognized, the way of good hope involves actively contributing, as Dorothea does, to a dynamic of interaction in which one's own hopes become inter-animated with the hopes of others, thus creating a stable and productive environment in which these can be pursued – or, of course, retargeted when specific hopes fail.

Responsive hope: the hope of care

We have now come full circle. Recall that I began this section by noting that maintaining hope for most of us requires a somewhat responsive social world – a world of at least some particular others who recognize and support the meaning and value we give to our hopeful efforts. I did not deny that there could be exemplary instances of individuals who maintain hope in the most desperate and isolated physical and psychological conditions. But I suggested that such cases would be genuinely heroic, requiring enormous amounts of personal stamina, as well as – most likely – a rare set of background beliefs that unshakeably support the hoper’s continuing efforts. My purpose, however, was not to inquire further into the nature of heroic hope; it was rather to examine the conditions under which a normal capacity to hope develops and even flourishes, requiring some moral strength on the hoper’s part, but no dramatic heroism to ensure that hope remains an active and constructive feature of an individual’s psychology, underpinning their sense of effective agency. George Eliot brings home to us the ways in which a responsive social world is among those conditions, as we see her various characters struggle in vain to develop and maintain their capacity to hope in the face of unsupportive social circumstances: Dorothea, Lydgate, even Fred Vincy – all of them are caught within a web of expectations, norms and relationships that thwart their efforts to fashion their hopes well or work constructively towards realising them. Of course, in keeping with Eliot’s realism, some of these circumstances they bring on themselves – Dorothea and Lydgate, primarily by picking unsuitable spouses, and Fred Vincy, by putting all his dependence on a cranky and avowedly whimsical uncle whose intentions are as fickle

and as hard to forecast as the weather. Thus, even though their dominating social circumstances are against them (including, of course, circumstances of birth and upbringing), it is important to see how they contribute to making these circumstances as bad as they are in consequence of their own wishful and wilful disorders of hope. Nevertheless, whatever part they play in creating a world that is unsupportive of their hopes, the ways in which that world is unsupportive is significantly determined by the actions and attitudes of others.

Hoping well therefore involves both intra- and inter-personal dimensions. Intra-personally, as we have seen, it depends on avoiding the excesses of wishful and wilful hope – neither depending too much on external powers for bringing one's hopes about, nor ignoring the critical role others play in supporting (or thwarting) one's hopeful efforts. Well-balanced hopers understand the need for relying on and developing their own powers of agency in formulating and pursuing their hopes; but such hopers also understand how others can significantly affect their powers, enhancing or inhibiting them depending on the quality of their various interactions. Hence, hoping well has an inter-personal dimension as well: it depends on finding – or making – a community in which individual hopers can experience the benefits of peer scaffolding.

How is such community to be achieved? Practically speaking, the most effective course may be to cultivate in oneself an inter-personal capacity for attending to the cares and concerns of others, thus seeing them as struggling hopeful agents in their own right who require support from others if their own hopeful energy is not to flag and die. By providing this scaffolding so far as possible oneself, one reinforces and supports the meaning and value they give to their own hopes, allowing them to become more energized by the world and so more open to seeking alternatives for

directing their hopeful energy in it. This in turn increases their capacity to respond expansively to the world, and in particular to those from whom they draw support. Hence, the responsive sympathetic scaffolding one gives to others invites responsive sympathetic scaffolding from them in turn, allowing their hopes to become synergistically inter-animated with one's own. Hoping well thus involves cultivating a meta-disposition in which some of one's hopeful energy becomes directed towards supporting the hopeful agency of others and, hence, towards creating the kind of environment one's own hopeful energy is supplemented by the hopeful energy renewed in them. In this way, hoping well draws less on the egocentric preoccupations of desire and dread and more on the alterocentric concerns of care.

Care is without doubt the paradigm social emotion; but properly understood, it is neither blind, nor self-abnegating. For instance, caring for another's capacity to hope as an effective peer-scaffolder does not mean simply endorsing everything they say or do. Rather, it means inviting them to articulate and pursue their hopes in a way that supports their own sense of effective agency. Sometimes this also means challenging them to better articulate their goals or the means they pursue to achieve them. Sometimes it means challenging the meaning and value they have invested in particular hopes. However, such challenges must take place against a backdrop that encourages their own agential initiatives, since the very point of peer scaffolding is to support these initiatives as critical to their continuing sense of efficacy and purpose. To care for the hopes and hopeful agency of others is thus to care about the clarity with which they pursue their own hopes, while at the same time endorsing the value of their own hopeful activities as such. To care in this way for another's capacity to hope is in effect to support their efforts to take better care of their own hopeful agency.

Now what about caring for one's own hopeful agency? Is this not also a feature of hoping with care? The answer is emphatically yes: hoping with care involves care that is both self-directed and other-directed. More interestingly, it is self-directed *because* other-directed and vice versa. To begin with the obvious: hoping with care, as I suggested above, requires clarity – clarity about what constitutes the real limitations of self and obstacles in the world that constrain our hopeful projects, as well as clarity about the values we endorse in pushing against these limits and obstacles to reach our hoped-for ends. Although we may strive for such clarity with regard to our own hopeful projects, it is often easier to achieve for others. Thus, in caring for the clarity of others' hopes and hopeful initiatives, we engage more readily in a practice of reflection and analysis for them which often has consequences for the way we think about ourselves. Further, in engaging others in discussions about such matters, we invite their comparative reflections on our own hopes and hopeful initiatives. Thus we eventually benefit ourselves in caring for others by engaging both our own reflective and their capacities.

How else can care for self and care for other begin to pull together in the economy of hope? I argued above that caring for our own capacity to hope means caring for how others respond to us. This involves not only their reflective responsiveness in helping us gain clarity with respect to our hopes; more importantly, it involves their emotional responsiveness in shoring up our hopeful energy in the wake of difficulties or disappointments. I also suggested that there are ways of encouraging this responsiveness in others – namely, by showing ourselves responsive to them as expansively able agents of hope, thus shoring up their sense of effective agency and so enabling them to support the agency of others in turn. Of course, not everyone will give themselves into this generative dynamic of mutually responsive

hope. So caring for our own capacity to hope means actively seeking out others who respond actively to the challenge of building a community of good hope in turn. Still, caring for our own capacity to hope in this way is not to act out of self-satisfying desire (as in the case of wishful hope) or self-protective fear (as in the case of wilful hope). It is genuinely to act with care, where this involves care for the hopes and hopeful agency of others, as much as it involves care for our own hopes and hopeful agency.

In sum, the care of good hope is both caring and careful – *caring* in doing one's utmost to create conditions under which hope thrives, but *careful* in understanding what those conditions are. Hence, it is the kind of hope that invites clarity – clarity about the limitations of self and other, but also clarity about how such limits can be tested and transcended under real world constraints. Such hope does not foster rosy-hued illusion; but nor does it balk at confronting these limitations and obstacles with the kind of confidence that ultimately derives from operating within a community of good hope. Building such a community must therefore be the first priority of responsive hope: for in hoping well for self and others, we as individuals stand the best chance of maintaining our sense of effective agency, thus fuelling our capacity to realize our hopes and cope with difficulties when these arise. Of course, there is no ultimate protection from the disappointment of unrealised hopes. Nevertheless, in learning to hope well in the company of responsive others, we find the next best thing – namely, our best protection from despair, or at least those persisting crises of despair that are the direct result of hoping badly.

CONCLUSION: FROM INDIVIDUAL TO COLLECTIVE HOPE, A BRIEF

COMMENT

In this paper I have argued that maintaining hope is an essential feature of human agency. I have also argued that questions about the rationality of hope are properly concerned with the problem of hoping well. I have called hoping well an “art”, meaning by the term that it is partly a *gift*: – of character, background, current physical and social circumstances, and other contingencies of nature. However, it is also partly a *skill* that we can develop over time with sufficient knowledge and experience. One factor that may contribute to developing this skill is surely a theoretical understanding of what hoping well consists in, whether this helps individuals directly by giving them some benchmarks of good and bad hope, or whether it helps social support organizations in providing appropriate resources for aiding individuals in developing such capacities. In any case, the art of hoping well is of considerable intellectual interest in itself, and I hope the arguments in this paper go some way towards inviting further reflection on the topic.

Perhaps the most surprising conclusion of this paper is the extent to which an individual’s capacity for hoping well depends on that individual’s being responsive to the hopes of others and, beyond that, participating in or even building a community of others who are likewise responsive to hopeful lives beyond their own. If this analysis is right, it shows that our success as individual hopers has an irreducibly communal dimension: we cannot hope well without taking a hopeful interest in the hopes of others and vice versa. But this still falls short of what has been termed elsewhere in this volume “collective hope” (see for example, V. Braithwaite; Drahos; Courville and Piper).

Collective hope refers to hope individuals hold in common with others as hope for the community of which they are a part. While it builds on individual or private

hopes, shared hopes become collective when individuals see themselves as hoping and so acting in concert for ends that they communally endorse. Now, there is an interesting question of how collective hope arises, and beyond that if hoping collectively can be done well or badly. I have not much to say on this topic here. But I note that in so far as agents develop in themselves an individual capacity for hoping well, they are committed to building the kind of community in which collective hopes would naturally arise. For in such a community, individuals are psychologically and materially involved in the hopes of one another, thus paving the way for discovering or even making hopes shared in common. Furthermore, under such conditions, the hopes so shared will naturally be subject to the kind of joint reflection on what meaning and value they have for individuals in the community, thus increasing the probability that whatever hopes continue to be shared will be robustly endorsed by members of the community. Under such conditions, it is also reasonable to expect a communally endorsed process of seeking out pathways most apt for achieving such hopes under real world constraints and collective limitations. And surely any hopes thus examined and endorsed stand the best chance of actively recruiting the agency of individuals in whatever manner or measure is collectively deemed appropriate for accomplishing the hoped-for ends. Moreover, should these efforts fail, there is already in place a practice of inter-animating concern amongst the individuals involved to keep collective hope alive by reviewing and sometimes retargeting the community's hopeful efforts. In sum, though I have argued for the benefits of hoping well at an individual level, there is reason to think that such practices may also provide the best conditions for generating not just hope, but practices of *good* hope at the collective level.

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ENDNOTES

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²² The other two are: “What can I know?” and “What ought I to do?” (Kant 1950, A805/B833).

³ Bovens poses this sceptical challenge, not to endorse it, but to explain why hoping is *rational* for creatures like us – that is, something we could rationally *choose* to do. It is rational, Bovens argues, because, under favourable circumstances, hoping leads us into activities that promote the likelihood of the hoped-for outcome. Furthermore, even when hope is shorn of this instrumental value (because we are not able to affect the likelihood of the hoped-for outcome), it may still be rational to hope in so far as there is some “intrinsic value” to hoping: it yields pleasure in anticipation, it sometimes promotes a better understanding of ourselves and of the ultimate desirability of what we are hoping for, and finally it shows that we value ourselves. in so far as it shows that we care about what happens

to us. Without denying any of these advantages of hope – or hoping well (more on this below) – the claim I make is stronger: Hope is undoubtedly valuable to us, but it is also essential to us if we are to lead a recognizably human life.

⁴ Of course, it may not be a possibility in fact. The fire occurred yesterday, and people were injured or they were not. We are able to hope that they were not, only because of our own ignorance. Once we are apprised of the facts one way or the other, the space for hope disappears, although wishes may still blossom in this epistemically unyielding terrain – for example, I may wish that the fire had never started, or at least that it had not taken its terrible toll.

⁵ On the importance of hope for self-development, see also Gravlee's discussion of Aristotle: "... [Hopefulness] underlies the deliberation and self-confidence necessary both to improve one's circumstances and to cultivate the excellences of character" (Gravlee 2000, 477).

⁶ All *Middlemarch* page references are to the Oxford World's Classics edition (Eliot 1996).

The hope process and social inclusion¹

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ABSTRACT: The psychology of individual hope has been well-articulated through the work of Seligman (2000) and Snyder (2000) but little has been done to extend this model to understand how individuals engage in collective hope. A model of the collective hope process is developed which emphasizes the importance of principles of social inclusion, open contestation of goals and transparent pathways to give certainty to the belief that the public are important to the process, even if the same public is uncertain and divided about the outcomes. The study is based on a survey of 2040 Australians who shared their hopes, fears and actions in relation to the Australian taxation system in 2000.

Keywords: collective hope, hope process, social inclusion, democratic participation, trust, tax compliance

When individuals seek to achieve an outcome as a group, hope is inevitably involved. As Philip Pettit observes in the conclusion of his paper in this volume, we collaborate with others on collective undertakings with a certain “cognitive resolve.” The spirit of cooperation is not simply a function of social bonds, particularly in instances where we are foregoing other opportunities. In addition to looking after our relationships and meeting our obligations, questions of goals and the means for achieving those goals enter into our deliberations (Braithwaite 1995). We ask ourselves whether or not the collective goal is worth striving for, is it achievable, and is our contribution valuable? There is no certainty to the way we answer any of these questions. Striving for the goal may make things better for us all, or it may not; the goal may be achievable, although any collective undertaking is fraught with unpredictability as to whether it is sustainable or not; and our contribution may be essential to the outcome, or irrelevant. In order to move forward and collaborate with others, we cannot rationally wait for certainty as Pettit points out. Instead we “do the sums,” sign on to a plan of action, and resolve to move forward – with hope as the energizer of our actions and the backstop to our rationality. In this paper, we refer to this as the process by which the individual embarks on collective hope.

The central thesis of this paper is that sustainable collective action requires individuals to “sign on” to the collective hope process (of the kind described by Courville and Piper and Shearing and Kempa this volume) involving our sharing a vision of desired social change and seeing opportunity for its realization. While the model developed in this paper is relevant to a collective hope process generally, it is tested within the context of a democratic society where systems of governance are in place to allow the collective hope

process to work. Just as a democratic structure of governance allows for collective hope, so does it allow for public hope. Drahos (this volume) makes an important distinction between public and collective hope. Public hope is the rather vacuous “razzle dazzle” that is passed on to the community through clever marketing and spin-doctoring by powerful elites. Collective hope, on the other hand, conveys understanding of and commitment to goals and a process of implementation. It is owned by the people rather than being imposed from above and it gives a sense of meaning and coherence to their lives. Within a democratic society, it is likely that individuals become involved in collaborative agendas (for example, voting, fighting a war, buying government bonds) as a response to appeals to both collective and public hope. As Courville and Piper and Shearing and Kempa have argued, it is unrealistic to consider public and collective hopes as alternative forms of hope; they are characterized by considerable overlap. It is reasonable, however, to expect truly democratic institutions to prioritize the processes whereby public hope can be “undressed” and like collective hope, called to account. Sadly, Peter Drahos’ paper is a poignant reminder that we would be deceiving ourselves if we believed that democracy routinely offers such protection. By the same token, it is reasonable to suppose that in a democratic society, collective hope works at some level to sustain collaboration and collective action.

When a social group shares a vision and sees prospects for social change, the collective hope process can be said to be working well. In such circumstances, individuals are likely to be prepared to make sacrifices and to give up some of their freedoms: In short, to pay the costs with the hope of the advantages that will accompany social

change. One of the outcomes of a well-functioning hope process is hypothesized as cooperation. In the empirical study reported in this paper, the hope process is used to explain cooperation with a tax authority.

Sometimes, the collective hope process does not work well in the sense that it is “underdeveloped.” The vision may not be shared across the community, or there may be impediments to its implementation within the dominant social order. An underdeveloped hope process is likely to trigger dissociation from the authority and the social infrastructure over which it exerts control. Dissociation does not imply hostility, although this may occur, but rather authority irrelevance. Dissociation may be a temporary state while resources are found to promote a successful collective hope process outside the system and challenge the dominant social order. At the heart of a hope process struggling to widen its appeal is private hope.

This paper is structured around four questions. First, can hope theory, as formulated in the individual context, be extended to account for collective hope? Second, can the problems posed by psychological individualism be overcome to account for the operation of collective hope? Third, can we find empirical evidence to support the collective hope model? Fourth, does the empirical model adequately represent Drahos’ (this volume) conception of collective hope or is it open to the kind of exploitation that Drahos describes as inherent in public hope?

At the outset, it needs to be clearly stated that no suppositions are being made in this paper about whether or not the hopes of the collective, if realized, promote the common good. As Cartwright (this volume) demonstrates, quests, no matter how noble

and well intended, do not always produce the outcomes expected. Hannah Arendt makes the same point, capturing the uncertainty of starting something: “We weave our strand into a network of relations. What comes of it we never know. We’ve all been taught to say: Lord, forgive them, for they know not what they do. That is true of all action. Quite simply and concretely true, because one *cannot* know” (Arendt 2000a, 21). And this is where hope enters our analysis.

HOPE THEORY: THE INDIVIDUAL PERSPECTIVE

For modern day psychologists, hope is essentially goal-directed thinking. Snyder and his colleagues define hope as “a positive motivational state that is based on an interactively derived sense of successful (a) agency (goal-directed energy) and (b) pathways (planning to meet goals)” (Snyder, Irving, and Anderson 1991, 287). This conception of hope should resonate with all of us. It occurs when we would like to reach a goal but we are not absolutely certain that it will happen, even when we take action to effect the change. For example, we might set ourselves the goal of finding a job; we plan our strategy, perhaps through an employment agency, perhaps through answering advertisements in the newspaper, or perhaps through our social networks; we plan how we should present ourselves to be successful and we tell ourselves that we can do it. As we meet with some success, our confidence grows, we try new approaches, we learn new pathways and we see ourselves as “winners”, as can-do people who can make things happen. Hope theory for individuals, therefore, poses three challenges – articulating our

goals, identifying the routes or pathways that we can use to achieve these goals, and finding our personal sense of agency. Agency refers to a self-perception that we can move along the pathway to goal achievement – we have the will power to start something and to persevere in the goal journey. If our hope lacks “legs” in any of these regards, it is reduced in stature as a human resource for change, reduced to wishful thinking, or day-dreaming, or escapism.

Hope theory has commanded considerable support in recent years (Gillham 2000; Snyder 2000), with two findings of importance for developing a theory of collective hope. First, while hope theory is essentially cognitively based, emotions have a part to play. Emotions are regarded as a by-product of goal-directed thought (Snyder 2000, 11). Positive emotions follow from the successful pursuit of goals, negative emotions from their less successful pursuit. The second finding of considerable importance is that when goals are blocked, those who show high hope differ from those with low hope in that they “perceive that they can use alternate routes and have the requisite agentic thinking to activate themselves” (Snyder 2000, 11). Perhaps Snyder’s conception of the high hope person provides an answer to the low hope that is apparent in Arendt’s portrayal of the marginalized Jewess, Rahel Varnhagen. Rahel displays the hope of the helpless, feeling that it “is senseless to attempt to do anything in this disordered, indefinite world”, and that it is best to wait in hope, a hope that “seduces one into peering about in the world for a tiny, infinitesimally tiny crack which circumstances may have overlooked, for a crack, be it ever so narrow, which nevertheless would help to define, to organize, to

provide a center for the indefinite world – because the longed-for unexpected something might ultimately emerge through it in the form of definite happiness” (Arendt 2000b, 58).

Hope theory provides a blueprint for how we might use hope to improve our well-being. Developed in the context of psychological work on stress and helplessness and their adverse effects on mental health, hope theory makes a significant contribution to teaching us to live more positive lives (psychologists refer to this field as positive psychology), at least in the sense of “getting what we want out of life” (Schwartz 2000, 409). But with these substantial gains come drawbacks that have not gone unnoticed by the psychological community (Schwartz 2000; Seligman 2000).

A CRITIQUE OF HOPE THEORY

First and foremost, hope theory assumes mastery, almost domination, on the part of the individual in the way he or she engages with the world. As Antonovsky (1992) has put it, the tradition from which hope theory has emerged rests on the basic assumption that “Control [the dangerous] agent and the problem is solved” (538). But yet not all things can be controlled by the individual, nor should they be. Rahel Varnhagen could not change her Jewishness although it was a source of shame to her, “the misery and misfortune of my life” (Arendt 2000b, 49). Arendt describes the way in which Rahel constructed her unhappiness as a personal problem from which she could only escape through refusing to engage with the world. Undoubtedly, hope theorists would argue that some things have to be accepted, and then we need to move on. But Arendt does not see

the solution as being so straightforward. Arendt presents a compelling argument for restating Rahel's predicament as a political problem, a problem of a people who were at that time stateless, whose feelings of being marginalized in society led them to strive for personal advancement through being exceptional individuals rather than to fight for political equality for the Jewish people. In other words, the hope that would make a difference for Rahel was not individualistic, but collectivist. It demanded reformulation of identity through analyzing and re-defining group relations.

Regardless of whether or not one agrees with this particular analysis, Arendt highlights the key constraints of hope theory. First, it is a theory about individuals advancing their own well-being, with little consideration for how their actions may affect others, or how the pursuit of individual well-being may shape the quality of social life more broadly. Second, it is a theory that fails to take into account how group relations impinge on the hope of individuals. Hope theory renders as irrelevant the political reality that while we may believe that all people are entitled to human rights, some of us have more rights, and as a result more opportunities than others, and some of us have more resources to protect those rights and opportunities. Being Jewish in the world of Rahel Varnhagen meant the denial of rights; being stateless and non-political meant having no collective voice for claiming rights and preventing the stultifying domination felt at the hands of German gentile society. No doubt, the respected members of German society at that time were intent on doing nothing more than realizing their own hopes. The question is, however, at what cost to what appear to be the more modest hopes of others?

KEY ELEMENTS IN A THEORY OF COLLECTIVE HOPE

A theory of collective hope has to provide resolution to the inevitable conflicts that arise from competing hopes. To put it more constructively, it needs to provide a framework for understanding how individual aspirations are coordinated to bring about a groundswell of opinion that certain goals are worth striving for, that there are pathways to their accomplishment, and that the collective has the capacity to move things along toward the achievement of these goals. Mandela's mobilization of anti-apartheid forces around the world illustrates the power of collective hope: Mandela (2001a, 2001b) recognized the importance of building consensus around core goals, of finding and using multiple pathways to advance these goals, and of empowering his people so that they never lost sight of their ability to shape their own destiny. The outcome of the hope process nurtured over some 25 years or more speaks for itself. But understanding the collective hope process to the point where it can be generalized to other contexts remains a challenge.

The work of Antonovsky (1972; 1979; 1993) on stress related illness offers a starting point for moving the key concepts of hope theory into a collective frame. Antonovsky challenged the popular view of life stressors as exogenous problems to be obliterated, mastered or dominated by human will. He reformulated the problem in terms of stressors being a ubiquitous part of human existence: Life is chaotic and in some sense, stress is life itself. Antonovsky introduced the idea of people having "generalized resistance resources" (1972, 541) which are always on hand to restore equilibrium when

states of tension are created by the demands of everyday life. This perspective changes the objective of the hope process from that of control to co-existence, from the domination of one's environment to accommodation and where appropriate, to its re-shaping.

Among the resistance resources proposed by Antonovsky (1972) are the ability to be flexible, to improvise, and be ingenious in meeting demands (provides adaptability); the knowledge that there are others who care about one's well-being (provides social bonds); and identification with the broader community such that the individual knows that the society, and not just the individual, is familiar with these demands and will help deal with them (provides meaning in life). High resistance resources according to Antonovsky bring a pervasive, enduring though dynamic feeling of confidence that the demands one is encountering are predictable and explicable, the resources are available to meet these demands, and the demands are challenges that are worthy of engagement.

Thus, while Antonovsky was concerned to find the secret of individual well-being, his analysis was far from individualistic. Individuals were best positioned for well-being when they were enmeshed in collective settings that nurtured their adaptability, that impressed upon them their importance and value to others, and that reinforced the meaning that they gave to their lives. Through Antonovsky, we have a conception of hope at the collective level that does not assume that everyone needs to get what he/she wants.

Moreover, Antonovsky alerts us to the way in which hopes are revised and reformulated through collective rather than individual actions, and most importantly

through our shared understanding of the way things are. In the case of Rahel, the secret is not so much to escape her Jewishness and the pain that it brings, but to understand the situation that she is in and to make sense of her experience, however unpleasant.

Developing a sense of coherence about her life, something that needs to be accomplished within a supportive and understanding network of people who care for her, provides a base for thinking positively, for finding new hope and a path to its realization.

At the collective level, the building blocks for finding a sense of coherence in our experiences of the world are given to us in large part by our society: its values, its institutions and the identities it bestows on us as members of various groups. Through these shared understandings we assemble our collective hopes for ourselves and each other. Thus we can begin the task of translating individual hope theory into collective hope theory. An individual's goals become the shared social vision of what society could be like for its members. An individual's sense of personal agency becomes the collective's sense of empowerment or political efficacy, of being able to have one's voice heard, and having it join others to the point where it makes a difference. And finally, the pathways for implementing goals in individual hope theory can be thought of as the social institutions that are available for groups wishing to pursue collective action. We should be mindful, however, of the extent to which such social infrastructure is dependent on particular forms of governance. While readily accessible within a democracy, the pathways for realizing hopes for collectivities may be far less accessible and safe to use within totalitarian societies.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF COLLECTIVE HOPE

If social goals are shared within a society, if its members feel that their voice can be heard and that others speak with or for them, and if the institutional pathways for achieving the goals are available and effective, we can conclude that all the elements of the hope process can be assembled for social groups as well as individuals. But with what purpose? Does it mean that change will occur? Unfortunately not, as Cartwright (this volume) reminds us. What it does mean is simply that change is possible, and that all the elements are there for it to occur.

Hope psychologists argue that their model improves the well-being of individuals both in an emotional sense and in terms of their decision making capacity: People with a good hope process in place have a blueprint for getting what they want out of life. But does the collective hope process have the capacity to ensure the well-being of a society in the same way? If we focus on ends in the context of South Africa, we can point to the way in which the collective hope process, with people like Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu as its leaders, ended apartheid and brought freedom to South Africa. But did it bring good decision-making? It certainly did not bring speedy resolution to the oppression of the South African peoples. On the other hand, it was designed to be respectful of all who called South Africa their home, regardless of skin colour. In this sense, the collective hope process of South Africa was socially inclusive. The day-to-day decisions of the anti-apartheid movement did not please all, there was no shortage of conflict, even hatred, but the collective hope process was designed so that all could have a “seat at the table”,

the objective being to persuade and win over those who opposed change, not outcast them. Thus, we might conceptualize the future well-being of a society in terms of two criteria. First, we could consider a society as doing well if it was making progress toward the realization of its shared social vision. Second, we could consider the way in which a society was going about the realization of its vision: Was it doing so inclusively or through domination, stigmatization, or denial of alternative voices? This paper focuses on this latter facet of a society's well-being, its inclusion of the different voices of hope.

An indicator of social inclusion in a society is the extent to which members express a willingness to cooperate with other members irrespective of the subgroups to which they belong. To the extent that shared goals and a sense of empowerment strengthen an individual's group identity, cooperation within that group is likely to increase (Moscovici and Doise 1994; Turner 1991). Taylor (2003) has demonstrated the way in which taxpayers who identify with broad social categories (such as an ordinary Australian) are more likely to be cooperative than those for whom subgroup identities (such as an industry or occupational group) are salient.

Cooperation involves individuals in compromising with others, making sacrifices and bearing costs, giving up some of their freedoms in order to be a valued member of the group. In order to be a cooperative actor within the tax system, taxpayers need to engage with the tax system in a way that respects the constraints imposed by law (including the spirit of the law) and to recognize the authority of the tax office. This would mean accepting that the tax authority is entitled to make demands and enforce those demands. It is important to note here that no assumption is being made that taxpayers will like the

demands or the enforcement of them. Indeed, on some occasions, people within the system may actively resist the demands. But this resistance occurs within system boundaries. The objective of resistance is to change the demands so that the system is better. The collective hope process for tax system reform is still at work, it is just that some individuals are not seeing progress in the direction that they believe is best.

But what if one does not share the social goals of the taxpaying community, what if one believes that the tax system not only fails to engage with alternative goals, but actively squashes them, does one lack hope? The answer is clearly no, but the hope remains more individualized as private hope, and if it is organized at all, it exists outside the dominant or traditional tax system.

Within regulatory contexts, there are strategies whereby individuals cut themselves off psychologically from their obligations. In taxation, people can opt out of the system through disengagement or game playing (Braithwaite 2003). Disengagement involves psychological withdrawal to the point where the authority of the tax office becomes irrelevant. Individuals place themselves psychologically outside tax office control. The objective of game playing, similarly, is to assert the individual's freedom from tax authority constraint, but the goal is achieved through moulding and using tax law to outwit the tax office. While disengagement involves a complete retreat, game playing involves an assertion of taxpayer prowess over a beleaguered tax office. In both cases of disengagement and game playing, we see dissociation from the tax system, at least the traditional tax system where paying tax is a social obligation that participants, in theory, willingly meet.

If the hope process for the tax system is on track, that is people believe that it will deliver an improved quality of life in the long term and that it is operating in a socially inclusive manner, we might expect to see relatively high levels of cooperation, and relatively low levels of dissociation. If the collective hope process is faltering, cooperation should be low and dissociation should receive the endorsement of a substantial proportion of the taxpaying population. In the remainder of this paper, the question addressed is how the collective hope process contributes to tax system well-being, defined as high citizen cooperation and low citizen dissociation.

DOES COLLECTIVE HOPE KEEP PEOPLE IN THE SYSTEM?

The first hypothesis tested in this paper is that the collective hope process facilitates cooperation with systems of governance in democratic societies, specifically the tax system, through (a) commitment to social goals relating to having a better society and a better tax system; (b) belief that the collective voice can be heard and acted on; and (c) confidence that the institutional pathways to effect change are in place or can be put in place. As the elements of the hope process become stronger, cooperation with the system increases. It is replaced by resistance, when the elements of the hope process weaken, that is, as individuals become disappointed in the collective goals, the collective capacity to follow through with implementation and the institutional pathways.

The second hypothesis tested in this paper is that the major elements of collective hope will be absent when individuals dissociate from the system. By the same token,

there is no reason to assume that hope is absent in dissociation. Traditional goals will be replaced by non-traditional goals as a sense of coherence is built around a new system. Furthermore, over time, sharing and persuading others of the desirability of a new approach allows private hopes to begin the laborious process of being transformed into collective hopes. In this respect, it is important to remind ourselves that Mandela started from just such a base. Dissociating from the South African regime would have preceded the building of an international anti-apartheid movement that gave South Africans and the world collective hope.

METHOD

Data base

These hypotheses were tested empirically using data from a national survey, the Community Hopes, Fears and Actions Survey (for details see Braithwaite 2001; Braithwaite, Reinhart, Mearns, and Graham 2001). A stratified random sample of 7754 persons was selected from the publicly available electoral rolls. A lengthy questionnaire on tax matters was sent to each person who had been randomly selected, together with a letter explaining the intent of the study and a stamped addressed envelope for the return of the completed questionnaire. Two reminder cards were sent at two to three week intervals. After 5 weeks, a second questionnaire was posted to non-respondents, again followed by two reminder cards. (Details of the methodology of the survey and data supporting its representativeness on social-demographic criteria are available in Mearns

and Braithwaite 2001.) Of the households contacted, 29 per cent completed and returned the survey, providing 2040 cases for further analysis.

Measuring cooperation and dissociation

In earlier work on regulation, individuals have been shown to adopt various motivational postures toward authority (Braithwaite, Braithwaite, Gibson, and Makkai 1994; Braithwaite 1995; 2003). Motivational postures are composites of attitudes, beliefs, interests, and preferences that represent the social distance individuals wish to place between themselves and the authority. Motivational postures signal openly to the authority and to others how regulatees feel about the regulatory system, whether they believe it is worthwhile or not, whether regulatees feel comfortable with the authority and if they are predisposed to do what the authority wants.

Five motivational postures have been identified, not as fixed, static and mutually exclusive orientations but as options that come into play as the situation allows. They are commitment (the notion that contributing to the tax system is the right thing to do and benefits all); capitulation (the notion that the authority will treat taxpayers the right way as long as they do what is required); resistance (the notion that the tax authority is out to get taxpayers and can never be satisfied); disengagement (the notion that the authority can't do anything to the taxpayer to cause a sleepless night); and game playing (the notion that the tax authority and taxpayers each play for the grey in tax law and enjoy it). Multi-item scales have been developed to measure these five postures (Braithwaite 2003) (see appendix for sample items).

When scores on these five scales of commitment, capitulation, resistance, disengagement, and game playing were intercorrelated and factor analyzed, two separate dimensions emerged. The first dimension was bipolar with one end defined by commitment to the tax system and capitulation to the tax authority, while the other end was defined by resistance. This first factor was called cooperation-resistance meaning the degree to which the individual was prepared to support the tax system and submit to its authority. Scores on commitment, capitulation and resistance (reverse scored) were aggregated to form the cooperation-resistance scale. The percent of the sample scoring above the midpoint on the cooperation-resistance scale was 82%, indicating that the majority of Australians express willingness to cooperate with the tax system.

The second dimension was unipolar with disengagement and game playing jointly defining the high scoring end of the dimension. This factor was called dissociation because it reflected the extent to which individuals could break free of the regulatory constraints imposed by the authority. Scores on disengagement and game playing were combined to form the dissociation scale. The percent of the sample scoring above the midpoint on this scale was 7%.

Measuring shared social goals

General policy directions for Australian society were assessed using two scales, one called the more caring and equal society scale, capturing the idea that our society would be more secure and attractive if it was more equitable and humane (endorsed by

91% of Australians) and the other, the small government, free markets scale representing the view that free markets could provide the solution to society's problems more effectively than government (endorsed by 40% of Australians) (see appendix for items).

The ideology of small government and free markets is associated with the idea that individuals should be encouraged to operate competitively and should receive economic and social rewards for their accomplishment. By association, status for the individual becomes a legitimate social goal that all individuals should be encouraged to pursue. The pursuit of status, therefore, was included in the analysis as a measure of society's values, in particular, the extent to which values were developing along a more individualistic than communitarian track. Pursuit of status was rated as important, very important, or of the utmost importance by 36% of Australians (see appendix for items).

Tax relevant policy priorities that were chosen for analysis in this paper involved reform of the tax system. Previous analyses (Byng 2003) collapsed 14 priorities into 3 policy initiatives for tax reform: (a) strengthening the tax system through increased transparency and an increase in the contributions of the privileged (rated as important, very important, or of the utmost importance by 91% of Australians); (b) lowering taxes through containment of the level of taxation and the costs of its administration (rated as important, very important, or of the utmost importance by 92% of Australians); and (c) simplifying the tax system (for example, getting rid of exemptions and deductions, having a flat rate of tax) (rated as important, very important, or of the utmost importance by 56% of Australians) (see appendix for sample items).

Measuring collective efficacy

Collective efficacy is the psychological by-product of a democratic society. Together citizens can achieve change – for example, through voting, making submissions to government, protesting, and campaigning for causes – that they would be unlikely to achieve as individuals. Moreover, through influencing politicians, members of the society can influence the administration of parts of government, for example the tax system. Thus, collective efficacy was represented by measures of how well the democracy was working, whether citizens were given their say and could hold their representatives accountable. The first measure, satisfaction with democracy, captured the idea that the form of governance we have works pretty well and is better than other models on offer (endorsed by 58% of Australians) (see appendix for sample items).

The second democracy scale represented the absence of political efficacy. The disillusionment with the democracy scale captured the idea that the voice of ordinary citizens was no longer heard nor was it relevant to government decision-making (endorsed by 86% of Australians) (see appendix for sample items).

The third measure was designed to test Antonovsky's (1972) idea that a central component in finding a sense of coherence and meaning is having the support of others. Without coherence and meaning, willingness to cooperate is likely to flag. Respondents were asked to indicate the degree to which they felt social ties with honest taxpayers, specifically the degree to which they identified with this group. The percent of Australians scoring above the midpoint on this scale was 88%.

Measuring belief in institutional pathways

Within a democracy, the responsibility for implementing government policy falls on the shoulders of the public or civil service. The bureaucracy becomes the pathway for the implementation of goals set down by government after it has sought its mandate from the people. In order for the hope process to operate for the collective, therefore, there must be a belief that the public service can and will perform its duties in accordance with its charter.

In the current context where the focus is on taxation, the perceived pathway to implementing the government's reforms is the Australian Taxation Office. If this pathway is viable in the eyes of the public, the public should be able to trust this authority. If one doesn't trust the tax office then one is denying that there is a satisfactory institutional pathway for the achievement of collective goals (57% of Australians expressed trust in the tax office) (see appendix for sample items).

In addition, measures of potential trustworthiness were used in this analysis, in keeping with Antonovsky's (1972) suggestion that in order to cope effectively with a degree of constant chaos (or stress), there needs to be a mindset of adaptability . Previous research has shown that people have clear and shared understandings of what is required of an entity (person, group or organization) if that entity is to be considered trustworthy (Braithwaite 1998). These are called trust norms. Trust norms are coherent sets of beliefs that are used to gauge the trustworthiness of others, in this case, a government authority:

Citizens and governments know what they need to do to earn the trust of the other. In the present context, trust norms are being conceptualized as a back-up if trust fails. The individual may decide that he/she no longer trusts the tax authority, but may agree that trust will again be possible if the tax authority behaves in certain ways, that is, brings its actions into line with trust norms.

Trust norms may have an exchange base or a communal base. Exchange trust norms comprise criteria that focus on predictability: Trust should only be offered when a person knows of the authority's competence, commitments, track record and competing interests. In exchange for reassuring information about interests and likely outcomes, a person offers trust.

Communal trust norms comprise criteria that reflect concern for the well-being of the other. Thus, when a person believes that the authority is respectful, attentive and responsive to needs, consultative, accountable and understanding of the position of the other, trust will be placed in the authority on the grounds that the authority will act in the interests of the citizenry.

The belief that the tax office could be considered trustworthy if it were to adhere to communal and exchange trust norms is measured in this paper through the communal and exchange trust norm scales (93% of Australians rated exchange trust norms as important, very important, or of the utmost importance and 99% of Australians rated communal trust norms as important, very important, or of the utmost importance) (see appendix for sample items).

RESULTS

Are cooperation-resistance and dissociation correlated with social goals?

The correlations² in Table 1 show that willingness to cooperate with a tax system and its regulating authority was higher when citizens wanted a more caring and equal society, and when they were wary of small government and free markets. Cooperative participants believed that the tax system should be strengthened through reforms that made the tax contributions of the privileged (corporations and wealthy individuals) more generous and transparent. They were less likely to prioritize containment (lower taxes) and simplification (flat rate of tax) of the tax system.

By way of contrast, dissociation was built around the hopes offered by small government and free markets. Those who favoured game playing and disengaging were not particularly committed to a vision that created space for compassion and care. Instead they were committed to the individualistic pursuit of economic and social status. Not surprisingly, the tax reform promoted by those who had dissociated from the system involved simplification.

INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

Are cooperation-resistance and dissociation correlated with collective efficacy?

The correlations in Table 2 show that willingness to cooperate with a tax system and its regulating authority was higher when people perceived the democracy as working well, giving them a feeling of participation in and relevance to the process of governance. Moreover, willingness to cooperate was associated with social ties to others who cooperated. Group identification with other honest taxpayers appeared to enhance the meaning of the collective endeavour. Collective efficacy at the level of democratic participation or identification with honest taxpayers was not strong among high scorers on dissociation. Those who had dissociated from the tax system tended to express disillusionment.

INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

Are cooperation-resistance and dissociation correlated with belief in institutional pathways?

The correlations in Table 3 show that willingness to cooperate with a tax system and its administration was associated with trust in the tax office. When trust norms were examined in relation to tax office functioning, cooperative participants supported an investment in exchange trust norms, that is, they believed that if the tax authority was to be considered trustworthy, it needed to deliver on its promises and improve upon its performance. Even if things were not as they should be, there was hope that they could be better in the future.

The dissociation response was notable in its dismissal of pathways to collective action, or even to the possibility of building them. Dissociation accompanied low trust. Not only was the tax authority rated poorly on trustworthiness, but also it was considered beyond the bounds of earning trust afforded by community trust norms.

INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE

Summary of bivariate findings

The above analyses demonstrate that cooperation with the tax system is linked to (a) social goals that are widely shared, (b) collective efficacy acquired through democratic institutions, and (c) belief in institutional pathways expressed as tax office trustworthiness. Opting out of the system, on the other hand, involves rejection of these elements in the collective hope process. By the same token, those who opt out are not without private hope. Their vision is simply less widely shared and less well connected to the democracy's institutional processes, though there is no reason to believe that such private hope cannot be developed to incorporate the elements of collective hope in the future.

Integration of the components of the collective hope process

In order to integrate the findings to see how social goals, collective efficacy through democratic participation, and belief in institutional pathways act together to predict cooperation-resistance and dissociation, two sets of regression analyses were undertaken. The first set examined cooperation-resistance, the second dissociation. Theoretically, there are no compelling reasons for postulating that the variables should be entered in a particular order or in successive steps. Preliminary analyses, however, suggested that certain valuable insights could be gained through entering the efficacy variables first, followed by the social goals and reforms, and last the pathways. Because of the high correlation between support for exchange and communal trust norms ($r = .66$, $p < .001$), these scales were combined to form a single trust norm scale.

INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE

From Table 4, the efficacy variables were important predictors of cooperation-resistance; the stronger the sense of efficacy and belongingness to the honest taxpaying group, the greater the willingness to be a cooperative player in the tax system. Of greater interest is the suggestion in the findings that efficacy and trust in the democracy may be inter-twined. It is of note that the contribution of the efficacy variables weakened when the pathway variables (trust in the tax authority) were included in the analysis. Possibly at the level of collective hope within a democratic system of governance, efficacy and having confidence in an institutional pathway are one and the same.

Having the institutional pathways in place to elicit change proved to be the most important factor contributing to cooperation. In this paper, the critical variable that was measured in relation to pathways was trust and its impact on cooperation was enormous (see Model 3, Table 4). This finding is consistent with the work of Tyler and Huo (2002) on the importance of procedural justice and trust for cooperation.

While trust and efficacy dominated the regression models in Table 4, social goals for change were not lost from view. The vision that individuals had for their society and its tax system explained why some Australians offered cooperation to the tax authority, others resistance. The nature of the goals – or the substance of the hopes – were consistent predictors of willingness to act collectively in the three models in Table 4. Cooperation with the tax authority accompanied a desire for a more caring and equal Australia and for a tax system in which the privileged could not avoid their tax obligations. Resistance was the more likely response among those whose aspirations were oriented to acquiring status in both economic and social terms, and who wanted to see greater emphasis on small government and free markets, along with containment of the tax system. Containment involved lowering the amount of tax paid by ordinary people as well as streamlining the bureaucracy and the processes of tax collection.

Wanting to strengthen the tax system and wanting to contain the tax system might be seen as contrary objectives. Yet these reform packages are positively correlated ($r = .43, p < .001$). Those who think that strengthening the tax system is a good idea also are more likely to think that it is desirable to lower the tax rate and tidy up administrative practices to make the system more efficient. The way in which we should think about

these findings is to broaden our lens and take on board the views of those who can't be bothered with reform or better governance: Those who no longer have hope. When we adopt a broader canvas and consider those who believe that something can be done to improve our social order and those who believe it is hopeless, we start to see why reformers of different persuasions might disagree on what to do, while agreeing that it is worth doing something.

It is of considerable significance that the data in Table 4 show reformers having different feelings toward the tax office: Those wishing for reform that contains the tax system were resistant, those wishing for a stronger system in which the wealthy pay their way were more likely to cooperate. These findings demonstrate that at the level of social goals and agendas for tax reform, there is contestation at work in the hope process that operates within the tax system. The goals that form part of the collective hope process are not allowed to "take off" without generating tension in the system. We see some evidence of a corrective mechanism against public hope at work.

The findings presented in Table 4, considered together, are also important in illustrating how reason and emotion are each critical to a collective hope process that brings about change from within a system. Reason and argument are fundamental to generating the ideas for change, but the positive emotions of collective efficacy and trust are critically important to holding cooperation together within the system. The findings also give us insight into why social change that is based on negotiation and cooperation requires skill and perseverance. In Table 4, we see how powerfully positioned the negative emotions of low collective efficacy and low pathway trust are to fracture the

emergence of a collective hope process that leads to reform through consensus or tolerance.

INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE

The story of Table 5 can be thought of as the sequel to Table 4 in that it shows what happens when the hope process takes a private turn and moves outside the system. Private is used here to signal that this hope process does not yet have the support of the majority of citizens. The marker for moving outside the system is identification with being an honest taxpayer. From the coefficients in Table 5, those who have dissociated from the system distance themselves from such an identity. Reinforcing this distancing response and its impact on dissociation are increased levels of disillusionment with the democracy; and once the pathways are taken into account, lack of trust in the tax authority. Of considerable importance among the pathway variables is the rejection of trust norms as a predictor of dissociation. When individuals no longer believe that there is anything the tax authority can do to earn their trust, the strength of their dissociation from the system is given a boost. Here we see evidence of hopelessness with the dominant system. And it is interesting to note that the loss of hope does not involve simply disagreement over goals (which have already been statistically controlled in Model 3), but rather disbelief that the authority could ever take the concerns of these individuals seriously enough to be responsive to them.

While loss of trust is an important feature of dissociation, goals should not be discounted as unimportant. In Table 5, we see a driving vision of a world where free markets rule and government is small in the sense of being relegated to the basic tasks of keeping the peace and administering justice. Associated with this vision for Australian society comes a desire for simplification of the tax system involving possibly a flat rate of tax, elimination of deductions, and abolition of exemptions. These are the goals that are shared by those who have dissociated from the tax system.

One last finding in Table 5 deserves comment. If we shift our attention to the first set of variables concerning collective efficacy, we see that satisfaction with the democracy is positively related to being dissociated from the traditional tax system, even though there is a degree of disillusionment and ambivalence among this group about government (see also Table 2). In retrospect, it seems most likely that being part of a democracy provides security for those who wish to step outside the system. Because one is aware of the benefits of living in a democracy, one is free to dissociate should one so desire.

CONCLUSION

This paper explores the domain of collective hope drawing on the theories of individual hope researchers such as Snyder (2000) and Antonovsky (1972; 1979; 1993) and on the empirical insights offered through an analysis of national survey data on the community's hopes, fears and actions in relation to the Australian tax system. The paper did not define collective hope at the outset, but concludes with a definition that provides

parameters for the construct in our future work: Collective hope is a shared desire for a better society, articulated through a broad set of agreed upon goals and principles, that are developed and elaborated through socially inclusive dialogue: Of particular importance in this process is being responsive to (listening to, seriously engaging with) private competing hopes in the community. This conception of collective hope is in accord with the principles outlined by Bar-Tal (2001) and endorsed by Drahos in this volume. The collective hope process – within the confines of democratic governance – has according to the present analysis three elements working together: commitment to shared goals; collective efficacy through democratic participation and a sense of group membership; and trust in institutional pathways for implementation. All three elements were shown to be present when taxpayers were prepared to cooperate with the tax authority. As a consequence, the following proposition for democratic governance is advanced for further study: When collective hope is high, an authority's capacity to elicit cooperation from its citizens is high; when collective hope is low, an authority's appeal to the citizenry is more likely to meet with resistance. Cooperation is posited as a necessary condition for adaptation to a rapidly changing world.

Collective versus private hope

In demonstrating the way in which Australians become involved in what has been called a collective hope process, we have also caught a glimpse of private hope – on the move, so to speak. A not insignificant proportion of Australians have hopes that are

dissociated from the taxation system: They subscribe to goals that are in opposition to the system, and they are opposed to the power of government and its intrusion into private life. Most importantly, they reject the traditional institutional pathways, failing to find within them collective empowerment or confidence in the institution's capacity to deliver desirable outcomes. In order for these private hopes to become collective hopes, proponents need to win the hearts and minds of the people through building alternative sources of collective efficacy, new institutional pathways, and grounding their agenda in the values and ways of being of the Australian community.

Identifying subcultures of support for what might be called an alternative vision of the tax system is beyond the scope of this paper, but not beyond speculation. Flourishing industries of financial planning and tax avoidance combined with vast resources of mobile capital point to a subculture that potentially can nurture a collective hope process. Increasingly, this subculture is drawing in small investors, and internationally, is challenging law and regulations that in the past have protected the capacity for revenue collection by sovereign states (Avi-Yonah 2000). In other words, those who have dissociated from the tax system are finding ways of establishing new pathways and building collective efficacy to realize hopes for a much simplified and limited tax system. The glimmer of hope for the traditional system rests with revitalizing the democratic ideal and restoring the much depleted legitimacy of the state (LaFree, 1998). If it is the case that the alternative authorities on tax matters (that is, alternative to the government) gain support through widespread disillusionment with current systems of governance, this paper suggests that our democratically elected leaders have an opportunity to turn the

tide. The tax authority, for instance, could be asked to increase its efforts to demonstrate its commitment to the principles of democratic governance and to implement reforms that will win the Australian community's trust.

Collective versus public hope

At the beginning of this paper we acknowledged the problem of distinguishing collective and public hope. Reflecting on the results of the analyses, the following points should be conceded to those who would favour a public hope interpretation. According to these data, to display high collective hope, is to aspire to goals that are closely aligned with the authority. Furthermore, the strongest predictors of a willingness to act with the authority are the “feel good” emotions of being part of a group, believing in the democracy and trusting the institutions that are in place to administer the system. All of these findings are consistent with either a public or a collective hope process.

There is, however, one finding that counters a public hope interpretation. Within the collective hope process described in this paper, tensions are present. Goals such as tax containment trigger resistance rather than cooperation. And there is evidence that where there is resistance, there is highly organized collective action to change the system (Murphy 2003). Tensions within the system concerning competing goals and loss of voice (see findings on disillusionment) are the stuff of social change. Trust is the pathway that suggests that struggle from within is worthwhile. A process that allows contestation within has the hallmarks of being a carrier of collective hope rather than public hope.

At the same time, there are also indications in these data that purposeful effort is required to ensure that hopes shared by the collective are always subjected to “cold analysis” (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000). On the basis of analyses presented in this paper, there is reason to suspect that change will not always take place in a society when it needs to take place. With the positive emotions of trust and efficacy playing such an important role in configuring system well-being, authorities pursuing unsound goals, that is, goals that do not advance the interests of the people, probably can prosper for some time without citizen backlash. If current results can be generalized, even our democratically based institutions may benefit enormously from superficial hope: They may have an in-built second, or even recurring, chance for eliciting citizen cooperation.

None of this is to be interpreted as an argument for weakening trust in public institutions or in the democracy. If Antonovsky (1972, 1979) is right, it is in the interests of an individual’s personal well-being to feel a sense of belonging, to trust others and to share a sense of what life is all about and what is worthwhile. These attributes are also important for harnessing the power of collective hope, which this paper suggests is necessary if a society is to adapt to the new world order. Rather than regulating the emotional side of hope, the argument presented here involves enabling the rational side in a way that is respectful of the whole collective hope process – making special efforts to create new institutional spaces for inclusive, mature, open and uncensored political debate about the issues confronting society. In this way there is scope to nurture collective hope that reflects inclusive and careful deliberation and to rein in public hope that fosters blind conformity to what powerful others say.

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APPENDIX

Samples of scales items

All scales comprised multi-item scales. Two items from each scale are included below as examples. The items were rated on 5 or 6 or 7 point scales representing different levels of agreement or importance. For further details, see Braithwaite, Reinhart, Mearns and Graham (2001).

Motivational posture of *commitment*: (a) Overall, I pay my tax with good will; (b) I accept responsibility for paying my fair share of tax.

Motivational posture of *capitulation*: (a) Even if the tax office finds that I am doing something wrong, they will respect me in the long run if I admit my mistakes; (b) If you cooperate with the tax office, they are likely to be cooperative with you.

Motivational posture of *resistance*: (a) It's impossible to satisfy the requirements of the tax office completely; (b) As a society we need more people willing to take a stand against the tax office.

Motivational posture of *game playing*: (a) The tax office respects taxpayers who can give them a run for their money, (b) I enjoy talking to friends about loopholes in the tax system.

Motivational posture of *disengagement*: (a) I don't care if I am not doing the right thing by the tax office; (b) I personally don't think that there is much the tax office can do to make me pay tax if I don't want to.

More caring and equal society scale: (a) Our community and nation should appeal to a spirit that each person is important and has a way of influencing things; (b) Our society will be more secure and more attractive if it is also more equitable and humane, as well as more productive and efficient.

Small government, free markets scale: (a) Free markets work because individual people, cooperating peacefully and voluntarily through markets, can achieve much that politicians and bureaucrats cannot achieve using compulsion and direction; (b) The true function of government is to maintain peace and justice: This does not include interfering in national or international trade or commerce, or in the private transactions of citizens, save only as they threaten peace and justice.

Pursuit of status scale: How important are the following as guiding principles in your life: (a) Recognition by the community (having high standing in the community); (b) Economic prosperity (being financially well-off).

Strengthen the tax system: (a) Ensuring that people who are wealthier pay more tax; (b) Making the amount of tax paid by all large corporations publicly available.

Contain the tax system: (a) Keeping taxes as low as possible; (b) Keeping the costs of administering the tax system down.

Simplify the tax system: (a) Looking into a flat rate of tax; (b) Making the whole tax system simpler through getting rid of as many exemptions as possible.

Satisfaction with the democracy scale: (a) In our democracy we can hold our representatives accountable; (b) Our form of democracy is not perfect but it beats by a long shot any other alternative we have been shown.

Disillusionment with the democracy scale: (a) There's a dollar democracy that runs through our supposed democracy; (b) I don't think we have enough input into legislation and the decisions that are important.

Identification with others who are honest taxpayers: Thinking about the group, honest taxpayers, would you say (a) being an honest taxpayer is important to me; (b) I feel a sense of pride in being an honest taxpayer.

Trust in the tax office: (a) The tax office takes advantage of people who are vulnerable (reverse score); (b) The tax office is open and honest in its dealings with citizens.

Belief in communal trust norms: In order to be trustworthy, how important is it for the tax office to (a) understand the position of taxpayers; (b) treat taxpayers with respect.

Belief in exchange trust norms: In order to be trustworthy, how important is it for the tax office to (a) be consistent in its decision making; (b) have a proven track record.

TABLE 1

CORRELATIONS OF COOPERATION-RESISTANCE AND DISSOCIATION WITH
SOCIAL GOALS

Social goals	Cooperation-Resistance	Dissociation
<i>Policy direction and values</i>		
More caring and equal society	.11***	-.15***
Small government, free markets	-.10***	.19***
Pursuit of status	-.04	.26***
<i>Principles of tax reform</i>		
Strengthen the system (target privileged)	.07**	-.02
Contain the system (lower tax)	-.07**	.04
Simplify the system (flat tax)	-.05*	.16***

- $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

TABLE 2

CORRELATIONS OF COOPERATION-RESISTANCE AND DISSOCIATION WITH
COLLECTIVE EFFICACY

Collective efficacy	Cooperation-Resistance	Dissociation
<i>Attitudes to democratic governance</i>		
Satisfaction with democracy	.37***	.03
Disillusionment with the democracy	-.32***	.07**
<i>Perceptions of solidarity on tax honesty</i>		
Identifying with the honest taxpaying group	.39***	-.18***

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

TABLE 3

CORRELATIONS OF COOPERATION-RESISTANCE AND DISSOCIATION WITH
BELIEF IN INSTITUTIONAL PATHWAYS

Confidence in collective pathways	Cooperation-Resistance	Dissociation
<i>Trust in authority</i>		
Trust in the tax office	.70***	-.15***
Communal trust norm for tax office	-.04	-.15***
Exchange trust norm for tax office	.08***	-.20***

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

TABLE 4

BETA COEFFICIENTS AND R^2 FOR THE PREDICTION OF COOPERATION-RESISTANCE FROM THE COLLECTIVE HOPE PROCESS VARIABLES USING HIERARCHICAL LINEAR REGRESSION ANALYSIS

Predictors	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	Efficacy	Efficacy	Efficacy
		+ Goals	+ Goals
			+ Pathways
<i>Efficacy</i>			
Satisfaction with democracy	.24***	.24***	.10***
Disillusionment	-.26***	-.27***	-.03
Identifying with the honest taxpaying group	.34***	.34***	.22***
<i>Goals</i>			
More caring and equal society		.07***	.06***
Small government, free markets		-.05*	-.04*
Pursuit of status		-.07***	-.07***
Strengthen the system (target privileged)		.10***	.10***
Contain the system (lower tax)		-.11***	-.08***
Simplify the system (flat tax)		.00	.01

<i>Pathways</i>			
Trust in the tax office			.60***
Trust norms for tax office ^a			-.01
Adjusted R^2	.30***	.33***	.58***

^a Combined communal and exchange trust norm scales

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

TABLE 5

BETA COEFFICIENTS AND R^2 FOR THE PREDICTION OF DISSOCIATION
FROM THE COLLECTIVE HOPE PROCESS VARIABLES USING HIERARCHICAL
LINEAR REGRESSION ANALYSIS

Predictors	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	Efficacy	Efficacy	Efficacy
		+ Goals	+ Goals
			+ Pathways
<i>Efficacy</i>			
Satisfaction with democracy	.09***	.08***	.10***
Disillusionment	.09***	.08***	.05
Identifying with the honest taxpaying group	-.20***	-.20***	-.13***
<i>Goals</i>			
More caring and equal society		-.16***	-.12***
Small government, free markets		.13***	.12***
Pursuit of status		.25***	.26***
Strengthen the system (target privileged)		.00	.01
Contain the system (lower tax)		-.08**	-.04
Simplify the system (flat tax)		.11***	.09***

<i>Pathways</i>			
Trust in the tax office			-.13***
Trust norms for tax office ^a			-.18***
Adjusted R^2	.04***	.17***	.20***

^a Combined communal and exchange trust norm scales

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

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² Through the process of describing the measures, it will be evident to readers that many of the scale distributions are highly skewed. This reflects the phenomenon being measured: Norms and values are likely to be endorsed by most people. All measures, therefore, were designed to discriminate different levels of acceptance so that there would be sufficient variability in the measures to undertake correlation and regression analyses. The problem that skewness poses for statistical inference was addressed through ensuring we used a large sample ($n = 2040$) (Braithwaite and Law 1985).

Hope and its Place in Mind

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ABSTRACT: I may have an open mind on whether a life-extending drug or technology is going to be developed before I reach my sixties and I may strongly desire that development. Do I therefore hope that it occurs? Do I hope for it in the substantive sense of “pinning my hopes” on the development? No, I don't. Hoping for a prospect in that sense certainly presupposes having an open mind on whether it will occur and having a desire for its occurrence. But, more crucially, it means investing the prospect with a characteristic, galvanizing and orientating role: it involves setting aside doubts about the possible non-occurrence of the prospect and acting accordingly. This paper offers a characterization of hope in that substantive sense and argues both that it can be rational and that it is ubiquitous.

Keywords: substantial hope, precaution, rationality, agency, ubiquity

Hope does not bulk large, indeed it scarcely bulks at all, among the topics that have engaged philosophers over the last half century or so. Philosophers of mind ignore it completely and even moral philosophers have given it short shrift. So far as hope has received philosophical treatment, that has tended to be among theologians and others of a markedly religious bent.

Perhaps the main reason why hope has slipped professional philosophical attention in this way is that it looks on a superficial analysis like it scarcely deserves attention. I argue that while this analysis may apply to a loose, lowest-common-denominator usage of the term “hope,” we should also recognize a more specific usage in which it refers to a phenomenon with a characteristic identity of its own. I believe that hope in this substantial sense is a very distinctive state of mind and that it has both a rational and ubiquitous place in human life.

The essay is divided into five sections. The first presents the analysis of hope in terms of a lowest common denominator of usage. The second prepares the way for going beyond that analysis by presenting an account of how precaution operates. The third section, drawing on the analogy with precaution, introduces hope in the substantial sense. The fourth section emphasizes how such hope, like precaution, can be perfectly rational. And the last section makes a case for its ubiquity.

SUPERFICIAL HOPE

The word “hope” is used under the prompting of different contexts in a great variety of ways. I may hope that I get this article written before the deadline, hope that I

don't embarrass myself in a public speech, or hope that I can survive a crisis in my life. I may hope that this afternoon stays fine, or that the car doesn't let me down on an impending journey. I may be hopeful that the rumor I heard about a friend isn't true or I may pin my hopes on the local rugby team winning the championship. I may hope against hope that something isn't the case. I may hope, as I say to someone in my charge, that I won't be disappointed with what they do. Or I may hope that there is a god in his heaven and that all's right with the world. The range of usage takes us from matters of the deepest concern to issues of only trivial importance and it sometimes involves myself or other people, and sometimes purely impersonal states of affairs.

One response to this variety of usage might be to look for a lowest common denominator of analysis: to find a core meaning in the term "hope," however thin or skeletal, that is present across all the different ways in which the word may be employed in English. I shall look at where that response would lead and then argue that it does not point us towards a phenomenon that has any interest.

In order to hope that something comes about, or to put one's hope in someone's achieving something, or to be hopeful that such and such has or hasn't happened – or anything of the kind – a first prerequisite is that one does not believe for certain that the hope is forlorn. If I hope that the afternoon will stay fine, or that the rumor about my friend isn't true, then I must assign a non-zero probability to the afternoon staying fine or to the rumor being false. I must not rule out the hoped-for possibility; I must believe that it could be realized.

One way of believing that a scenario or possibility could be realized, of course, is to believe – believe for certain – that it is realized. And just as hope requires that one not

rule out the hoped-for possibility, so it requires that one does not rule it in as a matter of absolute certainty either. As I watch a television replay of a match in the knowledge that my team won, I certainly do not rule out the prospect of their winning. On the contrary, I rule it in: I am certain that they won and may well be savoring the certainty of that outcome, as I relive the different plays. This certainty means that as I watch the game I cannot be said to hope that the team wins. Hoping that something happens may be inconsistent with believing for certain that it won't happen; but equally it is inconsistent with believing for certain that it will.

Just to believe that something is possible but not inevitable, however, is not necessarily to hope that it obtains. There are lots of things that I believe to be merely possible that I am indifferent about and lots that I very much hope will not obtain. In order to be said to hope that something is the case then I must want it to be the case. In order to be said to hope that someone achieves something I must want the person to achieve whatever is in question. And so on.

This line of thought takes us to the lowest common denominator of analysis. Under this account I can be said to hope that something is the case, hope that someone is or does something – hope that any such scenario is realized – just so far as I want the scenario to materialize and believe that it is possible but not inevitable that it does materialize: I assign a non-zero, non-unit probability to that desired prospect; I do not despair about it, and nor am I complacent about it.

This analysis would equate hope, then, with the belief that some prospect may obtain or may not obtain, where one desires that it does obtain. It would mean that whenever people's beliefs and desires with respect to a given prospect are configured in

that pattern, then they can be rightly ascribed the attitude of hope. They can be said to hope that the prospect obtains or to hope in the prospect or to pin their hopes on the prospect, or whatever.

I think that this analysis of hope in terms of belief and desire does apply whenever we have a use for the term. It represents a lowest common denominator that is present across the different usages possible. Whether we are considering the prospect of apple pie for dinner or a heaven after death, we can say that hoping in that prospect always involves the belief that there may or may not be apple pie, or there may or may not be a heaven, together with the desire that the prospect eventuate.

This analysis would equate hope with a more or less obvious arrangement among the distinct phenomena of belief and desire. In that sense it would analyze it away, denying it any interest as a phenomenon in its own right. The belief that hope can be defined away in this fashion may explain why hope has received relatively little attention in philosophy. But the analysis misses out on the fact that while the word “hope” is ordinarily used for attitudes that range over an enormous variety of scenarios, personal and impersonal, there are some central cases where hope is characterized by a more specific, substantial structure. So at any rate I shall be arguing.

In the cases that I have in mind, hope certainly requires the elements of belief and desire that the analysis captures. But it also requires something else besides and it is this extra structure that gives such hope a characteristic identity. The pattern of belief and desire that figures as the lowest common denominator is necessary for hope of this kind to be present in someone. But it is not sufficient. What, then, is the extra structure required? What is the missing X-factor or X-arrangement? In order to answer that

question, I want to spend some time discussing a phenomenon that parallels hope: that of precaution.

PRECAUTION

Anyone who has ever had work done to a house or apartment will probably have read the advice given to people in that situation about how to deal with tenders from builders (Bratman 1992). The advice is that when you have settled on a tender, and agreed a price with the contractor – say, a price of \$100,000 – you should assume in all your further planning that the actual building cost to you will be about a tenth or more as much: \$110,000. The advice is not that you should necessarily change your belief about the matter, as if belief were subject to discretionary control. Rather it is that in making all the decisions associated with the renovation – decisions on furnishings, designs, and the like – you should act on the precautionary assumption that you will have to pay the builder \$110,000, or something close to it: you should act as if it will cost that amount or as if there is a good chance that it will cost that amount.

The implication of this pattern of advice-giving is that you are capable of putting certain of your beliefs off-line, as it were, in making your decisions about different courses of action. In particular, you are capable of putting offline the belief – assuming that it is your belief – that the building will cost \$100,000 and are able to act as if you had the distinct belief that it will cost \$110,000. The lesson is that you are not the slave of the beliefs that are immediately relevant to a decision like this. You are capable of placing yourself at a distance from them and putting yourself under the control of an assumption you may not strictly endorse. You can assume the profile of someone you are not:

someone with the cautious belief that the cost will be the higher figure. You may and should do that, so the advice goes, if you want to guard against unforeseen costs.

But what if the advice actually leads you to change your belief about the cost? Will that remove the need for you to act as if the higher costing will obtain, or as if there is a good chance it will obtain? Not really, since precaution also guards against a second, related danger: that of going along initially with that cautious belief but then fluctuating in your resolve, as the belief waxes and wanes with incoming evidence. Tying yourself to the precautionary assumption will keep you on track – it will reflect the importance of avoiding a cost overrun – in a way that trusting yourself to the revised belief might not. Acting resiliently on the precautionary assumption will ensure that no matter how the evidence comes and goes, you will stick with that assumption and not allow yourself to be blown about by the vagaries of incoming data. Perhaps things look better this morning, as you discover that some material needed in the construction has fallen in price. No matter. So far as you follow the precautionary assumption, you will refuse to let that evidence affect the way in which you act. The assumption is where you stand. Your precise beliefs about the chances of the lower costing being correct are out of the loop that determines action.

This can all be put a little more perspicuously, if somewhat more academically, with the help of decision theory. According to decision theory you are bound to act according to, first, the utilities you attach to the various possible outcomes of the available options and, second, the probabilities you assign to those outcomes materializing in the event of your choosing one or another of the options. Let it be the case that you actually assign a relatively high probability to the extension costing

\$100,000 rather than \$110,000 and that the rational thing for you to do in light of that assignment is to plan around its costing that amount; planning around that costing maximizes your expected utility. The precautionary advice suggests that notwithstanding these facts, you should act as if something that is not the case were the case: as if you assigned a relatively lower probability to the extension costing \$100,000 rather than \$110,00.

Does the advice require you to act counter-rationally, from the point of view of decision theory? Not necessarily. The advice may remind you just how bad it would be to have a cost overrun and may thereby shock you into increasing whatever degree of disutility you attached to the overrun. Given this shift in your utilities, it may thereby become rational for you to plan around the higher costing, whether or not you change the relatively high probability you attach to the lower costing. Thus you may be rationally led to authorize the precautionary assumption that the cost will be \$110,000 or something close to it. Acting on that precautionary assumption will be the natural way to give effect to the newly kindled aversion for suffering a cost overrun.

But why should you be advised to act as if the renovation will cost \$110,000, or as if there is a good chance that it will cost that? Why shouldn't the advice be phrased in decision-theoretic terms instead? If the course of action recommended is rational for the reason just given then – to take the case where belief doesn't shift – it will amount decision-theoretically to acting on the basis of having a relatively high subjective probability that the renovation will cost only \$100,000 but having a very high disutility for a cost overrun. So why shouldn't the advice be phrased in those terms? Why

shouldn't you be told: act on your existing probabilities but in doing so allow for the fact that you have a particularly high disutility for a cost overrun?

There are at least two reasons why the original formulation is better than this decision-theoretic counterpart. One is that the formulation in terms of the precautionary assumption gives the agent intelligible, perspicuous guidance about what to do, whereas the decision-theoretic formulation would not do this. That formulation would be of use, at best, only to someone who already understood decision theory (Pettit and Smith 1990); and it would require a knowledge of one's subjective probabilities and utilities that is normally unavailable (Harman 1986). But apart from offering intelligible, perspicuous advice, the precautionary formulation also presents the agent with a stable reference point by which to navigate. The decision-theoretic formulation would offer a reference point that was hostage to every shift in subjective probability and utility; it would leave the agent at the mercy of evidential ebb and flow.

SUBSTANTIAL HOPE

In the case of precaution there is a prospect that the agent believes may or may not obtain – the cost overrun – and, at least after the advice is given, the agent comes to form an intense aversion for this. In order to avoid the danger of the prospect materializing, then – the danger of their own action leaving them unprotected against it – the agent rationally adopts the maxim of acting as if the cost overrun will materialize, or as if there is a good chance that it will materialize. That is the best method available of self-protection.

These comments direct us to the shape that a parallel, substantial form of hope might take. When there is hope of any kind present, however superficial, then there is a

prospect that the agent believes may or may not obtain but, unlike the prospect for which precaution is fitted, this is something that the agent desires to obtain. Hope would take a parallel form to precaution, then, if there were any reason in such a case why the agent should be moved to act as if that desired prospect were going to obtain, or as if there were a good chance that it was going to obtain. So can we think of any reason why this might be a rational response: why it might make sense to authorize a hopeful as distinct from a precautionary assumption?

The reason precaution makes sense is that the level of confidence that the agent has for the feared prospect materializing is too low to guard against the danger of being unprotected. A reason why hope would make parallel sense is that the level of confidence that the agent has for the desired prospect is too low to guard against a danger of some other kind. So what sort of danger might this be?

I see only one serious candidate. This is the danger that the confidence level will be so low that the agent loses heart and ceases to exercise agency effectively. If the agent assigns a relatively low probability to the desired prospect then that may cause them to make no effort to bring it about, thereby ensuring that they certainly do not bring it about. And even if the prospect is something that is beyond their influence – it may be the prospect of surviving an illness, or the prospect of a war not taking place – such a low probability assignment can mean that the agent does nothing to bring about other goals that are within their reach. In either case, the low level of confidence can induce an emotional collapse and a loss of self-efficacy.

With this claim in place, we can see our way to an account of a sort of hope that parallels precaution and that goes beyond the superficial variety of hope analyzed in the

first section. Hope will consist in acting as if a desired prospect is going to obtain, or has a good chance of obtaining, just as precaution consists in acting as if this were the case with some feared prospect. It will guard against the danger of loss of heart where precaution guards against exposure to a catastrophe like a cost overrun. And just as acting on the precautionary assumption will secure a benefit even in the case where beliefs adjust appropriately, providing a target that is stable across the ups and downs of evidence, so the hopeful assumption can guard against a second danger and secure a parallel benefit in the case where the agent becomes more optimistic. It can guard the agent against the tidal movements of evidence and against the demoralization produced by such an ebb and flow.

There are three elements, then, in the emerging account of substantial as distinct from superficial hope:

1. The agent desires that a certain prospect obtain, and believes that it may or may not obtain – these are the conditions for superficial hope – but may do so only at a level of confidence that induces a loss of heart, sapping spirit and effort;
2. the signal danger of this loss of heart prompts the agent to adopt a strategy that consists in acting as if the desired prospect is going to obtain, or has a good chance of obtaining;
3. this strategy promises to avoid that danger and secure the related, secondary benefit, relevant even for someone relatively optimistic, of ensuring stability across the ups and downs of evidence.

To hope that something is the case in this sense, as the first clause makes clear, requires that you desire it to be the case, and that you do not believe for sure either that it

obtains or that it does not obtain. But it is also to act and react as if the prospect were going to obtain or stood a good chance of obtaining. It involves forming attitudes, and performing actions, of the kind that this would make intelligible. And it is to do this, in particular, whether or not subjective probability happens to come in line.

To hope that something is the case or that you can make it the case, then, is to form an overall outlook akin to that which would be appropriate in the event of the hoped-for scenario being a firm or good prospect. Where the prospect is manifestly beyond your control it is to sustain a more or less sanguine set of attitudes, and to act on other fronts in the way that such attitudes would prompt. And where the prospect is within your sphere of influence – however improbable it is that the influence will be effective – it is to act as if there were also a good chance of making it come out as you wish. It is to embrace an assumption that gives you heart and life and energy. It is to embrace this assumption, furthermore, even if you happen to wax quite optimistic. The assumption will be there to ensure that you are not prey to the vicissitudes of appearance and warrant, now waxing cheerful, now despondent, as the tides of evidence ebb and flow. It will give you a fixity of purpose and outlook amidst the flux to which beliefs, in the nature of things, are subject.

Hope in this sense does not come cheap. Certainly it does not come about just by virtue of desiring the prospect and not believing for sure that it will or will not obtain. It requires the active adoption of a particular attitude, a positive piece of mental self-regulation (McGeer and Pettit 2002). In order to form the hope that something is the case, or that I or someone else will manage to make it the case, I have to invest that scenario with a level of confidence that may exceed the confidence of my actual belief in the

prospect, and a degree of stability that will certainly exceed the stability of my actual belief. I have to be ready to put that belief offline and to try to organize my responses and my efforts around the assumption that the prospect is firmly on the horizon.

We can usefully compare hope, and indeed precaution, to planning (Bratman 1987). To put a plan in place is to settle on a particular course of action like going to the movies tonight – or perhaps to settle on some general policy or principle of action – and then, absent new evidence, to let that plan dictate what you are going to do, without recourse to further reconsideration. Adopting a plan in this sense can save a lot of decision-making time and can enable you to manage the satisfaction of your desires quite efficiently.

Hope is a cognitive counterpart of planning. Forming an action plan is a way of handling the rough and tumble of desire, silencing any inclination to do something inconsistent with the action. Forming the hope that a particular scenario will eventuate, or at least eventuate in the event of your taking a certain initiative, is a way of handling the hurly burly of belief. It frees you from the bleakness of beliefs that would reduce you to numbed inaction and from the burden of beliefs that wax and wane unpredictably in level of confidence. It gives you firm and friendly coordinates in an uncertain and uncompanionable world. To have hope is to have something we might describe as cognitive resolve.

This account of hope, as it appears in the central cases, is surely plausible. Think of the hope that animated at least some of those who managed to survive the Nazi concentration camps: the hope that kept them from suicide or from just giving in. Or think of the hope displayed by many of those who have to cope with serious disease and

who insist on carrying on with their lives, allowing themselves no self-pity and inviting no pity from others. Or think of the hope that can keep a couple struggling to save a relationship, looking beyond recurrent difficulties to the prospect of achieving greater mutual care and commitment. In all such examples it is surely natural to think of hope as a focused enterprise in which people are willing to stand aside from the beliefs that come most naturally to them and to order their mental and active lives around more galvanizing assumptions: around a cognitive plan.

I trust that this account of substantial hope will prove to be attractive. It makes good sense of why we think that the preservation of hope can be so important, thereby establishing its superiority to the superficial account. It makes hope relatively unmysterious, holding it up as a phenomenon parallel to precaution. It explains the difference between hope and optimism: where hope is an intentionally sustained, essentially avowable response, optimism is a spontaneous, perhaps unconscious habit of belief-formation. And as we shall now see, the suggestion embodied in the account that hope is a rational response to at least some circumstances proves capable of vindication.

THE RATIONALITY OF HOPE

It is clear that precaution is often a rational strategy, serving as a sort of insurance policy against catastrophe. But it may not be so clear that hope enjoys the same pragmatic rationale. And even if it does – even if it guards effectively against a real danger – it may not seem to be an attitude that can be sustained in an epistemically rational way, without self-deception.

The first doubt bears on whether hope can be practically rational in the same manner as precaution: whether it can hold out a prospect of answering better to my goals

and concerns than a project of exposing myself to the bright light of evidence and fact. Won't my goals be better fulfilled in the case where hope is relevant if I act in a manner suited to how things are rather than to how I might wish them to be? And shouldn't I be rationally disposed, therefore, to be careful in the formation of my beliefs as to how things are and to be punctilious in seeking to organize my behavior around the beliefs that materialize within me?

I think that the answer to this question is that no, rationality does not always support such detached processing of fact in the cases where hope is relevant. What it is rational for any one of us to do is what would best promote our goals and concerns, given the kinds of creature we are. But we are creatures of such a feeling, emotional kind that we cannot always serve our goals and concerns well under the image that our beliefs give us of the world we inhabit. Those beliefs may make disaster seem so likely, or they may wobble so uncertainly between the scenarios they hold out as probable, that they leave us in the slough of despond, unable to act with decision or with any prospect of success. Unrelieved fact-processing might do best by our purposes, were we creatures that escaped the rule of feeling and emotion, like the Mr Spock character in Star Trek. But we are not creatures of that kind. We are ruled by lymph and gland and brain stem, not just by the computational processing of the cortex, and we are incapable of the detached adjustments to reality that Mr Spock routinely achieves.

We do not learn of a disease to which we have succumbed, for example, without being swamped by feelings of anxiety and incapacity. We do not experience the loss of someone dear to us without being numbed by grief and anger and desolation. We do not find that our plans are hostage to some alien will or force without suffering failures of

confidence and optimism. We rarely face a task of inherent difficulty or uncertainty without experiencing a loss of nerve. When it comes to dealing with the brass tacks of earthly life, we are something of a mess. We see everything, not through a glass darkly, but through a glass that hangs in the mists and vapors of a biological mind.

One reason that hope may often be pragmatically rational is that it promises to be able to lift us out of the panics and depressions to which we are naturally prey, and to give us firm direction and control. Without hope there would often be no possibility for us of asserting our agency, and putting our own signature or stamp on our conduct. We would collapse in a heap of despair and uncertainty, beaten down by cascades of inimical fact. Hope in this scenario can be our one salvation as agents and persons, our only way of remaining capable of seeing ourselves in what we do. Freud's best advertising line for psychoanalysis was: Wo Es war, soll Ich werden; where there was an it, there shall be an I. The line might well be applied to hope. In many circumstances hope represents the only way of retaining our identity and selfhood, and not losing ourselves to the turmoil of brute, disheartening fact.

But there is another aspect to the pragmatic rationality that hope can often possess. Not only is it capable of giving us self-direction and control, distancing us from the effects of turbulent fact and appearance of fact. It may also offer us the best way of coping with those harsh realities and finding our way through. It is common lore, however anecdotal in character, that people can cope better with illness, and even show remarkable resistance, so far as they keep their hopes up. And it is certainly common experience that when people don't despair under bad news or in evil times – when they manage to keep their hearts up and press on in positive ways – then they often succeed in

overcoming obstacles that might otherwise have brought them down. There need be no magic involved here. Many of us will treat a ten per cent chance of success in some venture as a depressing, potentially enervating prospect. And if we do, then that may well reduce the chance of success even further. But if we gain heart by the assertion of will involved in putting our hope in success, then we can give success the ten per cent chance it really has. The cognitive resolve that hope brings with it can be our salvation.

So much for the claim that hope, despite appearances, is certainly rational in pragmatic or practical terms; it promises to deliver tangible, human benefits. But what of the charge that even if it has these advantages, still it is evidentially irrational, requiring people to indulge in a sort of self-deception? How telling is this complaint?

The notion of self-deception covers a variety of phenomena. It applies at one extreme to the case – perhaps one of dubious coherence – where I recognize beyond all possible doubt that something is the case but I manage to hide that fact from myself. It applies at the other extreme to the case where I realize that exposure to evidence may disturb something I currently believe but I decide not to seek out that evidence. And it applies, in between, to a range of cases where I am more or less consciously aware of the thrust of the evidence but insulate myself from its effect.

There is no self-deception of any kind involved in hope, not even the innocuous sort that occurs towards the second extreme in this spectrum. For if the account given is correct, then those who embrace hope need not indulge in any illusion or delusion about how things are. True, they set themselves to act and react as if things were otherwise than the evidence suggests they are, or as if they were more firmly established than the evidence shows. But people can do this quite openly and honestly, being prepared to

admit to themselves and others that for very good pragmatic reasons – all the reasons that argue for cognitive resolve – they are refusing to expose themselves to the low or unstable tide of evidence; for current practical purposes, they are investing their confidence in a firmer, more encouraging prospect. They can be as undeceived as I am when I say to myself that my builder is reliable and will be able to do the job at the tendered cost, but then proceed to act as if that were not so. There is an element of make-believe in hope, as there is in this sort of caution, but make-believe does not amount to self-deception.

Hope, it is true, will display some facets that are reminiscent of self-deception. If I set out to act on a certain hope, for example, I may tell you that I don't want you to take me through this or that litany of evidence and fact. I may recognize that the hope around which I am organizing my attitudes and actions is a frail reed that needs nurturing and that it may not survive your recitation. But in recognizing that this is so, and in refusing to listen to the full recital of presumptive evidence, I do not tell myself a lie. I can be utterly undeceived about what I am doing.

Hope promises, then, to be both a practically rational and an evidentially rational – or at least evidentially not irrational – project for someone to undertake. Not only does hope in my sense have a characteristic identity or gestalt as a phenomenon of mind, it is a phenomenon that all of us may rationally want to be able to display under various circumstances. It is likely to represent a sensible and avowable response to the adversity that life puts in our path.

One final point. In discussing the rationality of hope, I have often spoken of someone rationally adopting a hopeful disposition, as if the response were consciously

and carefully reasoned. But a rational response remains rational, whether or not it is taken up in an explicit use of reason. And so I should add that the argument that hope is rational demonstrates, not just that strategic agents are rational in opting for hope, but that the spontaneous will to hope that is endemic to our species may often be entirely rational too. Whether hope is sourced in the emotions and aspirations of the heart or in the reasoned reflections of the head, it remains a potentially rational attitude to adopt.

THE UBIQUITY OF HOPE

Still, for all that I have said so far, hope may be something that has merely marginal significance in our affairs. Perhaps it is only needed on an occasional basis, as a protection against particularly harsh realities; perhaps it doesn't figure much in the regular course of things. But to think this, I want to say finally, would be a mistake. Hope in the sense that concerns us here is required across a large range of situations. It shows up in the most unlikely places.

I suggested that there are two ways in which our beliefs – our evidentially sensitive image of the world – may let us down, leaving us in the slough of despond and unable to cope. They may make relief from a prospect of adversity seem so unlikely as to deprive us of resources for reacting in a positive, potentially productive way. Or they may wobble so wildly in the probability they assign to relief, being sensitive to every perturbation of evidence, that they have a similar incapacitating effect. Hope offers an escape from both problems, giving us a supportive and stable image around which to organize our feelings and actions – giving us cognitive resolve.

The two problems from which hope gives us an escape in this way are endemic in human affairs and for that reason hope is needed on many different fronts. There are

numerous areas of action where the prospects on which we must count in launching successful effort are not as supportive or stable as we need, and in order to rescue ourselves from inertia or despair in these areas we have to rely on the capacity of hope to carry us through. I look briefly at the contexts of collective action and interpersonal recognition, both central to human life, in order to make this ubiquity claim plausible.

Consider the case where we are involved in collective action with others as members of a group that has a brief or challenge to discharge. In order for us each to be motivated to do our bit, we will have to feel relatively secure that that contribution will be matched by contributions on the part of others and that the contributions promise, in the aggregate, to deliver the results desired by the group. But where are we going to find a base for that security of expectation? Hardly in the uncertain whirl of belief, sensitive as this is to every twist of evidence and to every doubt about how others are disposed to behave, about how others think we are disposed to behave, and so on.

We typically escape from the predicament of such collective uncertainty and doubt, I suggest, by each going along with a group-level version of cognitive resolve. We make a ceremony of each agreeing to act as if it were the case that others will act in corresponding ways, and as if the overall effect of our concerted action will be to bring about a certain desired result. We make a ceremony of each organizing our efforts around that assumption, keeping the assumption safe from minute by minute doubt. And to do this, in my terms, is nothing short of making it a matter of common awareness that each member of the group will be animated by the required hope and will act appropriately; everyone believes that this is so, believes that everyone believes that this is so, and so on. Where we might have had doubts about what we each believe, we can be well positioned

to see evidence in the ceremony described of each committing ourselves to the hope required.

Collective groups often unravel, of course, as we are too well aware. But what typically fails, leading to their dissolution, is precisely an endorsement of the sort of hope I have in mind. Individuals will peel away from that working, galvanizing assumption about the availability of their different contributions and about the aggregate effect that those contributions will have. They will each sink back into their own private, unstable and typically not very sanguine beliefs. Or they will come to believe that others have lost hope in that way, or that others have ceased to believe that they retain that hope, or whatever. They will lose a grip on the only factor that might have kept them together.

Not only is hope needed in collective endeavors. It is also required in establishing the sorts of relationships in which we recognize and respect one another as persons – in which we have our status as persons confirmed. The relationships that do this for us are the discourse-friendly connections within which we each abjure recourse to force or manipulation, coercion or deception, and treat one another as subjects with whom we can talk productively, reasoning together about what one of us should say or think, or about what we should say or think in combination (Pettit 2001). Just as collective action requires the capacity for hope, so the mutual acquisition of status within such a relationship is premised on the availability of hope too.

To reason with one another it must be the case that each of us has the capacity to adjudicate the reasons we offer one another and the capacity to adjust and act as any reasons we accept require of us. In order to enjoy the status of a person among others, then – the status of a conversable, reason-capable subject – we must each ascribe the

capacity to track reasons to others, and we must each be able to expect that others will ascribe that capacity to us. But now the question is, what basis can we have for this ascription or expectation?

As in the collective case, I see little possibility that any one of us can rely on the resources of our own evidence and belief for access to this assurance. For we are each aware that we human beings often adjust our beliefs and act in a way that does not exercise the capacity to track relevant reasons. Why should any one of us ascribe that capacity to others even as we see them fail to go with the reasons? Why should we think that though they went wrong in this or that case – though they made an error of calculation or observation, or displayed a certain inconstancy of will – still they could always have done otherwise; they had the capacity all along to go with the reasons, and it was only a contingent limitation or obstacle that caused the failure? And why should we expect that others, finding similar failures in us, will continue to ascribe to us the capacity to go with the reasons – the capacity to do otherwise – and to treat us in the corresponding manner?

I see no possible base for our seeing others as possessed of the relevant capacity other than that which hope would provide. And I see no ground for any one of us to expect to be robustly ascribed that capacity other than that which a belief that others invest a similar hope in us would provide. We each act, as a matter of common awareness, as if the others with whom we routinely deal have the capacity, aspiring to find in them creatures with whom it is possible to reason and make society; and we do this through the thick and thin of failure, always refusing to let the evidence of failure dent our confidence. But this in my terms is just to say that we are each committed as a

matter of common awareness to the hope – sustained up to the very threshold of madness and mania – that others will always prove conversable in that way. We make it a matter of commonly recognized, cognitive resolve that others are capable of reasoning effectively with us, and that they each have the status of a person among persons.

These two contexts are meant to suggest that though we do not often talk of hope in relation to them, still hope as I have presented it in this essay plays a crucial role in each. Since the contexts involve areas of action and interaction that are right at the centre of human concerns, I think that they serve well in support of my final claim. Not only is substantial hope a rational enterprise, as argued in the previous section, it is also an enterprise that has a significant place in our dealings with one another; it comes close to being ubiquitous in human life.

CONCLUSION

We saw in the first section that hope is of little interest if it is equated with a desire for something that one believes may obtain or may not obtain. Drawing on a discussion of precaution in the second section, I argued in the third that in certain central cases such superficial hope becomes a substantial phenomenon, involving the extra feature of acting as if a certain animating assumption held true: acting, if you like, with a certain cognitive resolve.

Is such substantial hope a potentially rational state of mind to nurture and sustain? I tried to show in the fourth section that it is. It enables the subject to escape the grip of beliefs that are so bleak or so unstable that they reduce a subject to a helpless status. It provides the agent with direction and control and makes success in the face of adversity

much more probable that it would otherwise have been. And it does this, moreover, without forcing the subject into any sort of self-deception.

Is such substantial, rational hope of marginal or central significance in human life? I suggested in the final section that it is ubiquitous in our dealings with one another, being present beyond the range of instances where we readily recognize its importance. A little analysis suggests that it is crucial both to the collective action that we undertake for shared ends, and to the practice of interpersonal recognition in which we each attain the status of a person among persons.

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FROM AQUINAS TO ZWELETHEMBA:

A BRIEF HISTORY OF HOPE

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ABSTRACT: In this paper on the nature and functioning of hope, we see, in a brief glimpse of some leading medieval ideas, hope as an element in a structure of intellectual or theological understanding and in the perennially current metaphor of the quest. In considering a small number of speculative novels, we see hope as a necessary dimension of fictional projections that represent utopian visions and the challenges to their implementation.

Keywords: quest, medieval, utopia, virtue

“... unless the past and the future are
made part of the present by memory
and intention, there is, in human
terms, no road, nowhere to go”
Ursula K. Le Guin, *The
Dispossessed*, 153.

“What a hope!” This casually ironic cliché represents the drained dregs of a once-powerful, even noble idea. This slackening of meaning is noticeable in ways that are all around us in everyday speech, particularly when hope is used as a verb: “I hope it isn’t going to rain tomorrow.” “Can war in Iraq be avoided?” “Let’s hope so,” and so on. The noun, on the other hand, tends to retain some lingering resonance of a deeper and more serious principle: “There is some hope (*or* There is no hope) that there will be survivors of the avalanche.”¹

If these contemporary usages are mere echoes, what is the source? What are the structures of faith and/or reason that have at different times and in different places put hope in a prominent position as a guiding concept? Furthermore, what possibilities are there of extracting this concept from the current fogs of wishful thinking, ironic dismissal and political obfuscation that surround it, and giving it some degree of refreshed and stimulating life?

“Hope springs eternal in the human breast” (Pope 1732 I 95), and it may be helpful to regard hope as a constantly re-emerging force in the human psyche, which has from time to time been explicitly recognised and articulated within an intellectual or theological framework or system, while at other times – such as the present – it has drifted to the margins of serious consideration and analysis.

What kind of frameworks might these be, and how may they illuminate the potential of hope as a constructive force in our time? At its broadest, hope is essentially future-oriented, focused towards some desired goal. In what terms, then, has hope been understood as an operative principle in cultures in which there has been broad, explicit and confident consensus on what constitutes an appropriate and admirable object of hope? Furthermore, as we look towards our own collective future, what might be the shared object of our hope?

No period, however defined, is seamless, monolithic or internally uniform, especially not the Middle Ages (still referred to as the Middle Age in French and German). This vast stretch of time, places and cultures – c. 450-1450 – was given its dismissive name in the eighteenth century, suggesting that little of lasting importance or interest took place in the thousand years between the lamented end of the Roman Empire and the much worthier Renaissance and (even more so) Enlightenment.² Twentieth-century scholarship and interpretation has, however, brought about a less self-important and more sober perspective on medieval culture and its continuing presence in our present (Cantor 1991). Despite the many differences and changes subsumed under the label medieval, it may be worth – for the purposes of this discussion of hope – extracting and identifying the leading ideas in this context from this rich period of our shared heritage, and briefly tracing their history and some of their speculative expressions.

MEDIEVAL CHRISTIANITY AND AFTER

One of the characteristic cultural products of the Middle Ages was the compendium or encyclopedia³, summations of all that was considered known or knowable by means of the intellect or reason⁴. Within conceptual parameters which to them seemed “natural” at the time, generations of writers and thinkers pursued, observed or constructed patterns, correspondences and hierarchies in a spirit of almost obsessive rationality, based on the assumption that, beneath or beyond the muddle of human life⁵, this was essentially a world of order.

For example, Isidore of Seville (c. 560-636) produced his *Etymologiae*, which takes as its structuring principle the supposed direct and naturally inherent relationship between words and their objects or referents. This compendium ranges from God and the angels through the liberal arts to clothing, modes of transport, agricultural methods, and food and drink. Written at a time when new social and economic forms were beginning to emerge after the collapse or withering away of the Roman Empire, the *Etymologiae* became – for all of what we may regard as its oddities – a vital pattern and source of information and argument in the succeeding centuries.

Another example of an influential encyclopedic work, some six centuries later in the high Middle Ages, was the *Speculum Maius* (Great Mirror) of Vincent of Beauvais (c.1195-1264), consisting of three voluminous sections: the *Speculum naturale*, which, in Vincent’s words, concerns “all things” – that is, the material world; the *Speculum historiale*, about “all times”; and the *Speculum doctrinale*, “all arts”, all forms of art and learning: poetics, music, logic, politics, medicine, natural

philosophy (what we would call science), culminating in theology, and all of it crammed with detailed examples.

Works of this kind, in addition to being sources of information and enlightenment for the contemporary reader, are in effect expressions of praise and admiration for the marvellous *plenitas* (fullness, abundance) and order of the created world, in which all things are considered to be hierarchically connected: this chain or ladder begins with inanimate objects, such as stones, and ascends via the vegetable kingdom, the animal kingdom, human beings and angels, with God at the top (or, in other visionings of the universe, in the centre of a mandala or set of concentric circles).

Each of these levels or classes is considered to have its own special qualities or attributes: stones, for example, are outstanding for their endurance, plants for their power of growth, animals for their movement. What gives humans a special – and particularly challenging – position in this scheme of things is that they not only partake of the corporeality and senses of the animal kingdom but are endowed with both the power of reason and a soul (angels don't need reason – not being encumbered by “this muddy vesture of decay” (Shakespeare, *The Merchant of Venice*, V I 64),⁶ they apprehend truth directly).

What are the implications of this positioning of human beings on the cosmic map, and how does this relate to hope?

In this context, reason, that special human talent, is to be used to understand the nature of the world, and to use and cultivate the resources of the world in ways that reflect, to a lesser degree, the kingdom of Heaven on earth. Just as the macrocosm

is, as we have seen, formed of a hierarchy of overlapping and interlocking degrees, so both the microcosms of the body politic and the individual human being are formed on hierarchical principles, and each is frequently used as a metaphor for the other: for example, reason, understanding and memory, seated in the head, should control the lesser organs of, say, digestion and sexuality; if they do not, the result may be likened to a rebellion. Conversely, if the labouring classes (whose special role is to provide food for everyone) turn against the monarch (the head of state), this is as unnatural as an individual's desire for money or for sex becoming immoderate and overruling his/her reason. Another frequently used analogy for the unnatural overthrow of reason is of a horse controlling its rider, rather than the other way round.

Everything in the world, therefore – including every faculty of each human being – has its niche, its special place, its unique contribution within the plenitude of creation. Humans, however, not only have reason and understanding beyond that of other creatures, they also have a certain degree of free will (the extent of this freedom was a constant subject of debate throughout the medieval period – as it still is, but using the language of Marx, Freud, Jung, the Buddha and others, rather than of formal theology). And that's where the trouble (and the challenge) starts, and where the nature and function of hope can be – and needs to be – more clearly defined.

Human beings, then, have the power of choice, and their exercise of that power will be much influenced by their having – or not having – hope for a better future. For the medieval Christian, the primary object of hope is God and, through God's grace, personal salvation and eternal beatitude. God's grace, however, is to some extent attracted by the use to which the individual Christian puts his or her gift of reason and free will, and the choices that flow from that.

An Arab trader, who regularly travelled through the desert with goods loaded on his camel, came to his sheikh or spiritual adviser with a problem concerning faith: “When I’m travelling and I stop for the night, should I tie up my camel (thus showing my lack of faith), or should I simply trust in God?” The sheikh answered, “First tie your camel, then trust in God.”

For a medieval person to be regarded as unreasonable is therefore not a trivial matter – it suggests that they are choosing to throw away their specifically human talent and are willing to behave like animals.⁷

Thomas Aquinas’s *Summa Theologiae* is a comprehensive attempt to explicate the divine plan of creation, in so far as it is considered to be graspable by human reason. A modern editor describes the structure of this work as “the architectonic order of scientific theology” (*Summa Theologiae* 1964, xix). Human beings, their nature and their potential, are central to this plan, and Aquinas lays out an extraordinarily full and severely logical analysis of the workings of mind, body and soul.

In his extensive section on hope, Aquinas states succinctly, “Hope is directed to a future good which is hard but not impossible to attain” (*Summa Theologiae* 2a2ae 17, 1).⁸ If, in other words, the goal were easy to attain, hope would not be necessary; if, on the other hand, it were impossible to attain, hope would be pointless and self-deluding. Hope as an operative capacity is therefore at its most effective if it is associated with clear thinking and the realistic assessment of options and possibilities. The consistent linking of hope to human rationality and the power of judgment is therefore clear.

The mullah Nasr ud-Din was living close to the border of a country. He was regarded in the neighbourhood as a bit odd, and so when he approached the border one day leading a long train of heavily loaded donkeys, the customs officer was suspicious, and asked what was in the bags.

“Firewood,” said Nasr ud-Din.

“Uh-huh,” thought the customs officer, and searched each one. He found nothing but firewood, and reluctantly waved Nasr ud-Din through.

A few days later, here he came again with another train of heavily loaded donkeys.

“Potatoes.”

“Oh yeah?”

But it was all potatoes, sure enough.

A couple of weeks later, the customs officer was sitting enjoying some quiet in a coffee-house, when Nasr ud-Din came in. He called him over, bought him a coffee, and said, “Look, just between ourselves and entirely off the record, you’ve got to tell me – you really were smuggling stuff across, weren’t you?”

“Sure,” said Nasr ud-Din, “It was donkeys.”

Consequently also, hope only has active meaning when at least some degree of free will, practical thinking and individual or collective choice is assumed.

Naturally, therefore, hope may be abused: “it is quite possible to hope in a malicious way” (*Summa Theologiae* 2a2ae 17, 1). Aquinas does not deal directly with the way in which the human capacity for hope may be deliberately and cynically

exploited by others for their personal or collective gain (see the fully argued and illustrated paper by Peter Drahos, this volume), but warns that one should not put one's hope in other people, except as "secondary or instrumental sources of help in attaining the means to beatitude" (*Summa Theologiae* 2a2ae 17, 5), which once again requires careful judgment and the exercise of responsibility.

In this scheme of things, hope also has other powerful associations – it is one of the theological virtues, faith, hope and love, and is only fully effective when complemented by its sisters. In medieval (and later) Christian terms, all three of these concepts are – as we have seen in the case of hope – intimately tied to theologically defined notions of salvation and transcendence. It may be useful at this point, however, to attempt to redefine them outside that particular framework while maintaining, if possible, at least some of their potency, both individually and in relation to one another, as follows:

1. *Love* is a heartfelt wish for the well-being of another (or others), not dependent on a desire for personal gain.
2. *Faith* is an intuitive sense of the possibility of certain desired outcomes.
3. *Hope* is a force that "is directed to a future aim that is hard but not impossible to attain"

In conjunction,

1. *Love* without *faith* is fragile and vulnerable; *love* without *hope* is a dead end.
2. *Faith* without *hope* is insufficiently grounded in the experience of daily life; *faith* without *love* is a dangerous abstraction that may lose its way in scorn or hatred of whatever is "other."
3. *Hope* without *faith* has little staying power; *hope* without *love* is short-sighted and ignorant of its true long-term interests.

Aquinas notes that, just as angels do not require reason, they have no need of hope, as they are already in the presence of God. Also, “there is no hope to be found in either the blessed or the damned; it exists only in those who are still en route (*viatoribus*)” (*Summa Theologiae* 2a2ae 18, 3).

The individual Christian was often referred to as a *viator* (traveller) or *peregrinus* (pilgrim) on a life-long journey, constantly confronted by crossroads, bad weather, smooth-tongued fellow-travellers and conmen, and other discouragements, seductions and choices. On this path, there may also be secondary objects of hope, provided that these are directed in turn towards the ultimate divine objective. To use the language of pilgrimage, if you make the cities of Sodom and Gomorrah the objects of your journey, rather than the Heavenly Jerusalem, you may indeed get what you hope for, but at a price.

Let us consider further this image of the journey, and its implications for understanding the nature and workings of hope.⁹

The medieval quest: hope in action

The concept of life as a journey, pilgrimage or quest was deeply ingrained in medieval thought, and was particularly powerfully expressed in the growing body of tales of Arthur and his knights. Briefly, these tales first circulated in Latin in the ninth century, then in Anglo-Norman, were greatly enlarged and given a strong courtly flavour in the French of Chretien de Troyes in the thirteenth century, and were re-arranged, re-imagined and re-told in English prose by Sir Thomas Malory in about 1470 – it is this English version that has been drawn on for most versions of the Arthurian cycle since then (by, for example Alfred Tennyson and John Steinbeck in

written form, and as musical or film (or both) in *Camelot*, *Excalibur* and *Monty Python and the Holy Grail*). This trail is worth pursuing further, I believe, because it is in late medieval representations of the quest (especially by Malory) that we may observe hope not merely as a theological construct but as a force in human action and choices.

The Monty Python version is of particular interest to us in this context, partly because of its great popularity in our time, and partly because it focuses specifically not only on the quest but on the most famous of them all (at least among moderns), the Quest for the Holy Grail. What is it about the quest (or about this particular quest) that laid it open to the very amusing burlesquing to which it was subjected by the Monty Python team? And does their success suggest that we should pay no further attention to the quest (and its relations with hope) as a relevant metaphor and a source of serious understanding of our life and choices today?

I think not, for two reasons. First, the Grail Quest is in my view the least interesting, the least rich in human insight and the most stereotyped of all the stories that Malory included in his collection, and for that reason the most easily parodied. The *History* and the *Quest* of the Holy Grail are thought to have been composed by Cistercian monks at some time in the thirteenth century, using the highly popular model of the quest in order to subvert the very values of chivalric behaviour upon which that genre was based. In *Lancelot and Gawain*, for example, Malory presents characters whose slips and indiscretions only serve to highlight their strengths and achievements, striving as they do to combine “private virtue and public service” (Brewer 1968, 1) as deliberately exemplified by Malory in terms of the ideals of knighthood.

The Grail episodes on the other hand, while composed with great skill, are essentially polemics promoting an explicitly heaven-directed and almost infallible otherworldliness, represented by Galahad, and to a lesser extent by Perceval and Bors, which makes it difficult for ordinarily imperfect readers to see them as realistic role-models. Lancelot's human weakness and impurity, on the other hand, disqualifies him from success in this quest.

The second (mis-)step leading from Malory to Monty Python is via the vigorous but romanticising neo-medievalism of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which produced, for example, Pugin's Houses of Parliament, the paintings of Dante Gabriel Rossetti, the ideal of the English gentleman (see Girouard 1981), and Tennyson's *The Lady of Shalott* and *Idylls of the King*, his version of the Arthurian cycle. While the *Idylls* contain some of Tennyson's most eloquent and moving writing, his representation of the Grail episodes has something of the shiny moral surface of Victorian high culture – Sir Galahad, the only knight who actually achieves the Grail, famously points out that “My strength is as the strength of ten, Because my heart is pure” (Alfred Tennyson, *Sir Galahad*). It is these levels of high-minded oversimplification that lend themselves to burlesque, not the knightly quest as such, which, as I propose to show, functions at its best as a mythic¹⁰ or fabulizing means of coming to terms with our life as a journey, with hope as one of its most important but easily deformed elements.

The Tale of King Arthur is the first of eight inter-connected books in Malory's Arthurian cycle. It recounts, among other matters, the conception and birth of Arthur, the drawing of the sword from the stone, the gift of the sword Excalibur, Arthur's proving of himself as an exemplary knight, his defeat of competing kings in the region, and the appearance of key figures such as Lancelot, Gawain and Tristram.

Merlin, whose special foresight gives him the uncomfortable knowledge that his own time is limited, is a constant presence in this book, arranging by devious means for Arthur's conception, advising and admonishing him, generally acting as a catalyst in attempting to build a culture in which knighthood is not merely a matter of individual physical heroics, but comes to stand for a combination of individual fulfilment and prowess and a commitment to (in idealised feudal terms) social service and social justice.¹¹ He is, in other words, acting in hope (or out of hope), in a manner which integrates a distant vision with the easily under-valued details of immediate choices.

The second section of this book, "Torre and Pellinor", begins with Arthur's betrothal (against Merlin's advice) to Guinevere and the presentation of the Round Table as part of her dowry. At the feast celebrating their wedding and coronation, there occurs what Merlin (who knows something unusual is about to happen) describes as "a strange and marvellous adventure" (Malory 1967 I, 102).¹² First, a white hart and a white brachet (a female hound) run into the hall, pursued by thirty black hounds "with a great cry" (102). The brachet bites a piece out of the haunch of the hart, which leaps aside and knocks a knight off his bench. The knight seizes the brachet, goes to his horse and rides off.

Then there enters a lady on a white horse, crying to the king for help to retrieve her brachet. Just as he is telling her that he cannot help her, a knight "all armed on a great horse" (Malory 1967 I, 103) rides in, seizes the lady and rides out again with her, despite her loud outcries. "So when she was gone the king was glad, for she made such a noise" (103), but Merlin insists that it would dishonour both Arthur and this great feast if he took no action. At Merlin's urging, Arthur calls on three knights to respond: Sir Torre, a newly knighted young man, is to bring back the brachet and the knight, "or else slay him" (103); Sir Gawain, to bring back the white

hart; King Pellinore (not the bumbling but charming knight of T.H. White's delightful twentieth century version) to bring back the lady and the second knight, "or else slay him" (103).

Very briefly, Gawain pursues the hart into a castle and lets loose his two hounds; the knight of this castle emerges and protects the hart by killing the hounds. Gawain, infuriated at the loss of his hounds, fights with the knight, refuses his pleas for mercy and is about to cut off his head when the knight's lady throws herself in between and Gawain accidentally cuts off her head instead. Four armed knights enter and accuse Gawain: "Thou new made knight, thou hast shamed thy knighthood, for a knight without mercy is dishonoured" (Malory 1967, 107). Gawain and his squire (who has also criticised him for his action) are thrown into prison; in the morning an informal court (in the quasi-legal sense) of four fair ladies spares their lives and then, on hearing that they come from the court of King Arthur, decides along with the knights that Gawain should return to the court with the head of the hart, "because it was in his quest" (108). In addition, however, he is obliged to "bear the dead lady with him, on this manner: the head of her was hanged about his neck, and the whole body of her before him on his horse mane" (108).

When he reaches the court, Merlin sees to it (as in all three cases) that Gawain gives to the assembly a full account of his quest, and shows them the evidence – clearly, he has both succeeded (in the most narrow sense of bringing back the hart) and failed in a deeper sense. The assembled court "judged him for ever while he lived to be with all ladies and to fight for their quarrels; and ever that he should be courteous (a key and at times profound chivalric concept), and never to refuse mercy to him that asketh mercy" (Malory 1967 I, 108).

These quests are, it seems, being orchestrated by Merlin in order to provide hard – even shocking – examples, for the edification of the newly created order of knights of the Round Table, of what it means in practice to be a knight engaged on a quest – or, on another level, a human being faced with the varied and unexpected tests of principle of an ordinary life. For example, how consistent with the objects of one's hope (e.g., bringing back the white hart, or promoting a system of fair trade) are one's particular choices from time to time along that road?

And what of Torre and Pellinore? Tore, riding an old courser and bearing hand-me-down armour and weapons, negotiates a number of difficult situations with both courage and insight, and on his return is – at Merlin's suggestion – rewarded by Arthur with an earldom. The quest of King Pellinore is for our purposes probably the most revealing of the three. He rides speedily after the lady abducted by the knight, and shortly comes to a valley where a young woman is sitting by a well with a wounded knight in her arms. She appeals to Pellinore for help, but Pellinore is "so eager in his quest" (Mallory 1967 I, 114) that however much she cries out after him, he speeds on his way. The narrator at this point informs us that the young woman wishes that Pellinore might be in such need before he dies; the knight dies in her arms and she kills herself for sorrow.

Pellinore in the mean time has continued to speed on his way, and with the help of a poor man by the roadside he is guided to where there are two tented pavilions – one of the knights had challenged the second as he came by with the lady, saying she was his cousin, and they are there fighting over her while she is guarded by their squires. Pellinore behaves with knightly propriety, parting the two knights and assessing the rights and wrongs of the situation. Both knights attack him, but despite the treacherous behaviour of the abductor, who stabs Pellinore's horse under him, he

kills the recreant knight and receives the submission of the lady's cousin. He stays overnight in the latter's castle, and they exchange knightly courtesies.

In the morning, after more mutual compliments, he sets off with the lady. Her horse throws and severely bruises her, dislocating her arm, and they decide to rest under a tree for the night. In the darkness they overhear a conversation between two knights – one is coming from Camelot, where he has been greatly impressed by this new fellowship of knights; the other is heading for Camelot with the intention of poisoning King Arthur – an almost throwaway hint of the challenges facing the collective hope of a more just and thoughtful social compact.¹³

They ride on in the morning, and come to the well where the knight and lady had been. They find that all but the lady's head has been eaten by "lions or other wild beasts" (Malory 1967 I, 118), and Pellinore is horrified: "Alas! Her life might I have saved, but I was so fierce in my quest that I would not abide" (118). He is not able to explain to his companion why he is so distressed. He takes the knight's corpse to a nearby hermitage for burial, and comes back to the lady's remains, "with fair yellow hair" (119). "[M]uch his heart cast (that is, was drawn to) her face" (119). He returns to Camelot with one live and successfully retrieved lady and one bodiless blonde head, and tells his story.

Guinevere reproves him for not saving the life of the young fair-headed woman, and he agrees, repeating that "I was so furious in my quest that I would not abide" (Malory 1967 I, 119). Merlin then intervenes, revealing that the young woman was Pellinore's own daughter; she was to marry the young knight, but on their way to Arthur's court he was treacherously speared from behind by a cowardly knight. Pellinore, comments Merlin, will ultimately be abandoned to his death by the person

he trusts most. It could perhaps be said that he had faith and hope, but was lacking in love.

The reports being concluded, the assembled knights agree on a set of principles that will guide them and all other knights of the Round Table in their actions: to flee treason; to give mercy when asked; to honour and support women; to undertake no battle in a wrongful cause, either out of love or for material gain – individual actions are seen as inseparable from the collective hope for a prosperous and peaceful future.

Merlin has therefore successfully stage-managed this special occasion in order to demonstrate the convergence of the individual quests into a shared set of values, standards and objectives. The vision of the Order of the Round Table is taking shape by means of an open process of action and reflection, in which taking responsibility (by implication, looking to the future) is very clearly distinguished from blaming (getting stuck in the past, however dreadful).

What are we to make of these succinct and powerful tales, and others like them? In relation to our present concern, I suggest, the quest may be seen as a representation of hope in action, a narrative embodiment of the theological and moral abstractions of the churchmen, encyclopedists and other commentators. The ostensible aim of the quest (that is, the object of hope) may be agreed, but – as each of the quests has demonstrated – every step of that journey is as important as any other step. Means and ends cannot usefully be separated.

Also, the individual wayfarer may, like King Pellinore, be single-mindedly confident as to the appropriateness of his choices along the road, but in truth his autonomy is an illusion, and his welfare and the full success of his enterprise is intimately bound up with the interests of others. This re-articulation of the ideals of

knighthood that is undertaken in the late fifteenth century by Sir Thomas Malory and – even more explicitly – by Sir Gilbert Hay in Scotland, strongly emphasises the interdependence of the individual and the collective in terms of rights, responsibilities and appropriate objects of hope.¹⁴ The terms of the discussion may at times seem strange to us, but the search for understanding and coherence is familiar.

“WHAT IF ...?”: THINKING IN HOPE

In Malory’s Arthurian cycle, this discussion is only occasionally explicit, and is generally embodied in the action of the narrative. In this postmedieval period of exceptional change and anxiety there was also, however, a great deal of more explicit commentary and speculation on the relations between the individual and the collective and their implications for the “common profit”. Among the most widely read and influential of these works was Sir Thomas More’s *Utopia*, published in Latin in 1516, very quickly translated into English and other vernacular languages and still a powerful influence in imagining alternative futures, or objects of shared hope.

Utopia is a prose narrative in two sections. The title is a coinage from Greek, meaning no place, with an underlying pun on *Eutopia* (good place), suggesting the great difficulty of moving from the unsatisfactory present to a better future. However, the very fact of writing and circulating this provocative document may be seen as an act of hope, a living out of Aquinas’ definition (“Hope is directed to a future good which is hard but not impossible to attain”). More was a devoted churchman, a scholar and a diplomat, who later became Henry VIII’s trusted Chancellor (and who was even later executed for refusing to, in effect, transfer his religious allegiance from the Pope to Henry after the king’s English Reformation). He was a close friend of

Erasmus, the great humanist scholar, and was an active participant in an informal international network of thinkers and doers in public life.

The first book of *Utopia* begins in Antwerp, where More pictures himself (as was frequently the case in reality) on a diplomatic mission, and where he is introduced to one Raphael Hythloday, who had supposedly been on the transatlantic expedition of Amerigo Vespucci in 1504. He and a few companions had decided to go on exploring further west, and had come upon several kingdoms and other states, including Utopia. He describes some of the key features of this place, and he and More begin a friendly and informal debate on their merits and demerits.

They agree to continue the discussion on another occasion, and the scene shifts to the dinner-table of Cardinal Morton in London, where More and Hythloday are among the guests, including also a lawyer and a friar. The conversation deals with the contemporary state of England: especially the movement of rural people to the city, as the remnants of feudal interdependence decay and as struggling landed families dismiss their servants, all leading to an increase in unemployment and crime. The lawyer takes a hard line on punishment as both desirable retribution and as deterrent, while the friar and More attempt to define the underlying causes of the increase in crime and public disorder, and thus arrive at possible remedies. After some diplomatic interventions from Hythloday, they invite him to tell the whole story of his journey to Utopia. That account forms the main part of the second section.

The dinner-table conversation imagined by More has therefore established that the social and economic situation in England at the time called for serious and innovative thought about alternatives that would be both just and effective. This then leads naturally on to the question posed in all serious speculative fiction: “What if...?” In this case, More, through the imaginary voyage of Hythloday, puts the radical

question, “What if there were no such thing as private property?”, and explores some of what the implications of this difference might be in practice.

To stimulate debate (and probably to cover himself against any charges of sedition in a highly sensitive political environment) More invents an extreme case, in which no distinctions are permitted in housing, clothing or any material objects, however personal, in which all towns are designed according to the same ground-plan, and in which gold is regarded with such contempt that it is used for chaining and thereby humiliating stubborn prisoners¹⁵ (of whom there are few). The details that More provides on Utopian family life, economic relations, justice, etc, all flow from the original ‘What if ...?’ premise, presenting a comprehensive picture of a starkly different society that demanded a response from the reader.

More’s *Utopia* quickly became very popular. It circulated widely in both its original Latin form and in English and other translations, to the extent that it gave its name to a whole genre of speculative thinking and experimentation.¹⁶ More was not the first to use narrative fiction to explore the forms and implications of different visions of human coexistence, but his example has inspired many successors to put into the public domain, through the medium of speculative fiction, more or less fully articulated expressions of the object of their individual and/or collective hope, sometimes combined with suggestions – more or less convincing – on how to get there from here.

So, for example, there have been versions that express the values of either proto-socialism and communitarianism (William Morris, Edward Bellamy) or elitist vanguardism (Ayn Rand, Robert Heinlein). Some others have used this speculative space to promote warnings, rather than encouragement, on the possible effects of grand utopian visions: Aldous Huxley’s *Brave New World* (1932), on the dead-end of

upbeat scientism, and George Orwell's *Animal Farm* (1945) and *1984* (1949), on the slide into tyranny when revolutionary socialism loses touch with its foundational values.

In taking forward this discussion of the nature, possibilities and difficulties of hope, I propose however to look briefly at one work of speculative fiction by each of two contemporary and still productive fabulists, Ursula K. Le Guin and Kim Stanley Robinson. In relation to our investigations in this volume of papers, what is especially striking about their speculative narratives (thought-experiments to use Le Guin's description in introducing *The Left Hand of Darkness* (1969)) is the degree to which they combine a broad and identifiable values-based vision with highly inventive imaginative detail and a sober sense of practicability and human fallibility – surely crucial elements in the effective practice of hope. These thought-provoking narratives are not the road itself, but – in the ways in which they construct and then problematize the possibilities of utopian change – they are helpful signposts.

Le Guin's *The Dispossessed* (1974) is a meticulously imagined and constructed fable of contrasting personal and collective possibilities and the obstacles on the route to their realisation. Le Guin has, it seems (and she – like Robinson – is thoroughly acquainted with the history of her chosen genre) deliberately taken on Sir Thomas More's basic premise – that is, the abolition of private property – and re-situated it in circumstances that test its viability far more convincingly than in the original *Utopia*. More, for the purposes of his fable, assumed that the inhabitants of Utopia were almost unfailingly rational beings who were happy to accept the necessary constraints on individual expression and choices for the sake of the collective good. Le Guin, on the other hand, deliberately situates her narrative at a point of crisis in the life of an anarcho-syndicalist, anti-propertarian social experiment

that had been running for several generations and is showing signs of strain and reaction.

Where More doesn't explicitly problematize the utopian vision at all, and where Malory sadly shows us, with minimal commentary, the collapse of a great and still inspiring dream, Le Guin in this novel sets herself the challenge of understanding more fully what makes a hope-based project powerful and attractive and what makes it at the same time vulnerable and potentially fragile.

The action is set in the constellation of Tau Ceti in the distant future. Urras is a planet very much like our earth, with a familiar range of competing ideologies; Anarres is its moon, but with a thin but viable atmosphere and a limited but adequate range of indigenous plants and supply of water. The Odonian revolutionaries (named after Odo, the woman who had most clearly exemplified and articulated a set of radically democratic values) had been exiled to Anarres 170 years before the beginning of the action, and the narrative – in two intertwined streams – centres on episodes in the life and growing awareness of Shevek, an Anarresti physicist and committed Odonian. In the development of his theoretical model ("the unification of Sequency and Simultaneity in a general field theory of time" (*The Dispossessed*, 73), he finds himself coming up against walls of jealousy, fear of change, and intellectual propertarianism, and he comes reluctantly to recognise that "the will to dominance is as central to human beings as the impulse to mutual aid is, and has to be trained in each individual, in each new generation" (140), and "it's always easiest to let yourself be governed" (140).

In order to escape from this self-imposed stagnation, he breaks the 170-year-old taboo on personal contact with Urras, the original home planet, and travels there alone, regarded by many on Anarres as a traitor. On Urras he discovers a (to him)

bewildering combination of wealth and poverty, creativity and cruelty – “They knew no relationship but possession. They were possessed” (64). When he realises that what the authorities on Urras want from him is the exclusive possession of his theory (with its implications for the instantaneous transmission of information across space and time), he goes underground and then, with the assistance of Keng, the Ambassador of Terra (that is, our earth), he returns to Anarres to carry on the unending revolution.

In their last conversation, the Ambassador notes that, “My world, my Earth, is a ruin. A planet despoiled by the human species” (*The Dispossessed* 286), and says sadly that “We forfeited our chance of Anarres centuries ago, before it ever came into being” (287). Shevek has by this time, however, moved (or been moved) from naïve idealism through shock and disappointment to a calm acceptance of his ongoing responsibility, and when Keng says with melancholy admiration, “I thought I knew what ‘realism’ was,” Shevek replies, “How can you, if you don’t know what hope is?” (289).

The Dispossessed is therefore both a statement *of* hope (in writing and publishing it at all) and a statement *about* hope – in exploring the vicissitudes of a serious and intelligently articulated utopian vision in the face of conflicting human desires, economic hardship and ideological hostility. Vision and practice are two hands washing each other, and there is no finality.

Kim Stanley Robinson’s *Pacific Edge* (1990) takes this challenge even closer to home, both in time and place. The novel is set in Orange County, California, in 2065, and the action takes place in and around El Modena, a conscious community in which population growth is limited to what the natural resources (including particularly water) can support, various forms of communal living are commonplace,

the dominant form of transport is the bicycle, and the present suburbanization of Orange County has been deliberately rolled back.¹⁷

As in *The Dispossessed*, the core of this novel is the political and emotional growing-up of an active and idealistic young man – in this case Kevin, a builder and adapter of ecologically and aesthetically satisfying houses. He has just been elected to the town council, and his favourite withdrawing place, the one remaining undeveloped hill-top on the edge of the town, is the object of a re-zoning proposal, at first somewhat disguised in an application for a variation in water supply. Robinson has an exceptional gift for integrating key ideas and concepts, down-to-earth dialogue, a convincing interplay of characters and a striking sense of place into one satisfying narrative.

The central train of events is shadowed by occasional flashbacks to the notebooks of Kevin's grandfather, Tom Barnard, who in 2012 was struggling to write an utopian novel, but who had by the time of the main action of this novel withdrawn into disappointed solitude. Writing in Switzerland, he notes that "there is no such thing as a pocket utopia" (*Pacific Edge*, 51), which is what Kevin (and the reader) come to recognise in the case of El Modena. His frustration with fictional utopias is that "they don't have to deal with our history" (81), but can artificially make a fresh start on, for example, another planet, and he recognises that they need to "invent the history leading out of this world (please) into the world of this book" (126). Utopia, he writes, "is when our lives matter" (155); he resolves (within Robinson's own fiction, of course!), that he will "not just write a utopia, but fight for it in the real world" (251), and he comes out of his solitude to add his experience and insight to "the process of making a better world ... Struggle forever" (82) in the messy arena of daily life.

Both these novels take as vital the relationship between the individual and the community or collectivity, and both attempt to demonstrate the desirability and the possibility of a convergence of interests between the two: while there are constantly tensions in this relationship, both works are exploring and testing, through a fictional experiment, how this convergence might be expressed in practice through sufficient agreement on an appropriate object of hope.

Novels must come to an end, but in neither *The Dispossessed* nor *Pacific Edge* is there truly a closure. A novel, however powerful the ideas that it embodies, is not a tract or treatise but an imaginative projection, and the reader is left with the suggestion made in another of Le Guin's thought-experiments (*Always Coming Home*, 1985): "Let the heart complete the pattern" (53).

In this essay on the nature and functioning of hope, we have seen, in a brief glimpse of some leading medieval ideas, hope as an element in a structure of intellectual or theological understanding and in the perennially current metaphor of the quest. In considering a small number of speculative novels, we have seen hope as a necessary dimension of fictional projections that represent utopian visions and the challenges to their implementation.

HOPE IN ACTION

The next and logical step is hope embodied in more than fictional form, hope in practice¹⁸, and we shall conclude by briefly considering one contemporary example of this stage of the living-out of hope. The point of including it is not so much in the details of the model that has been built, but in the process of building it, which may be suggestive beyond its local circumstances.

Contemporary South Africa, despite the inevitable deflation from the euphoria of the early 1990's, still presents fertile ground for innovative experiments in social, political and economic relations: there is – at least in theory – an ideological and political commitment by the government to the refreshment of democratic practices; there is a severe need for just such a refreshment, especially in the communities most marginalized and deprived by generations of apartheid, a need which no government agency has the capacity to deliver on its own; and there is in these communities an eagerness to participate actively in the new dispensation.

In late 1997 the Community Peace Programme (CPP) initiated a pilot project in a poor black community, Zwelethemba¹⁹, some 90 kilometres from Cape Town. This experiment was to test a hypothesis: that people living in a community of this kind (many of them unemployed and poorly educated in formal terms) have the knowledge and the capacity for the building and self-direction of their community, with minimal intervention by professionals or outside experts. Matters of security being so fundamental to the peaceful functioning of a community, these were the issues around which this knowledge and capacity was to be drawn out, mobilised and made visible and effective. The aim was also to build a model that was not merely a once-off, but that would be robust and well-grounded enough to be widely replicated without substantial modification.

By early 1988 some thirty Zwelethemba residents had come forward to take part in this model-building project. Having agreed on the broad vision of building peace in a self-directed community, the next step was to identify the values that would form the foundation of whatever processes or structures were to come. Respect, in many possible manifestations, was the top priority; leadership, for example, was re-

visioned as the capacity to facilitate, to be a catalyst in the growth of others, by example and, where appropriate, by coaching.

By trial and error, with frequent reviews of practice, there crystallised out a Code of Good Practice (a simply expressed touchstone of values and priorities), and step-by-step procedures for conflict management (peacemaking). Other dimensions have been added and tested as the needs became apparent: a system of outcomes-based payments, supported increasingly by funding from local governments; internal and external reporting procedures; instruments for surveys and monitoring; procedures for the day-to-day and month-to-month coordination (through a deliberately small and proportionately shrinking core of professional staff) of a growing network of Peace Committees, as these structures have come to be called.

Each step in the building of this integrated model is tested against the question: “Does it or does it not support and promote constructive self-direction?” For example, at an early stage in the pilot project, the group agreed on a conventional constitution with a Chair, Deputy Chair, Secretary, etc, and then discovered that the office-bearers never attended actual peace-gatherings, but preferred to hobnob with town councillors and chat importantly about what everyone else was doing. On reflection, therefore, the group simply abandoned that particular form of structuring and concentrated on inventing and testing forms and procedures that expressed and reinforced, rather than unintentionally undermining, the guiding values and objectives of the project.

What has emerged in practice is a practicable and sustainable way of balancing altruism (service to the community, through facilitating a process of conflict management) and self-interest (financial reward, based on active engagement in the processes).

It seems therefore possible to move towards the realisation of a shared vision by mobilising people's energies, knowledge and commitment around common problems (that is, common in the senses of being both shared and frequent) – the process of engagement itself makes these commonalities visible and initiates a regular series of action/reflection feedback loops.

While the various partners engaged in this project certainly believe in the more-than-local validity of the details or content of this model, they are not the point here. Rather, they would suggest that the very idea of imagining, building, testing and monitoring a coherent model of governance – in whatever area of social, political, cultural or economic life one chooses to be engaged in – is of fundamental importance in considering possible forms and processes for the realisation of hope.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

Herbert Marcuse noted that “one of the worst signs of our danger is we can't imagine the route from here to utopia” (cited in *Pacific Edge*, 127). Hope is about thought in action, but it cannot function alone. This essay has attempted to demonstrate that, in addition to its traditional sisters of faith and love, hope's companions are reason, imagination, action, reflection and perseverance. The journey – or, even more specifically, the quest – may stand as an image of unfolding possibility, of the constantly evolving practices that derive from the application of these human talents. There is nothing more realistic than hope, provided that it has these companions on the road.

¹ This distinction may arise from the fact that the verb is always connected to a person – “I/They hope ...” – suggesting wishful thinking rather than serious expectation, while the noun implies a broader, generalizable and possibly more stable vision.

² The transitional or inbetween periods may be called postclassical and postmedieval respectively, just as we today are in the postmodern and wondering what new kind of consensus, if any, is going to emerge. For further discussion of the concept and term, postmedieval, see John Cartwright (1996).

³ Literally, a circle of that which can be learned and taught.

⁴ Ways of knowing the divine, on the other hand, were celebrated through analogy and metaphor by such writer-mystics as Richard Rolle and Dame Julian of Norwich in England, Jacob van Maerlant in the Netherlands and Meister Eckhart in Germany.

⁵ In medieval Christianity seen as the realm of mutability, presided over by the fickle goddess Fortune; in the East, the realm of *Maya* or illusion.

⁶ That is, our body and physical senses.

⁷ Cf. Boethius, *The Consolation of Philosophy*, 1962: “Human souls ... are more free while they are engaged in contemplation of the divine mind, and less free when they are joined to bodies, and still less free when they are bound by earthly fetters. They are in utter slavery when they lose possession of their reason and give themselves wholly to vice” (104). See also note 4 and text.

⁸ “...objectum spei est bonum futurum arduum possibile haberi.”

⁹ The great folksinger, composer and community activist Ewan MacColl used to sing (with tongue in cheek):

This life is a journey we all hae to gang,
And mony’s the burden we carry along –
Though sorrow be your burden, and poverty your lot,
We’ll be happy all thegither wi’ a wee drappie o’t.

However, his songs and his actions showed that enjoying a “wee drappie o’t” was merely a refreshment stop on a journey requiring thought, planning and determination.

¹⁰ By myth I understand a narrative that is not literally true but which exemplifies or embodies some important truth or truths about human existence. Our dominant anti-imaginative and anti-intellectual culture tends at present, however, to equate myth with untruth.

¹¹ For another contemporary example of a traditional heroic figure being used for a comprehensive statement on the relationship between the privileged individual or ruler and the needs of the broader society, see Sir Gilbert Hay, *The Buik of King Alexander the Conquerour* (c. 1456), especially John Cartwright ed, 1986, Vol. II, lines 2055-2084.

¹² Spelling modernised by the present writer.

¹³ In the end, the tragic collapse of the Arthurian dream is not so much due to the adultery of Lancelot and Guinevere, although that is clearly the proximate cause, as to the selfish bickerings, petty vengefulness and short-sighted ambitions of some of the other knights in the court. The institutional practices and code of behaviour developed under the guidance of Merlin were in the end not enough to contain, defuse and re-direct the selfish passions of the individuals involved. The vision remains, however – a balance of pragmatism and idealism in which faith, hope and love operate for the common good. We get a bit embarrassed talking about love in the public or civic context – perhaps we can begin with respect, which is a prerequisite for love.

¹⁴ As the Xhosa/Zulu saying puts it, “Umntu ngumuntu ngabantu” (A person is a person through other people).

¹⁵ This is probably also an example of More’s quietly satirical undertone, referring here to the excessive show and hierarchical rituals of life in the royal court, the centre of power.

¹⁶ Although misunderstanding or ignorance of the book itself has led to the common interpretation of utopian as admirably idealistic but obviously impractical, More’s purpose was clearly to stimulate innovative and constructive thought and debate, not to provide a blueprint for a particular desired model.

¹⁷ Oscar Baldarrama, the newly appointed town attorney who has just moved to El Modena from Chicago, writes ironically to a friend: “It really exists! Arcadia! Bucolica! Marx’s ‘idiocy of rural life!’” (XXX). However, his experience and scepticism is important to his new fellow-citizens in understanding the political intricacies of the situation.

¹⁸ Although, as we have already suggested, the writing of fictions such as those of Le Guin and Robinson may in itself be regarded as an example of hope in practice. The pen can be as mighty as the spade.

¹⁹ This Xhosa name happens to mean place of hope.

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